Defining Determinism and Such

Given some recent chatter here, I offer my attempt to define some theses and the relationships between them.  I ask some questions along the way, and I’m certainly not claiming they are as precise and complete as they need to be!  Maybe they are just imprecise and incomplete enough to generate some more interesting chatter!

 

Determinism (D) = 1. A complete description of the system at one time, and of all the laws that govern that system, logically entails a complete description of that system at any future time.  (This version is just past-to-future, though some define D to include present-to-past too.  “The system” for all these theses is meant to pick out the scope over which the thesis applies, but notice that a system can only be deterministic as defined here if it is entirely “closed off” from any indeterministic system, which is why indeterminism in the micro-system surely falsifies D in the macro-system, unless the laws of the micro-system include some weird aggregation laws to ensure that the indeterminism never “percolates up.”) 

Because the other theses below will be framed in terms of events and laws, here’s such a definition of D (I’d be curious to know if people think it is accurate and equivalent to the above):

2. For every event E in the system, there is a set of prior events which, as governed by the laws of that system, is logically sufficient for E.

(I wonder whether “logically sufficient” is the best modality to use here?)

(I wonder what the phrase about laws is doing here and how the thesis might work if that phrase was excised.  I also wonder whether there is a good way to define “deterministic laws”; perhaps “D laws = all events governed by such laws are such that for every event E, there is a set of prior events which are logically sufficient for E”?)

(Brian Park’s definition of “determinism” suggests something like this, I think:  “An event E in the system is ‘deterministic’ if there is a set of prior events which, as governed by the laws of that system, is logically sufficient for E.”)

 

Indeterminism (~D) = 1. A complete description of a system at one time, and of all the laws that govern that system, does not logically entail a complete description of that system at any future time. 

OR:  2. For some events Ei in the system, there is no set of prior events which, governed by the laws of that system, is logically sufficient for Ei (even if for some or even most events in the system, there are sets of prior events logically sufficient for them).

 

Causalism (C) = For every event E in the system, there are prior events which, governed by the laws of that system, cause E.

C is clear consistent with D or ~D, though people, especially scientists discussing free will, sometimes use D when they really mean C (or perhaps L below).

 

Law-governed (L) = For every event E (or process Q) in the system, that event (or process) is governed by a law of that system.

L is pretty vague and clearly consistent with D or ~D, though D as written above entails L.  On some combinations of views of laws and causation, (C & ~L) is possible and (~C & L) is possible (right?). 

 

Predictability (P) = For every event E in the system, some other system could in principle predict E, given complete information about some relevant set of prior events and the laws that govern that system. (This is the Laplacean view of determinism.  I think it helps to make the predicting system outside of the predicted system to avoid some possible paradoxes.)

I take it that P is not necessarily entailed by D, though many people make that move.  For instance, if I understand the Bohmian interpretation of quantum physics, it says that the system is deterministic but in principle not (fully) predictable.  And I think some people interpret non-linear dynamics to suggest it can make a D system ~P in principle.

D certainly does not entail P by a cognitive agent within the system, much less P in practice by any finite cognitive agent inside or outside the system.

I take it that ~D does entail ~P (at least putting God aside), even though indeterministic systems and laws might allow for levels of predictive accuracy in practice that are rarely achieved in practice in deterministic systems (see quantum theory).

I take it that P likely entails L but that L does not entail P.  I don’t think P entails C and C does not entail P.

 

Mechanism (M) = 1. For every event E (or process Q) in the system which is at any “level” above the lowest level, there is a set of lower-level events (processes) which, governed by the laws of that system, are logically sufficient for E (or Q).

Or, more specifically: 2. For every mental event M (or psychological process Q) in the psychological system, there is a set of lower-level, physical (say, neurobiological) events (or processes) N which, governed by the laws of that system, are logically sufficient for E (or Q). 

(M2 looks like a strong form of supervenience.)

We could also put M in terms of explanation and say:  3. For every mental event M (process Q), there is a set of lower-level events (processes) which, governed by the laws of that system, fully explain E (or Q).

I think it is very important to recognize that:

D does not entail M and M does not entail D. 

For instance, M without D could clearly occur in a mechanistic system with indeterminism that seeps up from lower levels to higher levels, as seems to occur with quantum indeterminism.  (I can’t easily imagine how a mechanistic system could be indeterministic at higher levels if deterministic at lower levels or vice versa, can you?)

And D without M could occur in a deterministic system that has higher-levels whose activity is not logically entailed by (or for M3 fully explained by) lower levels.  For instance, dualistic parallelism with D relations among the mental events and among the physical events but no interaction between mental and physical.  Or psychological processes that do not supervene on the neurobiological processes, but both levels are deterministic systems and they interact with each other deterministically (is overdetermination the only way to make sense of this?  Markossian’s interesting account of compatibilist agent causation may be relevant here.)

Finally, M seems to entail C and L, though neither C nor L entails M.

M does not entail P nor does P entail M (though in practice M seems to be a good way to get increasingly close to P). 

 

Since I’ve already gone on way too long (and probably said too many false things), I’ll stop here without sticking my neck out about what I think about the relationships between each of these theses and FW/MR.  But I’d love to hear what y’all think!

Comments

[Bob Doyle]

Hi Eddy,

I very much like the idea of sorting out different determinisms and their interrelationships.

I have tried to do this on one of my information philosopher pages.
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/determinisms/

I detect a strong logical component in all your definitions. For me Logical Determinism (LD) is only one of a dozen or so determinisms that have been philosophically important. You mention a few. I will add several more below.

(LD) Logical Determinism reasons that a statement about a future event happening is either true or it is not. If the statement is true, logical certainty necessitates the event (e.g. Aristotle's Sea Battle). If the statement is not true, the event can not possibly happen. For logic. the truth is outside of time, like the foreknowledge of God.

In general, logic tells us nothing about the physical universe., logic being merely a reasoning tool (deduction, induction, hypothetical-deduction etc.)

(ND) Necessitarianism is a variation of logical and causal determinism that claims everything is simply logically necessary. The world has no contingency. Leucippus first held this view.

(MD) Mechanical Determinism explains man as a machine. If Newton's Laws of Classical Mechanics govern the workings of the planets, stars, and galaxies, surely they govern man the same way. This relates clearly to your (L) law-governed, with the laws being Newton's Laws of Motion. Note that the quantum mechanical laws of motion are also deterministic (the Schrödinger equation) but they become indeterministic for measurements and the creation of new information. Classical mechanics is "information preserving." Quantum mechanics allows information creation.

Please see http://www.informationphilosopher.com/introduction/information/

(CD) Your causalism. Causal Determinism finds that every event has an antecedent cause in the infinite causal chain going back to Aristotle's Prime Mover. There is nothing uncaused or self-caused (causa sui). Galen Strawson holds this view.

(PD) Physical determinism. Your (L) Law-governed? Physical Determinism extends the laws of physics to every atom in the human mind and assumes the mind will someday be perfectly predictable once enough neuroscientific measurements are made.

(AD) My "adequate determinism" accepts all the known laws but recognizes that they are all merely probabilistic. For large objects the probabilities approach certainty. Our mind/brains are macroscopic and large enough to overcome indeterminism - when they need to. Thus we have as much control over our actions as any compatibilist/determinist could desire.

However, a modest indeterminism allows us to generate "free" random alternative possibilities for consideration by our adequately determined "will."

Here are some other important determinisms that may be a part of any given philosophers belief set.

(BD) Behavioral Determinism assumes that our actions are reflex reactions developed in us by environmental conditioning. This is the Nurture side of the famous Nature/Nurture debate - note that both are determinisms. This view was developed to an extreme by B. F. Skinner.

(BD) Biological Determinism finds causes for our actions in our genetic makeup. This is the Nature side of the Nature/Nurture debate - both sides are determinisms.

(FD) Fatalism is the simple idea that everything is fated to happen, so that humans have no control over their future. Notice that fate has arbitrary power and need not follow any causal or otherwise deterministic laws. It can include the miracles of omnipotent gods.

(HD) Historical Determinism is the dialectical idealism of Hegel or the dialectical materialism of Marx that are assumed to govern the course of history.

(LaD) Language Determinism claims that our language determines (at least limits) the things we can think and say and thus know. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis claims that speech patterns in a language community are highly predictable.

(PD) Psychological Determinism finds events in our childhood that are controlling our actions and mental states today.

(RD) Religious Determinism is the consequence of the presumed omniscience of God. God has foreknowledge of all events. All times are equally present to the eye of God (Aquinas' totem simul). Note the multiple logical inconsistencies in the idea of an omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent God. If God knows the future, he obviously lacks the power to change it. And benevolence leads to the problem of evil.

(STD) Spatio-temporal Determinism is the view of special relativity. The "block universe" of Hermann Minkowski and Albert Einstein assumes that time is simply a fourth dimension that already exixts, just like the spatial dimensions. The one possible future is already out there up ahead of where we are now, just like the city blocks to our left and right. J. J. C. Smart is a philosopher who holds this view. He calls himself "somewhat of a fatalist."

For some of these determinisms (behavioral, biological, historical-economic, language, psychological, and religious) there is significant evidence that they do limit human freedom. Most of the cases in Wegner's book, The Illusion of Conscious Will, provide such evidence. But others are merely dogmas of determinism, believed for the simple reason that they eliminate random chance in the universe.

Chance is anathema to many philosophers.

As I see it the real problem for compatibilists is compatiblism with indeterminism, not the determinisms, which may be illusions?

Please see http://www.informationphilosopher.com/articles/illusion_of_determinism/

In the 18th- and 19th-century, philosophers searched for the unknown law behind the "calculus of probabilities" in order to dispel chance. Today the search is for the "hidden variables" behind quantum mechanical probability.

My view is the same as William James in 1884 - admit there is some chance in the world and see if we can have a "free" and then "will" two-stage model for our thought processes.

Please see:
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/james/

[Alan]

For what it's worth Eddy, I've always had reservations about a definition of determinism that didn't include some reference to a specific system of events/entities intended to be covered by the concept. While Barry (if I may be so familiar) is correct in his earlier post on another thread that quantum indeterminism definitely has macroscopic consequences in some general sense (Schrodinger's Cat, radiation-caused mutations, etc.), it still seems plausible and pertinent to find a definition of determinism with respect to a system of events/entities (such as good old-fashioned billiard-ball collisions, which appear to be insignificantly influenced by quantum indeterminism) that appear to be instances of that concept. With such a definition in hand, we can then attempt to see if that concept then applies to human psychology, given the current state of scientific knowledge about the events/entities/systems of the human mind. If (e.g.) quantum events turn out to be an important element in human decision-making at the behavioral level, then indeterminism has a place in at least some FW discussion due to that fact; if not, then it may well be that the determinism of mind is the way to go from there. And of course, this would all be independent of at least some prominent compatibilist positions, which are usually motivated by other, mostly non-metaphysical, considerations.

[Kevin Timpe]

One quick worry about your second defintion of determinism, (2). It seems to require that any deterministic system has an infinite past, since there can be no first event in a deterministic system on such a definition. That's probably an untoward consequence of such a definition. Furthermore, since I don't think the first definition of determinism you give has this consequence, it suggests that the two are not equivalent.

[Brian Parks]

Eddy,

Good summary.

You present: "(D) A complete description of the system at one time, and of all the laws that govern that system, logically entails a complete description of that system at any future time."

Two gripes:

First, (D) goes much farther than it needs to for the purposes of our debate. We are not considered with the universe as a whole, we are concerned with an infinitesimally small partition of the universe--human choice. We need to define "determinism" so as to keep our focus there.

Second, (D)'s requirement that *any* prior state of the system entail *every* subsequent state of the system is far too demanding. From the chooser's perspective, a choice that is constrained by *every* prior state of the universe is no more constrained than a choice that is constrained by a single prior state. The difference is overkill.

That's why I think we should go with (D*): For any human choice C that is made at (t), there is some time (t - dt) at which the state of the chooser's brain entails the occurrence of C, let dt be any positive number.

(D*) is just as hostile to free will as (D), but it is much more likely to be true. If we assume that human choices are manifest as macrophysical neural processes in the brain, then the traditional interpretation of QM does not pose any problems for (D*).

[Eddy Nahmias]

Hi Brian,
I understand what you are saying, but I ask again how an argument for the incompatibility of your D* and FW would go. And I suggest it would not look like the Consequence argument, since that argument *does* require a "wider" determinism. And I suggest it may look more like an argument for the incompatibility of FW and mechanism (M) than an argument for incompatibilism per se. Your D* (with its mention of the brain) starts to look more like my M2 than my attempt in the initial post to define a narrower "determinism" as you seemed to be suggesting.

Let me be clear that I agree with you that a thesis like D* (or M2 or M3) is *intuitively* more threatening to free will than D (see my co-authoured paper on FW, MR, and Mechanism), and it is more like what scientists seem to have in mind when they say they are "discovering free will is an illusion." But I think this fact about our intuitions provides an error theory for incompatibilist intuitions rather than support for incompatibilism as defined in the philosophical debates.

I also think we can explain away (or revise) people's intuition that D* (or M) threatens free will if we help people see that "the chooser's brain" IS the conscious, deliberating, rational self that they want to be in charge of their actions rather than thinking that "if my brain does it, I don't." Put simply, my hypothesis is: for people who come to accept that a naturalistic explanation of the (conscious) mind does not eliminate the (conscious) mind, the free will problem should (and will) dissipate.

[Tom Clark]

Eddy, you say

"I also think we can explain away (or revise) people's intuition that D* (or M) threatens free will if we help people see that "the chooser's brain" IS the conscious, deliberating, rational self that they want to be in charge of their actions rather than thinking that 'if my brain does it, I don't.'

This is exactly what people don't want to believe: the naturalistic non-dualist claim that the self is nothing more than the brain doing its thing. My hunch (research needed) is that many folks equate free will with the power of the immaterial self to command the brain/body according to its immaterial, causa sui will. They want and assume they have this radical sort of freedom. This is why so many of them, hearing about naturalistic monist compatibilism of say Dennett's variety, object that this isn't real free will, only a "cheap substitute" as Dennett called it in in his 2007 Edinburgh talk, reviewed at www.naturalism.org/revolution.htm . Dennett said we should be content with the cheap substitute, but it's a hard sell for the millions of dualists out there.

For those that come to accept the naturalistic hypothesis, it's an open question how many of them will believe that the cheap substitute can justify the full range of highly punitive desert-based responsibility practices now in vogue.

[Eddy Nahmias]

OK, let's ignore the second stage of my story for now (I'm trying to do studies to see how wedded the folk are to a dualistic conception of free will, and I certainly can't rehearse the argument that naturalistic free will need not be a "cheap substitute", and I agree that it won't support the *full* range of punitive responsibility practices, though I don't think that means such free will is not sufficient for people to be (genuinely) responsible and deserve credit and blame if perhaps less, and less often, than we tend to think).

But let's be clear about the first stage of my story. Determinism does not entail a mechanistic naturalism or even the falsity of dualism (see discussion of D vs. M above). So, if we define "incompatibilism" precisely as the thesis that D entails ~FW and ~MR, then the intuitions and arguments Tom and Brian seem to be focusing on are *not* properly construed as intuitions and arguments for incompatibilism. Right? And I'd like to hear more about how this alternative argument would go.

[Mark Smeltzer]

Tom,

I've been trying to wrap my head around this whole "dualism = immaterialism" suggestion for years. Aren't there lots of natural phenomena that are properly classifiable as immaterial? I'm thinking energy for starters.

My worry could be stated like this: if the folk think that S has an immaterial constitution, but physicists determine that S is comprised of X, Y and Z, does that mean that S is material?

It just seems to me that the value of the material/immatarial distinction largely has value at the folk level, where we are interested in those things that we can grab hold of or observe, and those that we cannot. I'm not sure if this distinction even survives the context transition to a physics discussion.

[Tom Clark]

Mark,

Good point. More precisely, my hunch is that many folk suppose there's something about the self that isn't subject to physical law, and so is non-physical or immaterial in that sense, and therefore a candidate for being causa sui with radical freedom. This is what some folks might call their soul, or what more secular dualists might think of as the irreducible conscious mental essence of their self. How the soul/mental essence gets a grip on the physical brain is of course the difficulty that folk dualists tend to gloss over.

[Tom Clark]

Eddy,

Let's assume you're right and it's fear of mechanism, not determinism, that hangs people up. You say people should identify themselves with "the conscious, deliberating, rational self" and that this self IS "the chooser's brain." Since you believe the folk need not worry about mechanism, this suggests that the brain's operations aren't mechanistic, even if they might be deterministic. Do we know for sure that the brain's operations aren't mechanistic?

[Brian Parks]

Eddy,

You say: “Your D* (with its mention of the brain) starts to look more like my M2 than my attempt in the initial post to define a narrower "determinism" as you seemed to be suggesting.”

My mention of the brain was a distraction then. Let’s take it out…

(D*): For a choice C made at time (t), determinism holds with respect to C if there is some time (t - dt) at which the laws of nature and the state of the universe necessitate the occurrence of C, let (dt) be any positive number.

You say: “I understand what you are saying, but I ask again how an argument for the incompatibility of your D* and FW would go. And I suggest it would not look like the Consequence argument, since that argument *does* require a "wider" determinism.”

The consequence argument can be made just as effectively with (D*) as with (D). Here, I’ll show you…

Consider the original consequence argument based on (D).

(Preliminaries)

Np Operator = “p and no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether p.”

Rule A = If p is necessarily true, then Np.

Rule B = If it is the case that Np and N(p therefore q), then Nq.

p = A true factual statement about the universe at time (t), the present moment. Note that p can be, but does not have to be, a true factual statement about a choice C that agent A presently makes.

P = The conjunction of all true factual statements about the state of the universe at a time (t - dt) in the past.

(Argument)

(1) Necessarily, ((P & L) therefore p). //A statement of the traditional (D) formulation of determinism.

(2) Necessarily, (P therefore (L therefore p)). //A logical reformulation of (1).

(3) N(P therefore (L therefore p)). //Rule A applied to (2).

(4) NP. //Taken to be trivial.

(5) N(L therefore p). //Rule B applied to (3) and (4).

(6) NL. //Taken to be trivial.

(7) Np. //Rule B applied to (5) and (6).

QED.

Now, consider a refined consequence argument based on (D*).

(Preliminaries)

Np Operator = “p and agent A has no choice about whether p.”

(Notice that we’ve narrowed the scope of the Np operator to the agent under investigation. We’ve also eliminated the irrelevant question about whether there was ever a choice about p in the past.)

Rule A = If p is necessarily true, then Np.

Rule B = If it is the case that Np and N(p therefore q), then Nq.

p = A true statement about some choice C that agent A makes at time (t), the present moment.

P = The conjunction of all true factual statements about the state of the universe at a time (t - dt) in the past (with (dt) chosen so as to render premise (1) true).

(Argument)

(1) Necessarily, ((P & L) therefore p). //A statement of the new (D*) formulation of determinism.

(2) Necessarily, (P therefore (L therefore p)). //A logical reformulation of (1).

(3) N(P therefore (L therefore p)). //Rule A applied to (2).

(4) NP. //Taken to be trivial.

(5) N(L therefore p). //Rule B applied to (3) and (4).

(6) NL. //Taken to be trivial.

(7) Np. //Rule B applied to (5) and (6).

QED.

It seems quite clear to me that the (D*) formulation of the consequence argument does the same thing as the (D) formulation. The two formulations are equally potent and equally threatening to free will. What do you consider to be the relevant difference?

Now, you ask about other arguments against compatibilism. Personally, I would make a self-switching argument or some sort of luck based Galen Strawson type argument. I find those types of arguments to be the most compelling. However, they are focused more with moral responsibility than with free will.

On that subject, what does “free will” even mean? That term gets tossed around all over the place in this debate, as if everyone somehow knew what everyone else was talking about when they use the term. To the contrary, my suspicion is that none of us know what we or anyone else are talking about when we use that term.

If someone asked you for a clear, precise, robust definition of the term “free will”, what would your answer be?

[Mark Smeltzer]

Brian,

The major difference between the Consequence Argument and your revised Consequence Argument* is that premise (4) in the original is trivially true, whereas there is no good reason to presume the truth of (4) in your argument.

[Brian Parks]

Mark,

Why would you consider (4) trivial in the original argument, but not in the revised argument?

[Eddy Nahmias]

Tom, to clarify (I hope!), I think it is coherent (and even likely) that:
1. The brain’s operations are indeed mechanistic
2. Mental states and processes ("the conscious, deliberating, rational self") are not anything supernatural or ontologically distinct from the operations of the brain, yet
3. Mental states and processes cannot be fully understood (at least by us) solely in terms of the operations of the brain (i.e., without reference to mental states and normative concepts)--that is, eliminativism is false

I think that most people, including scientists, have a hard time seeing how the combination of 1 and 2 does not lead to the falsity of 3. And for good reason (these are hard problems in philosophy of mind). In other words, people have a hard time seeing any options between substance dualism and eliminative materialism (indeed, sometimes students interpret any non-dualist theory as saying that minds don't exist).

What I meant above is that if people could make sense of 1, 2 *and* 3, perhaps as the mind sciences advance in certain ways, then they would be less likely to find naturalism (or determinism) threatening to free will.

[Eddy Nahmias]

Brian,
I think Mark is right that premise 4 needs to be treated differently in the two arguments. As I suggested in an earlier response to you, in the original Consequence argument, premise 4 is supposed to be trivially true because P represents a state in the distant past before any humans existed, so it seems obvious that now one could have any choice about that state of the past. In your argument, P represents the state of the universe (or the relevant part of the universe) at a prior time to the choice, but that prior time may be quite recent (the more you push it back to a time before the agent in question exists, the more D* looks like D, and the larger the chunk of space-time you need to include).

But if the prior time is, say, a couple minutes ago, then for any normal adult agent, NP is far from trivially true. For instance, if my choice now is about whether to finish this post now or go watch hockey and finish it later, then P likely includes a statement about what I chose to do a few minutes ago to set up my current situation such that I need to make this choice. And it is not *trivially* true that I had no choice about what to do a few minutes ago.

Your argument requires another argument for NP (premise 4), and that argument would, I suspect, look more like Galen Strawson's Basic argument because it would need to get an infinite regress going such that there can be no initial P about which you had a choice.

Now, I (freely) choose to go watch hockey.

[Mark Smeltzer]

Brian,

In the strictest sense, your (4) can be taken as trivially true, but then the conclusion of argument (assuming the validity of the transfer principles is not in question) is also trivially true.

However, I am operating under the assumption that you want your argument to be functionally equivalent with the original consequence argument. Given that assumption, there is a crucial ingredient missing from your formulation: ruling out any free choices prior to t - dt.

Your argument leaves us open to the possibility of free choices occurring before time t - dt. That is why van Inwagen's (4) refers to a set of proposition in the distant past where no one could possibly had made any prior free choices.

Given this missing component, your argument is not a generalizable argument against compatibilism. Your argument at best could show that an agent was unfree in specific situations -- however if we allow for prior free decisions, additional premises would need to be added to allow for cases where freedom transfers from the prior free decisions to the events in the latter chain.

All that said, I don't see why we can't lump your version of determinism in with some of the other types that Bob identified. Surely there are reasons to be concerned about this more narrow type of determinism, even if it is not a threat to free will in general.

[Brian Parks]

Eddy,

Limit the scope of p to the first choice that I ever made. That is, take p to be a true statement about my first choice, C1, a choice that I made at time (t1).

Clearly, if we find a time (t1 – dt) at which the state of the universe necessitated C1, (4) will be trivially true. I never have had a choice about the state of the universe at (t1 – dt) because I hadn’t started making choices yet.

So, with the scope of p limited to my first choice, the argument for Np is just as strong as it is in the original argument. Hopefully we can agree on that.

Now, limit the scope of p to the second choice that I ever made. That is, take p to be a true statement about my second choice, C2, a choice that I made at time (t2).

Clearly, if we find a time (t2 – dt) at which the state of the universe necessitated C2, (4) will be trivially true. I never had a choice about the state of the universe at (t2 – dt) because I only made one choice in my life, and I didn’t have any choice about making that choice.

(Even if that choice somehow led to the state of the universe at (t2 – dt), I didn’t have any choice about making that choice, and I didn’t have any choice about the fact that making that choice led to the state of the universe at (t2 – dt). Therefore, by rule B, I didn’t have any choice about the state of the universe at (t2 – dt).)

So, with the scope of p limited to my second choice, the argument for Np is just as strong as it is in the original argument.

And so on, and so on, up to my umpteenth millionth choice.

You say: “Your argument requires another argument for NP (premise 4), and that argument would, I suspect, look more like Galen Strawson's Basic argument because it would need to get an infinite regress going such that there can be no initial P about which you had a choice.”

But see this is not an additional premise, it’s a logical extension of premises that already present in the original formulation. There is no extra commitment that needs to be made.

If you want to argue that choices come in degrees, that’s fine. Regardless, you will have to admit that there was some time when I made a first choice, whatever degree of choice that choice entailed. The refined consequence argument will apply to that choice with just as much force as the original consequence argument. From there, the rest follows easily.

So I maintain my original point—the two formulations are equally potent and equally threatening to free will.

Finally, when are you going to give me a definition of the term "free will"? ;-)

[Brian Parks]

Mark,

"Your argument leaves us open to the possibility of free choices occurring before time t - dt. That is why van Inwagen's (4) refers to a set of proposition in the distant past where no one could possibly had made any prior free choices."

See the above post.

Put simply, if a free choice made now requires a free choice made in the past, then free choices are automatically impossible. The string of "free choices" has no way to begin.

So if the refined argument yields the result that a choice now can only be free if there was some free choice in the past, then it is just as damaging to free will as the original argument.

[Mark Smeltzer]

Brian,

To reject the nontrivial application of your argument, all we need is one case where freedom might exist that your argument doesn't address, and that should be easy to do since your argument doesn't address freedom in the general:

For any time t and any agent A, such that NP is true at t, there may be a time prior to t when agent A made a free choice.

Given that your argument cannot address that possibility, we can conclude that it is unsuccessful in motivating incompatiblism.

Your argument could potentially be repaired by adding additional premises that are not in the original consequence argument to make some existential claims, but then the whole thing will break down and turn into something new. Suffice it to say that the argument as your presented it cannot survive.

In light of the weakness we have identified, a new argument could be made that is inspired by your favored definition of determinism as follows:

Principle D**: for any time T1 where an agent A exists and makes choice C at T1, there necessarily exists a prior time T0, such either (1) A does not exist at T0 or (2) that given the entire set of true propositions at T0, agent A necessarily chooses C at T1.

So, using D**, we could put together a rather simple argument that doesn't use any transfer principles per say:

1. If D**, then A necessarily chooses C at T1. (trivially true)
2. D**.
3. A necessarily chooses C at T1.
4. If A necessarily chooses C at T1, then C is necessarily not a free choice.
5. C is necessarily not a free choice.
6. If D** and C is necessarily not a free choice, then, necessarily there are no free choices. (trivially true)
7. Therefore, necessarily there are no free choices.

Given this argument, the compatiblist is likely to reject either (2) or (4). You might find this argument novel or compelling, but it doesn't seem to present anything new to me (as a compatibilists) that the consequence argument does not. However, it does have the advantage of lacking any clear transfer principles (which is interesting in its own right since many compatibilists spend a lot of time assaulting the transfer principles that variations of the CA will depend on).

[Mark Smeltzer]

If the moderator could delete this post, and my prior post, I would appreciate it. I found several significant typos that need correcting.

[Mark Smeltzer]

Brian,

To reject the nontrivial application of your argument, all we need is one case where freedom might exist that your argument doesn't address, and that should be easy to do since your argument doesn't address freedom in the general:

For any time t and any agent A, such that NP is true at t, there may be a time prior to t when agent A made a free choice.

Given that your argument (as you stated it above) cannot be used to reject that possibility, we can conclude that it will be unsuccessful in motivating incompatiblism.

Your argument could potentially be repaired by altering the principles and operators to make some necessary existential claims, but then the whole thing will break down and turn into something new. Suffice it to say that the argument you presented cannot survive as an argument for incompatiblism.

In light of the weakness we have identified, a new argument could be made that is inspired by your favored definition of determinism as follows:

Principle D**: for any time T1 where an agent A exists and makes choice C at T1, there necessarily exists a prior time T0, such that given the entire set of true propositions at T0, agent A necessarily chooses C at T1.

So, using D**, we could put together a rather simple argument, which I will call the Inconsequential Argument (because even if its right, there's nothing we can do about it!):

1. If D**, then A necessarily chooses C at T1. (trivially true)
2. D**.
3. A necessarily chooses C at T1.
4. If A necessarily chooses C at T1, then C is necessarily not a free choice.
5. C is necessarily not a free choice.
6. If D** and C is necessarily not a free choice, then necessarily there are no free choices. (trivially true)
7. Therefore, necessarily there are no free choices.

Given this argument, the compatiblist is likely to reject either (2) or (4). The semicompatibilist will probably just nod and yawn.

You might find this argument novel or compelling, but it doesn't seem to present anything distinctly new to me that the consequence argument does not.

However, it does have the advantage of lacking any clear transfer principles, and it doesn't depend on a premise about the distant past. That makes this argument interesting for two reasons: (1) some philosophers spend a lot of time assaulting the transfer principles that variations of the CA will depend on, and (2) some philosophers (*cough*, Joe Campbell, *cough*) have taken issue with the CA's use of the distant past.

(ps. my gut is telling me that D** is open to an obvious attack, but it's 2:45 AM so I'm going to leave it for now.)

[Jean-Louis]

Proviso : I am not a philosopher, not even somebody trained in philosophy (a mathematician indeed). I happened to have bookmarked this site long ago, and stumble today on this very interesting "basic" article.

As often when trying to understand something about determinism/free will (which is awfully opaque to me) I stumble on the expression "law of nature" or "law of the system" in your exposition. I am awfully disappointed not to find a definition of what is admissible as a "law of the system".

To try to be more explicit, here are two examples of possible "laws of the system" :

* "A body persists its state of rest or of uniform motion unless acted upon by an external unbalanced force." (Newton's first law as quoted on Wikipedia)

* "Whenever the gregorian date is June 30, 1908, a meteoroid strikes Siberia".

Obviously the first one is generally accepted as a "law of the nature" while the second is not. So on a very naive look, admissible laws are laws which are "general enough". But what means "enough" ? Does not the meaning of D depend on the meaning we accept for "enough" in "general enough" ?

Further, does you definition of D admit an _infinite_ set of laws ? An infinite and not recursive set of laws ? As long as it remains unclear which type of set of laws is admitted, it remains opaque to me, as it refers to an opaque concept.

[Mark Smeltzer]

In light of Jean's question, one additional advantage of D** in the Inconsequential Argument is that it doesn't contain any mention of "laws".

[Brian Parks]

Mark,

The strategy is to apply the argument to the first choice that the individual makes in his life, at whatever age that occurs. And then to the second choice. And then to the third choice. One by one, we will eliminate the possibility that any of those choices are free.

You say: “To reject the nontrivial application of your argument, all we need is one case where freedom might exist that your argument doesn't address, and that should be easy to do since your argument doesn't address freedom in the general.”

But it does address freedom in general.

On the assumption that D* holds with respect to all of an individual’s choices (a highly plausible assumption, I would argue), the argument will preclude the freedom of her first choice and every one of her choices thereafter.

Let’s see if we can agree that the argument precludes the freedom of her first choice. We’ll move forward from there.

Let:

p = Agent A chooses C1, the first choice of her life, at time (t).

P = The conjunction of all true factual statements about the state of the universe at a time (t - dt) in the past (with (dt) chosen so as to render premise (1) true).

(1) Necessarily, ((P & L) therefore p). //The D* formulation of determinism.

(2) Necessarily, (P therefore (L therefore p)). //A logical reformulation of (1).

(3) N(P therefore (L therefore p)). //Rule A applied to (2).

(4) NP. //Taken to be trivial.

(5) N(L therefore p). //Rule B applied to (3) and (4).

(6) NL. //Taken to be trivial.

(7) Np. //Rule B applied to (5) and (6).

QED.

If we limit the scope of p to the individual’s first choice, as we have done above, would you agree that the argument yields the conclusion Np just as effectively as the original consequence argument?

How would you challenge (4) in this case? We’ve defined p so that it references the agent's first choice, so by definition she has not made any prior choices. Why, then, would (4) be any less trivial than it is in the original argument?

[Mark Smeltzer]

Brian,

The major change you've made here is that you've altered (p). Now the conclusion of the argument reads:

Agent A chooses C1, the first choice of her life, at time (t) and agent A has no choice about whether Agent A chooses C1, the first choice of her life, at time (t).

Assuming that you have succeeded in making (4) trivially true, and that the transfer principles are valid, what does the argument prove? Very little I'm afraid.

The argument's conclusion says that agent A doesn't have any choice about A's choosing C. Doesn't that seem a little weird to you? If agent A chooses C, doesn't that mean, de facto, that the agent has a choice about C?

The original consequence argument's (p) doesn't contain a dependency between (p) and the agent's choice. There's a reason for that ;)

[Brian Parks]

Mark,

You say: “The argument's conclusion says that agent A doesn't have any choice about A's choosing C. Doesn't that seem a little weird to you? If agent A chooses C, doesn't that mean, de facto, that the agent has a choice about C?”

No, because “having a choice about” is just another way of saying “is free.” Even Van Inwagen will admit that we make choices, in the sense that conscious selections emanate from our minds and brains. The question is whether we “have a choice about” those selections, i.e., whether they occur freely.

I will admit that there is equivocation here, but it is equivocation that is already present in the discussion. No one has precisely defined what the terms “free choice” and “free will” mean, so we don’t know what those terms add to the unmodified terms “choice” and will.”

That is why I continue to challenge compatibilists (Eddy are you listening?) to give a precise definition of the terms “free choice” and “free will.” What precisely do those terms mean? What do they add to the simpler terms “choice” and “will”? I contend that if we force combatilibists to address this point, it will become clear that either “free choice” and “free will’ are trivial and insignificant, or they are incompatible with determinism.

Returning to the consequence argument, if the equivocation bothers you, we can eliminate it.

I will use the word “behavior” to refer to any process that results from activity in the organism of the individual, including activity in the individual's mind and brain. The term is meant to include both voluntary and involuntary processes. I request chicken instead of steak at the restaurant. That process results from activity in my mind and brain, so we will call it a behavior of mine. I digest the chicken that I have eaten. That process results from activity in my stomach, so we will call it a behavior of mine.

The term is meant to be broad—if you wish, infinitely broad.

Now, let:

p = “B is a behavior of individual A that occurs at time (t).”

Run the new consequence argument with p defined as above. The conclusion generated is Np.

Now, presumably your response is: “No, premise (4) of your new consequence argument is not trivially true. At least one of the individual’s past behaviors was free, i.e., the individual had a choice about whether or not that past behavior occurred, and therefore the individual had a choice about whether P.”

Fair enough. My response is: “Please identify for me the first behavior of the individual that, on your view, was free, i.e., that the individual had a choice about. Surely, there has to have been a first.”

Now, refer to that behavior as B1, and let p = “B1 is a behavior of individual A that occurs at time (t).”

Clearly, if its preliminary assumptions are correct, the original consequence argument demonstrates Np. Agreed?

Now, let’s explicitly generate the conclusion Np with the new consequence argument:

(1) Necessarily, ((P & L) therefore p). //The D* formulation of determinism.

(2) Necessarily, (P therefore (L therefore p)). //A logical reformulation of (1).

(3) N(P therefore (L therefore p)). //Rule A applied to (2).

(4) NP. //Taken to be trivial.

(5) N(L therefore p). //Rule B applied to (3) and (4).

(6) NL. //Taken to be trivial.

(7) Np. //Rule B applied to (5) and (6).
QED.

My question: with p defined as above, would
you agree that the new consequence argument generates the conclusion Np just as effectively as the original consequence argument? If not, why not?

How would you challenge (4) in this case? We’ve defined p so that it references what you have claimed to be the first free behavior of the individual, so how can you claim that NP is any less trivial than it is in the original consequence argument?

Now, if your concern is that our discussion has been artificially limited to the individual’s first free behavior, don’t worry. We’ll get to the next step—i.e., using the argument to preclude later free behaviors—just as soon as we agree that the argument precludes this first one ;-)

[Brian Parks]

Mark,

To avoid a possible source of confusion, I want to explicitly point out that I've been using lower case p differently than upper case P.

Lower case p = "B is a behavior of individual A that occurs at time (t)."

Upper case P = "The conjunction of all true factual statements about the state of the universe at a time (t - dt) in the past (with (dt) chosen so as to render premise (1) of the new consequence argument true)."

Also, when I said:

"Even Van Inwagen will admit that we make choices, in the sense that conscious selections emanate from our minds and brains."

I meant:

"Even Van Inwagen will admit that determinism is compatible with our making choices, in the sense that determinism is compatible with conscious selections emanating from our minds and brains."

[Eddy Nahmias]

Briefly, I would follow most compatibilists in arguing that the "free" part of "free choice" indicates that the agent's choice derives from her own conscious, rational deliberations (rather than the choice resulting from coercion or unconscious biases or uncontrollable impulses, etc.). But I won't offer an analysis here. (I actually think it's a mistake for compatibilists to take on the burden of offering sufficient, much less necessary *and* sufficient, conditions for free will that will inevitably get nitpicked to death; rather, I think the burden is on the libertarian to explain why his metaphysically onerous conditions are necessary for free will.)

I like that Brian's argument moves the crux of the debate to the "first free choice." Doing so, I believe, diminishes the intuitive appeal of incompatibilism (to the extent it rests on such arguments). I think that when we focus on the supposed first free (responsible) choices of young children, we are more apt to recognize that the capacities involved in free will are possessed (and exercised) to varying degrees, and we are more apt to think that a very small degree of free will (and genuine responsibility) can indeed gradually arise from "no degree" of it as children just barely begin to become self-reflective deliberators and start to understand moral considerations. There is no metaphysical infusion of agent causal powers. There is just the gradual emergence of more sophisticated psychological capacities, which, with proper education and upbringing (yes, something beyond our control!), can develop more fully into the more full-fledged capacities for free and responsible action we suppose more adults have (yes, we probably still over-attribute such capacities to each other). On this picture, we are unlikely to think there is some sharp line that gets crossed at a precise point such that we would want to say that choice X at time t is someone's "first free choice."

Hence, this response to Mark becomes problematic: “Please identify for me the first behavior of the individual that, on your view, was free, i.e., that the individual had a choice about. Surely, there has to have been a first.” And NP becomes "untrivial."

[Kip]

I think we should start asking a lot more people what the definition of free will is, and whether X qualifies as free will. The meaning of the term is governed (entirely?) by its usage. But nobody can seem to agree on the definition.

I agree with Eddy that the burden shouldn't be on compatibilists to provide a definition. I think the burden is on both parties to (constructively?) research and find the boundaries of the definition, even if they are very fuzzy. At the end of the day, the term might be too poorly defined to answer the question "do people have free will?"

There are a bunch of heuristics I would use to favor a libertarian/non-realist definition. Most importantly, the fact that (1) libertarian free will doesn't exist is less obvious than the fact that (2) compatibilist free will exists, and we should define the term in a way that is informative, and conveys the less obvious truth. But the more appropriate way to resolve the dispute is to just determine the common usage.

I will say, Eddy, that, when people demand compatibilists to say where the first free choice is, I don't think they're being overly burdensome just to win an argument in a sophistic way. They're doing it to force the compatibilist to face and confront a very important ethical truth, an ethical truth that compatibilists seem (SEEM) bent on ignoring: that all of the later choices only rippled from that first choice, and the unfreedom of that first choice tainted all of the rest... that saying "well, the second choice is free because it's based on previous free choices" (as *many* free willists have done in print) is a losing argument... that ultimately, everything is a matter of luck, because even things that appear to not be a matter of luck, are based on our character, heredity and environment, which are also matters of luck.

But, you get my point. At least, I hope you do.

[Brian Parks]

Eddy,

You say: “Briefly, I would follow most compatibilists in arguing that the "free" part of "free choice" indicates that the agent's choice derives from her own conscious, rational deliberations (rather than the choice resulting from coercion or unconscious biases or uncontrollable impulses, etc.).”

Let me start with with a question.

Suppose that I implant a device in your brain that gives me control over your desires, aversions, feelings, sensitivities, motivations, and so on, but not your actual powers of deliberation and choice. In other words, you get to do the deliberations and make the choices, I get to decide what the input to that process is going to be.

So, this is what I do. I give you the exact desires, aversions, feelings, sensitivities, motivations, and so on that your friend Bernie Madoff had prior to some criminal choice that he made. I then put you in the exact circumstances that he was in during the choice. Naturally, you end up making the same choice that he made.

Was your choice free? Yes or No?

Really, this question should not be a hard question to answer. Either the choice derived from your own conscious, rational deliberations, in which case the answer would be Yes, or it did not, in which case, the answer would be No.

(As a gentle warning, please do not evade by saying that you would become Bernie Madoff. Bernie Madoff is sitting in a prison cell right now. Unless he can be in two places at once, changing your psychological states cannot turn you into him.)

You say: “I actually think it's a mistake for compatibilists to take on the burden of offering sufficient, much less necessary *and* sufficient, conditions for free will that will inevitably get nitpicked to death; rather, I think the burden is on the libertarian to explain why his metaphysically onerous conditions are necessary for free will.”

If you are going to say that you have “free will”, you should be able to precisely specify what you mean by that term. Different camps in this debate use the term in different ways.

You say: “On this picture, we are unlikely to think there is some sharp line that gets crossed at a precise point such that we would want to say that choice X at time t is someone's "first free choice."”

Your response seems evasive to me.

A child speaks first words. A child takes first steps. If choices are well-defined events like these, then why would it be impossible for a child to make a first free choice?

Granted, the term “free choice” is ambiguous. But that is your problem, not mine. You, after all, are the one asserting the term's existence. Eventually, you will have to precisely specify what it means. Once you have done that, locating the first free choice in an individual’s life should not be a problem at all.

If your point is to say that “free” is a property that comes in gradual degrees, that’s fine. Let C1 be the first choice in my cognitive life that, on your view, had any “free” in it at all, however small the degree of “free.” The question is: did NP hold with respect to that choice? As far as I can see, the answer to that question is trivially yes. And the triviality is no less than in the original consequence argument.

[Mark Smeltzer]

Brian,

Refocusing the argument to behaviors won't get us anywhere either. Because if there are free choices that produce behaviors, wouldn't those free choices necessarily precede the behaviors?

Given that (P) simply claims that there is a time in the past that entails (p), if P contains the behavior selecting free choice, wouldn't we expect it to entail (p)?

Insofar as you've had to change the argument three times now, I think my point about the original being shaky has been well supported. I think you should read over the Inconsequential Argument (from my 2:44 AM post) that I posted above and see if there's anything in it not to your liking... because I think it more effectively presents the causal story you are trying to tell.

[Eddy Nahmias]

Brian, the risk of giving quick answers is they won't be satisfying, and I'm afraid I have to risk it again.

1. You raise the manipulation argument against compatibilism, which by the way, I think is the strongest current argument for incompatibilism, given problems with the Consequence argument ... and recent reconstructions of it ;-} I can't offer a full response to the manipulation argument, but I may post about it one of these days. Meanwhile, I think I would reject your claim that "the choice derived from [my] *own* conscious, rational deliberations" since they derived from another agent's goals and are not likely to be responsive to my own reasons (and if they are so responsive, then it's not clear why we should call it "manipulation").

2. I just meant that I think the burden is on *incompatibilists* to show that FW and MR are incompatible with determinism (see my co-authored "Is Incompatibilism Intuitive"). As such, compatibilists do not need to prove compatibilism by offering sufficient conditions for FW that are compatible with determinism. They are free to do so, but they will likely fail (as usually happens when such attempts are made in hot debates in philosophy). But you are right that anyone discussing the free will issue should attempt to offer an account of FW, though I am not sure FW is best defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Anyway, I can't offer such an account here, though I offer glimpses in my published work and am trying to do better in my book in progress. All this being said, I am not "asserting the term's existence"--it (and similar terms) are used often in ordinary speech and philosophy. I am suggesting that term can be usefully defined in such a way that humans generally have some degree of free will and are often able to act freely. But ...

3. I don't think that asserting this commits me to saying that there is a first free choice, much less that we would be in a position to pick it out (I realize your argument is not based on any epistemological uncertainties, but my point was that your premise 4 does not appear trivial in part because, I think, we are not in a good epistemological position to assess its truth). As a parent of three, I am not sure when exactly my children spoke what should count as their first words or took what should count as their first steps, much less when they made what we should call their first choice, and much less still when they made what we should call their first *free* choice (in the loose sense I defined above). If we make our definitions of each of these things more precise (first word = recognized consonant and vowel sounds of real word as agreed upon by three independent observers), we will find more precise occurrences. But perhaps only by stipulation.

[Brian Parks]

Mark,

You say: “Refocusing the argument to behaviors won't get us anywhere either. Because if there are free choices that produce behaviors, wouldn't those free choices necessarily precede the behaviors?”

I’m using behavior broadly, to include anything that emanates from the organism of the individual. Thus, what you are calling a “choice” or a “free choice” is a behavior, indeed, the behavior in question. I’ve intentionally not called it what you call it--a “choice” or a “free choice”--so as to avoid equivocation or a contradiction with the argument’s conclusion.

You tell me that an individual’s behaviors include what you call “free choices.” Fair enough. Go to what you consider to be the first such behavior in the individual’s life. Now, run the new consequence argument on that behavior. The conclusion is that the individual cannot have had a choice about whether the behavior occurred.

Now, your response is to say, “But wait, the behavior was a choice, so de facto, the individual had a choice about whether or not it occurred.” Oh no, no ;-) You called it a choice, not me. Those were your words. I just called it a behavior and left it at that. I stayed non-committal. So I’m good ;-)

My new consequence argument proves, with the same force as the original consequence argument, that the individual can’t have had a choice about whether or not the behavior in question occurred. So it would be a mistake—or at least an equivocation—to call it a choice. Call it a selection, a deliberation, an execution—but don’t call it a choice, because the individual never had any choice about whether or not it occurred.

Now, your criticism of the new consequence argument was to say that NP is not trivially true. But you will have to admit that it is trivially true when P describes a state of affairs that obtained prior to the time of the behavior that you have identified as the first “free choice.” Thus, to the extent that we limit the scope of the argument to that behavior, NP is trivial. Ergo Np, i.e., the behavior is not free.

Now, going forward, I will have you identify the behavior that you consider to be the second “free choice”. I will then show that P is trivial with respect to that behavior as well. Ergo, Np., i.e,. the behavior is not free either. And so on. The final conclusion—that no behaviors are free—is cake from that point.

You say: “Insofar as you've had to change the argument three times now, I think my point about the original being shaky has been well supported.”

It may be shaky, but it is not any more shaky than the original consequence argument. That was my only claim.

As for changing the argument, that’s not what I’m doing. I’m expressing the argument in different terms so as to more effectively preempt evasions and distractions ;-)

You say: “I think you should read over the Inconsequential Argument (from my 2:44 AM post) that I posted above and see if there's anything in it not to your liking... because I think it more effectively presents the causal story you are trying to tell.”

I agree with the argument's premises and conclusion, however, I don't think the argument does any real work. Your premise,

(4) If A necessarily chooses C at T1, then C is necessarily not a free choice

is basically a restatement of incompatibilism, i.e., "if determinism, then no free choice." But incompatibilism is precisely what is at issue here. The argument begs the question.

[Brian Parks]

Eddy,

You say: “The risk of giving quick answers is they won't be satisfying, and I'm afraid I have to risk it again.”

Well, you’ve given thoughtful answers, and I appreciate that. I’ve read your papers, so I know what your responses are going to be.

As a complement, I’ll definitely say that I think you’ve developed one of the stronger pro-free-will positions out there, particularly with respect to the challenges from neuroscience and social psychology, which I agree are more threatening to free will than simple determinism. Still, I would warn you that you’re fighting a losing battle ;-)

You say: “You raise the manipulation argument against compatibilism, which by the way, I think is the strongest current argument for incompatibilism, given problems with the Consequence argument ... and recent reconstructions of it ;-} I can't offer a full response to the manipulation argument, but I may post about it one of these days.”

Fair enough. I look forward to reading the response.

Note, however, that my argument is a manipulation argument against moral responsibility in general, not a manipulation argument against compatibilism. If indeterminism is true, and by some random chance you don’t choose as Madoff did, all that I have to do is put you in the scenario again. And again. And again. Eventually, even if it is on the 1,000,000th try, you are going to make the same choice that Madoff made. You’ll be as guilty for that choice as Madoff was for his choice. Thus compatibilists and libertarians will both have to throw you’re @ss in prison ;-)

I originally crafted the argument as a critique of Randolph Clarke’s position. If you’re interested, I present the argument in full in section 5 of this paper:

http://people.consolidated.net/gptravel/umr_no_possible_bdp.pdf

You say: “Meanwhile, I think I would reject your claim that "the choice derived from [my] *own* conscious, rational deliberations" since they derived from another agent's goals.”

Hmm... But what if my goal wasn’t to get you to choose as Madoff did? What if my goal was the opposite, i.e., to prove that you have free will and that you would not do as Madoff did, even if you had to work from his identical circumstances?

What if I had confidence in you, what if I believed, as the libertarian does, that you were capable of pulling yourself up by the bootstraps and deviating from Madoff’s path? You let me down. So it’s your fault, not mine ;-) Don't blame me.

Admittedly, I caused you to have the feelings and motivations that guided to choose as Madoff did. But still, you were the one that did the deliberating. You made the choice. You pulled the trigger. Did you not?

How can you absolve yourself? It would seem awfully contrived for you to assert TNR in this case, i.e., “I am not responsible for the choice because I am not responsible for the mental content that guided me in making it”, and then reject TNR when it is applied in the same fashion elsewhere.

You say: “2. I just meant that I think the burden is on *incompatibilists* to show that FW and MR are incompatible with determinism (see my co-authored "Is Incompatibilism Intuitive"). As such, compatibilists do not need to prove compatibilism by offering sufficient conditions for FW that are compatible with determinism.”

For the record, I am not a compatibilist or an incompatibilist with respect to free will. I think the compatibility of free will is a function of how you define the term “free will” (duh, right?) Compatibilist free will, or C-Will, is obviously compatible with determinism. Libertarian free will, or L-Will, is obviously incompatible with determinism. That’s all that needs to be said as far as “free will” is concerned. Precisely define what you mean by the term, and we’ll quickly know whether its existence is compatible with determinism.

The real dispute here is normative. It is a dispute over what kind of free will—compatibilist, libertarian, or otherwise—is necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility, i.e., for an individual to be an appropriate object of judgment. I say neither. The concept of an “appropriate” object of judgment implies a norm, and norms do not exist. They are evolved projections of our minds, not aspects or features of reality. This is plain to see for anyone who takes an honest look.

When you ask “Does Madoff deserve to receive lifelong punishment given the fact that he did not chose the sleezy personality traits that led him to steal?” you are not zeroing in on any feature of reality, as you might be doing in a physics experiment. Rather, you are zeroing in on your own feelings. Those feelings exist as part of your mental repertoire not because they are justified or unjustified, but because they are adaptive, i.e., net-conducive to the survival of your genes. When you talk about them as “justified” or “unjustified”, you are mistakenly treating them as if they were more than just feelings, i.e., as if they were truths that reality could somehow confirm or deny. Reality can do neither; it is silent on the matter.

Human behavior has well-defined causes in the mind and brain. These causes do not discriminate between individuals. If I give you Madoff’s exact inputs prior to a choice, I’m going to observe his exact outputs in the choice, or something extremely close. If I give you Mother Theresa’s exact inputs prior to a choice, I’m going to observe her exact outputs in the choice. That’s just how nature works; we are no less parts of nature than any other part.

When I focus on the fact that human behavior has well-defined causes in the mind and brain, my reactive feelings soften to almost nothing. I think, why blame the individual when the real difference-makers are the inputs, the principles of choice, the sensitivities, the feelings, the motivations, the personality traits, and so on? The individual cannot do anything other than flesh out what is already given in those, maybe introduce a bit of randomness into the process. So why blame her?

Now, when I consider that I would almost certainly do exactly what she does if I were in her exact internal and external circumstances, that just hammers home the point. Applying blame to her for something that could just as easily have belonged to me, you, or anyone else strikes me as a painfully arbitrary and self-serving approach to take.

I suspect that your reactive feelings don’t respond in the same way or to the same degree. Fair enough. I’m not saying that my reactive feelings are “right” to soften or that yours are “wrong” not to soften. Reactive feelings are just feelings, just states of mind elicited by various stimuli. Their function has everything to do with biological adaptation and nothing to do with revealing deeper “truths” about who or what is morally responsible.

You say: “I realize your argument is not based on any epistemological uncertainties, but my point was that your premise 4 does not appear trivial in part because, I think, we are not in a good epistemological position to assess its truth”

But if we limit our discussion to the first free choice, then we will be in a good epistemological position to assess NP. Premise (4) will indeed be trivial.

As a practical matter, we may not be able to say exactly when or where the first free choice happens. But that’s not a problem. We don’t need to know when or where the first free choice happens. We just need to know that it happens. If we know that it happens, then we can know that NP is trivial prior to it, and therefore that Np precludes its being a genuinely free choice.

Do we know that a first free choice happens? Well, if the concept of a “free choice” is well-defined, and if “free choices” are happening right now, then the answer is necessarily yes. If the concept of a “free choice” is not well-defined… well, then you have a larger problem, a problem that you will have to resolve prior to giving a serious defense of the pro-free-will position. If and when you do resolve that problem, my argument will be patiently waiting for you ;-)

[Mark Smeltzer]

Brian,

I'm getting the impression that we're not getting anywhere. I believe your revised version(s) of the consequence argument fail for many reasons, and I don't think you have adequately addressed the concerns that have been raised.

In fact, I don't even know who you are making your argument to. It seems that only thoroughly committed mechanistic reductionists would accept your premises without debate (especially that last part about *everything* in an agent's causal sequence being a behavior). Unless this is a just a back patting exercise for you, I don't know why you think your arguments would be the least big persuasive to the opposing crowds.

In regard to the Inconsequential Argument, premise (4) does not beg the question. Begging the question is an informal fallacy in which the truth value of a premise in an argument depends on the truth value of the argument's conclusion. That is not happening here.

Surely most compatibilists will have reasons to reject premise (4), and a separate set of arguments would need to be constructed to defend premise (4) in that context. But, that premise is really a big part of what's at issue in the consequence argument anyway, and it points to the big thing that is still missing from the incompatiblist toolkit. If premise (4) were trivial true, (most of) this debate would have been over a long time ago. So no surprise there.

[Brian Parks]

Mark,

You say: “It seems that only thoroughly committed mechanistic reductionists would accept your premises without debate (especially that last part about *everything* in an agent's causal sequence being a behavior).”

I’ve defined the term “behavior” to mean anything that happens in the organism. Note that I am the one using the term, therefore I am the one that gets to define it. So forget mechanistic reductionism or whatever else. Not relevant to our discussion.

The term “behavior” is specifically intended to be broad, to include a lot of things in the organism, including what you would call a "choice." I’m not calling it a "choice", I’m using a different term, so that I can avoid generating the weird conclusion that “you don’t have a choice about whether or not your choices occur.” That conclusion is an equivocation on the word "choice."

If you don’t like the term “behavior”, we can use a different term, e.g., “X” or “kskldfk”, in its place. As long as we are fully clear on the meaning of the term, the specific choice of letters and sounds won’t make a difference.

You say: “I'm getting the impression that we're not getting anywhere.”

We're not. So let’s take a step back and review the discussion. Eddy and I were initially discussing various definitions of determinism, and I claimed that the D* definition was just as much of a threat to free will as the conventional D definition. Eddy disagreed and suggested that consequence-type arguments against compatibilism could not be made as effectively on the basis of the D* definition.

I then presented a new consequence argument based on D*, and I claimed that this argument was just as effective at demonstrating incompatibilism as the original consequence argument.

To repeat, my claim was that the new consequence argument was just as effective at demonstrating incompatibilism as the original consequence argument. My claim was not that either argument successfully demonstrates incompatibilism.

Now, you entered the discussion and challenged whether premise (4) of the new consequence argument was trivial (as it is in the original consequence argument). Your claim was that the individual might have made some past “choice” such that NP would not be true. (Unless someone explains and gives a motivation for the distinction, I’m going to take “choice” and “free choice” to mean the same thing. I’ll just stick with the single term “choice”).

Since then, I’ve been trying to show you why your challenge is not a problem. The strategy is as follows. I have you identify the first behavior in the individual’s life that, on your view, constituted a “choice.” I then run the new consequence argument on that behavior to show that it cannot have been a “choice.” That is, the individual cannot have had a choice about whether or not it occurred. Premise (4) of the argument, i.e., NP, will be trivially true because, on your own admission, the individual did not make any “choices” prior to the behavior in question. Thus follows Np, the conclusion that the behavior in question—the thing that you are calling a “choice”—was not, in fact, a “choice.” The individual did not have any choice about whether or not it occurred. That conclusion follows just as effectively as it does in the original consequence argument.

I then run the argument on the behavior that you identify as the second “choice”, then the third “choice”, and so on, with premise (4), i.e., NP, trivial on each run—indeed, just as trivial as it was on the first run, and just as trivial as it is in the original consequence argument. It will be trivial because, as demonstrated by the previous runs, the individual made no prior “choices.”

In this way, I will have shown that the new consequence argument is just as effective at demonstrating incompatibilism as the original consequence argument. Claim established.

You say: “I believe your revised version(s) of the consequence argument fail for many reasons, and I don't think you have adequately addressed the concerns that have been raised.”

The argument may ultimately fail. None of the concerns, however, that you have raised pose problems for what I am claiming, specifically, that the new consequence argument demonstrates incompatiblism just as effectively as the original consequence argument.

Your main challenge to my claim seems to have been that premise (4) is not trivial. That challenge has already been addressed. Premise (4) is no less trivial than in the original consequence argument. See above.

The only other point you made was that it was weird for me to say that “you do not have a choice about whether or not your choices occur.” I agree, that’s why I am no longer referring to what you call a “choice” with that word, i.e., “choice.” To do that would be to equivocate on the word “choice.”

You say: “In regard to the Inconsequential Argument, premise (4) does not beg the question. Begging the question is an informal fallacy in which the truth value of a premise in an argument depends on the truth value of the argument's conclusion. That is not happening here.”

Well, the argument is supposed to be an argument for incompatibilism, but then premise (4) is basically the assertion, “incompatibilism.”

The consequence argument tries to demonstrate the truth of your premise (4) via more basic principles (e.g., rule A, B, and so on). In that sense, it does work, or at least it tries to. Your argument, in contrast, does no work. It just restates, in the form of a premise, the very issue under dispute. What does that accomplish?

[Mark Smeltzer]

Brian,

I understand what you're attempting to do in your explanations. I understand that you want the argument applied "just so" and that you want it taken seriously on those merits. The problems I have been pointing out are problems with the specific premises in the arguments you have proposed thus far.

With regard to the switch to have (p) be about behaviors in an organism, you can't strip choices out of the discussion without undermining the meaning of Np. Remember, Np means:

“p and no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether p.”

The objection I raised to your switch still stands, and your refusal to address that objection is the reason that the conversation is at a stalemate. The common sense definition of a choice is that it precedes behavior. So, whatever a choice is (you are the one presenting an argument about what should and should not be considered a free choice -- so I don't think I should have the burden to define your terms for you), it wouldn't seem to matter if a behavior was necessitated by a free choice.

I understand that you don't want the argument to be susceptible to that kind of objection. But, want alone won't repair the argument. The premises need to be altered in a way that precludes the possibility of a free choice ever happening in a deterministic would. Otherwise, it cannot be an argument for incompatibilism.

I encourage you to take that objection seriously and continue refining the argument if you wish it to be taken as a serious contender. If that isn't a mantle you want to bear, then I suggest you stick with the one of the various versions of the CA that are floating around in response to the many objections made against the original CA (viz., the original CA is not where any self-respecting incompatibilist would want to hang their hat).

Finally, regarding (4) in the Inconsequential Argument, while you are right that it focuses our attention on one of the core claims of incompatibilism, why is that a problem? That claim, forthright as it may be, is still necessary for any incompatibilist argument to succeed. If (4) is demonstrably false, then there cannot be a successful incompatibilist argument (though the door would still be open for impossibilist arguments).

Prima facia, (4) seems to have a lot going for it: 2 + 2 equals 4, and if 2 + 2 then necessarily you have 4. Surely no one exists that has a choice about whether 2 + 2 equals 4, right? If determinism is equivalent to logical necessity (or even contextual necessity of the following type: e.g. "for all worlds that p, necessarily q", and "if q, then {P0, ... Pi}"), then surely there are no free choices! What is so trivial about that?

For the compatibilist to reject the Inconsequential Argument, the compatibilist would need to offer a compelling story that allows us to ignore the allure of that prima facia evidence. That, in my estimation, is what the consequence argument (at its very best) is about: moving the conversation forward.

In that respect, I think the Inconsequential Argument could be more successful because it lacks the trappings that people have gotten hung up on in discussions of the CA (transfer principles, the distant past, laws of nature, etc.).

[Brian Parks]

Mark,

Let me remind you of my initial claim. My initial claim was that the new consequence argument is just as effective as the original consequence argument at demonstrating incompatibilism. My initial claim was not that either argument succeeds.

The metric is equality. That is what is at issue.

You claim that there are “choices.” Ask yourself: Given determinism, would Van Inwagen call those things “choices”? Obviously not. If he were to call them “choices”, he would either be equivocating on the word “choice” (i.e., he would be meaning something different by “choice” than he means when he uses it in the N operator), or he would be contradicting his conclusion. His conclusion, after all, is that Np is true for any p. If he admits that “choices” occur (with “choice” meaning what it means in the N operator), then there would be something about which someone has a “choice”, i.e., there would be a p for which the conclusion Np is not true.

Read what I have written above slowly and carefully. Do you understand the point?

The same point applies to me. If I were to use the word “choice” to refer to what you are claiming is a “choice”, I would either be equivocating on the word “choice”, or I would be contradicting the argument’s conclusion. For that reason, I have employed a different term, “behavior”, to refer to what you are claiming is a “choice.”

Note, I am not saying that “choices” cause “behaviors.” Stop operating on that assumption. Stop making a straw man.

If you are going to take issue with the fact that I am using the term “behavior” to refer to what you consider to be a “choice”, I can just use the letter “X.” In fact, that’s what I’ll do. I’ll just make the argument with the letter “X” instead of the word “behavior.”

Here we go:

(1) Necessarily, ((P & L) therefore p). //The D* formulation of determinism.
(2) Necessarily, (P therefore (L therefore p)). //A logical reformulation of (1).
(3) N(P therefore (L therefore p)). //Rule A applied to (2).
(4) NP. //Taken to be trivial.
(5) N(L therefore p). //Rule B applied to (3) and (4).
(6) NL. //Taken to be trivial.
(7) Np. //Rule B applied to (5) and (6).

Your response is to say, “No, premise (4) is not true because the individual made choices in the past.”

OK. Take what you consider to be the individual’s first choice. Put aside the issue of whether it was in fact a choice, and just label it with the term “X.”

Let p = “X occurs at time (t).” Now run the argument on p.

(1) Necessarily, ((P & L) therefore p). //The D* formulation of determinism.
(2) Necessarily, (P therefore (L therefore p)). //A logical reformulation of (1).
(3) N(P therefore (L therefore p)). //Rule A applied to (2).
(4) NP. //Taken to be trivial.
(5) N(L therefore p). //Rule B applied to (3) and (4).
(6) NL. //Taken to be trivial.
(7) Np. //Rule B applied to (5) and (6).

Clearly, the argument demonstrates Np—that the individual had no choice about whether X occurred, and therefore that X was not a choice—just as effectively as the original consequence argument. Premise (4) is just as trivial as in the original consequence argument because, on your own admission, there were no “choices” prior to (t).

Now, take what you consider to be the individual’s second choice. Put aside the issue of whether it was in fact a choice, and just label it with the term “X.” Let p = “X occurs at time (t).” Run the argument on p. The argument will demonstrate Np just as effectively as the original consequence argument. That's because there will have been no choices prior to (t), and therefore premise (4) will be just as trivial as it is in the original consequence argument.

Continuing in this way, our approach can demonstrate Np for any p just as effectively as the original consequence argument. Hence my initial claim, that the two arguments are equally effective at demonstrating incompatibilism.

Nothing that you have said thus far poses a problem for that claim. So give up already ;-)

You say: “The objection I raised to your switch still stands, and your refusal to address that objection is the reason that the conversation is at a stalemate.”

Mark, the objection has been more than addressed. There is no reason for our discussion to be continuing on like this. Concede the point. The two arguments are equally effective at demonstrating incompatibilism.

You say: “Finally, regarding (4) in the Inconsequential Argument, while you are right that it focuses our attention on one of the core claims of incompatibilism, why is that a problem?”

(4) is nothing other than the assertion “incompatibilism.” Unless you give an argument for (4), you haven’t given an argument for incompatibilism.

You say: “That claim, forthright as it may be, is still necessary for any incompatibilist argument to succeed.”

OK, do you have an argument for (4)? If so, that argument is your argument for incompatibilism, not what you have presented.

If (4) is obvious, if it doesn’t need an argument, then incompatibilism is obvious, and doesn’t need an argument either.

You say: “In that respect, I think the Inconsequential Argument could be more successful because it lacks the trappings that people have gotten hung up on in discussions of the CA (transfer principles, the distant past, laws of nature, etc.).”

It avoids the trappings of the consequence argument because, in contrast with the consequence argument, it doesn’t do any work. It doesn’t even try. It simply asserts “if X is necessitated by the past and the laws of nature (i.e., if determinism), then X is not a free choice.” What it asserts is precisely what is at issue!

[Mark Smeltzer]

Brian,

First off, the Inconsequential Argument does do work because it distinguishes between choices and free choices. The distinction being that choices could be merely of the mundane variety, but free choices would have to be paradigmatic of an exercise of free will. The Inconsequential Argument attempts to show that even if choices can exist in a deterministic world, free choices cannot.

I'll admit that premise (4) in the Inconsequential Argument may produce a dialectical stalemate, but at least it is being honest about what's at issue. Moreover, it is not so different from Rule A in the Consequence Argument (see note below). For certain, (4) is one of the quintessential hallmarks of incompatibilism. If (4) is false, then the CA and your argument (my present objections aside) also fail. So, it seems like premise (4) might be a more productive place to aim our focus at. If compatibilists cannot live up to their burden to tell a good story to reject the prima facia evidence for (4), that would be a big deal. Right?

Back to your argument, I have a few questions that you may want to consider, but I do not require answers to them:

1. What value is there is achieving equivalence with the original CA? (Since the original CA been defeated in a number of ways.)
2. Why do you think your revised NP about behaviors affords you the right to demand that the argument be applied to every behavior of the organism when NP doesn't make that claims?
3. Why are you accusing me of accusing you of equivocating on the word "choice"? [Some number of posts ago you did provide a version of (p) that contained the word "choice", but after the argument's absurd conclusion was pointed out, you changed (p) to be about behaviors. Moving (p) to be about behaviors successfully resolved the terminological absurdity. I then went on to offer a new criticism of the argument with the new (p), but you seem to be linking that criticism back to my prior unrelated criticism about using the word "choice" in (p)... ??]

Moreover, I am not sure what point you want me to concede. Do you want me to concede that your first argument was just as effective as the CA? I won't because it wasn't. How about the second version? Nope. The third? The forth? You've changed the argument's premises so many times, I'm not sure what you want me to concede...

My assumption is that we were just discussing the arguments you were presenting and were working together to refine them into something interesting. I don't like this concession talk. There needn't be a battle here.

I am 100% positive that if we keep going you will eventually produce a version of the argument that will satisfy my demands; at which time I will happily appraise is as being equal to, or perhaps even better than, the original CA.

If your point is that the CA isn't a good place for the incompatibilists to hang their hats, then we are already in wholehearted agreement. The original CA has a lot of problems. Surely incompatibilists can do better!

Finally, since there seems to be great confusion about this, I am going to attempt to restate my objection to the latest incarnation of your argument.

Your original D* contains the word choice:

For any human choice C that is made at (t), there is some time (t - dt) at which the state of the chooser's brain entails the occurrence of C, let dt be any positive number.

Taking your comments about wanting to avoid equivocating into account, I think that you want to propose D+ (I already used D** earlier in thread):

D+ = For any human behavior B that is made at (t), there is some time (t - dt) at which the state of the chooser's brain entails the occurrence of C, let dt be any positive number.

As regards the actual argument, here are the operators again for clarity:

• Np Operator = “p and no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether p.”
• Rule A = If p is necessarily true, then Np.

  (Doesn't this look similar to premise (4) in the Inconsequential Argument?? If you claim that the Inconsequential Argument does no work because of premise (4), then how does the Consequence Argument do any work with Rule A? But, I digress...)

• Rule B = If it is the case that Np and N(p therefore q), then Nq.
• p = B is a behavior of individual A that occurs at time (t).
• P = The conjunction of all true factual statements about the state of the universe at a time (t - dt) in the past (with (dt) chosen so as to render premise (1) of the new consequence argument true).

And here is the argument:

1. Necessarily, ((P & L) therefore p). //The D+ formulation of determinism.
2. Necessarily, (P therefore (L therefore p)). //A logical reformulation of (1).
3. N(P therefore (L therefore p)). //Rule A applied to (2).
   
4. NP. //Taken to be trivial.
   
5. N(L therefore p). //Rule B applied to (3) and (4).
   
6. NL. //Taken to be trivial.
   
7. Np. //Rule B applied to (5) and (6).

So, what we're got here is an argument over the particulars of a situation. We come up with a situation that satisfies (p), then we come up with a (dt) that satisfies NP, and then we can (presumably) conclude that Np.

You want to claim that the argument applies to every possible (p), but it does not. You would have to alter P to achieve that goal:

P* = For any p, there necessarily exists a time in the past (t - dt) where the conjunction of all true factual statements about the state of the universe at (t - dt), combined with laws L, necessitate that p occurs at t.

In fact, your original P was altogether absurd: P asks us to pick out a time (t - dt) such that premise (1) is true, but premise (1) makes an assertion about P. How was that supposed to work? That cyclical dependency in P has been removed in P*.

Given P*, and the previous definitions, I think the following argument could be considered equivalent with the original CA:

1. Necessarily, ((P* & L) therefore p). //The D+ formulation of determinism.
2. Necessarily, (P* therefore (L therefore p)). //A logical reformulation of (1).
3. N(P* therefore (L therefore p)). //Rule A applied to (2).
   
4. NP*. //Taken to be trivial.
   
5. N(L therefore p). //Rule B applied to (3) and (4).
   
6. NL. //Taken to be trivial.
   
7. Np. //Rule B applied to (5) and (6).

I apologize if my previous attempts to highlight this tension went unnoticed due to brevity. I mentioned several times that the lack of an existential claim in P was damning, but I don't think that point was made in an effective manner. Hopefully this post will bring us closer to being on the same page.

[Brian Parks]

Mark,

You ask: “What value is there in achieving equivalence with the original CA? (Since the original CA been defeated in a number of ways.)”

Well, the equivalence supports the claim that D* determinism is as threatening to free will as D determinism. If that claim is true, then we should focus our attention on D* determinism, since it is the species of determinism that is less demanding and more likely to be true.

You ask: “Why do you think your revised NP about behaviors affords you the right to demand that the argument be applied to every behavior of the organism when NP doesn't make that claim?”

I don’t understand your question.

You ask: “Why are you accusing me of accusing you of equivocating on the word "choice"?

Wasn’t that your criticism?

You pointed out that there was weirdness in my defining p as “Agent A makes choice C at time (t)” and then my claiming Np, i.e., that the agent has no choice about whether p. The implied result is that “the agent has no choice about her choice.” That’s either an equivocation on the word “choice”, or a contradiction.

I acknowledge the equivocation. Point taken. That’s why I’ve cleaned up the terminology.

You say: “Some number of posts ago you did provide a version of (p) that contained the word "choice", but after the argument's absurd conclusion was pointed out, you changed (p) to be about behaviors.”

No, I didn’t change what (p) is about, I just introduced a different term or label so as to avoid the aforementioned equivocation.

You say: “Moving (p) to be about behaviors successfully resolved the terminological absurdity. I then went on to offer a new criticism of the argument with the new (p), but you seem to be linking that criticism back to my prior unrelated criticism about using the word "choice" in (p)... ??”

If I understand your new criticism, it is that if choices cause behaviors, then they precede behaviors in time. Thus, if (p) refers to a behavior at time (t), then NP is not trivial, because there was a choice prior to (t) (i.e., the choice that caused the behavior).

But your criticism represents a misunderstanding of the way I’m using the term "behavior." I’m not saying that there is a choice, and that this choice then causes a behavior. I’m using the term "behavior" to refer to exactly what you claim to be a “choice.” Obviously, if the consequence argument is true, it’s not a choice, at least not a "chioce" in the sense specified in the N operator, so I’m not going to call it that.

I’m allowed to use the word “behavior” however I want. It’s just a term. In the previous post, I just used the letter “X.” Hopefully, that will avoid any future confusion.

You say: “Moreover, I am not sure what point you want me to concede. Do you want me to concede that your first argument was just as effective as the CA? I won't because it wasn't. How about the second version? Nope. The third? The forth? You've changed the argument's premises so many times, I'm not sure what you want me to concede...”

The underlying premises haven’t changed, a term has changed. First, the term was “choice”, then you rightly pointed out the equivocation, so I instead used the term “behavior”, you objected that this was reductionistic, so now I am just using the term “X.”

What is your issue with “X” going to be? ;-)

You say: “Since there seems to be great confusion about this, I am going to attempt to restate my objection to the latest incarnation of your argument. Your original D* contains the word choice: For any human choice C that is made at (t), there is some time (t - dt) at which the state of the chooser's brain entails the occurrence of C, let dt be any positive number. Taking your comments about wanting to avoid equivocating into account, I think that you want to propose D+ (I already used D** earlier in thread): D+ = For any human behavior B that is made at (t), there is some time (t - dt) at which the state of the chooser's brain entails the occurrence of C, let dt be any positive number.”

Right, but actually I am just going to use the letter "X." That way we can completely preempt any discussion about what constitutes or should constitute a "behavior." Also, the brain comment was taken out based on Eddy’s concerns about mechanism and reductionism.

So we have,

D++ = “For any X that occurs at (t), there is some time (t-dt) at which the state of the universe entails the occurrence of X.”

You state the definitions: "Np Operator = “p and no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether p.” Rule A = If p is necessarily true, then Np. Rule B = If it is the case that Np and N(p therefore q), then Nq. p = B is a behavior of individual A that occurs at time (t). P = The conjunction of all true factual statements about the state of the universe at a time (t - dt) in the past (with (dt) chosen so as to render premise (1) of the new consequence argument true).”

This is right, except change p (italicized above) to “X occurs at time (t).”

So we have the argument,

(1) Necessarily, ((P & L) therefore p). //The D++ formulation of determinism.
(2) Necessarily, (P therefore (L therefore p)). //A logical reformulation of (1).
(3) N(P therefore (L therefore p)). //Rule A applied to (2).
(4) NP. //Taken to be trivial.
(5) N(L therefore p). //Rule B applied to (3) and (4).
(6) NL. //Taken to be trivial.
(7) Np. //Rule B applied to (5) and (6).

You say: “Your original P was altogether absurd: P asks us to pick out a time (t - dt) such that premise (1) is true, but premise (1) makes an assertion about P. How was that supposed to work?”

P is the conjunction of all factual statements about the state of the universe at some time (t – dt). Obviously, there is more than one value of dt that you can choose, thus there is more than one P that you can choose. I’m saying choose a value of dt, and a corresponding P, for which premise (1), the claim that “Necessarily, ((P&L) therefore p)” is true.

What’s the problem? Why is that absurd?

You say: “So, what we're got here is an argument over the particulars of a situation. We come up with a situation that satisfies (p), then we come up with a (dt) that satisfies NP, and then we can (presumably) conclude that Np.”

I would say it this way. We identify the p in question, then we identify a P (with an associated dt) such that “Necessarily, ((P&L) therefore p)” is true. Then we apply the rest of the argument to generate Np.

You say: “You want to claim that the argument applies to every possible (p), but it does not.”

I disagree. There is no (p) to which the argument cannot be effectively applied.

The key is contained in the strategy described above. You claim that premise (4), NP, will not be trivial because the individual made choices prior to (t). But all of my prior runs of the argument, starting with p centered on what you identified as the first choice, then with p centered on what you identified as the second choice, and so on, will have already proven that those were not choices, i.e., that the individual did not have a choice about them. So premise (4) will in fact be trivial.

You say: “I apologize if my previous attempts to highlight this tension went unnoticed due to brevity. I mentioned several times that the lack of an existential claim in P was damning, but I don't think that point was made in an effective manner. Hopefully this post will bring us closer to being on the same page.”

I don’t see the problem. Can you elaborate?

As for the inconsequential argument, a quick question: if you take (4) to be trivial, and you therefore accept the argument's conclusion, then does that mean that you are an incompatibilist?

And if you are an incompatibilist, do you deny D*? If so, on what grounds? I'm curious.

To be honest, you seem well on your way to becoming a skeptic ;-)

You say: “I'll admit that premise (4) in the Inconsequential Argument may produce a dialectical stalemate, but at least it is being honest about what's at issue. Moreover, it is not so different from Rule A in the Consequence Argument (see note below).”

I don’t think your (4) is as trivial as Rule A.

Rule A says: if necessarily p, then no one has a choice about whether p.

Your (4), in contrast, says: If A necessarily chooses C, then C is not a free choice.

In rule A, the “necessarily” is supposed to preclude “has a choice about.” In (4), the “necessarily” is supposed to preclude that “choice” from being a “free choice.”

Those are different moves. The latter move will generate a lot more controversy than the former.

Why can’t a “choice” that an individual makes necessarily be a “free choice”? What does the “free” in “free choice” mean? Does it mean “not made necessarily?” ;-) That’s what it would have to mean for (4) to be trivial.

Here's a suggestion. Rather than focusing on whether the choice is free, focus on whether the individual is morally responsible for the choice. In other words, replace "free" with "morally responsible for." That will help to break down the stalemate that your original (4) will generate.

Consider,

(1) If D**, then A necessarily chooses C at T. (trivially true)
(2) If A necessarily chooses C at T, then A cannot not choose C at T (trivially true).
(3) If A cannot not choose C at T, then A cannot be morally responsible for choosing C at T (argue abductively--manipulation cases, frankfurt examples, and so on)
(4) If D**, then A cannot be morally responsible for choosing C at T. (1 - 3)

Since we have not lost generality with respect to C or T, A cannot be morally responsible for any choice at any time period. QED.

[Brian Parks]

Quick clarification: In your rehash of the argument, you said Np = "p and no one has, or ever had, any choice about p". That's not actually how I defined it. I defined it as “p and agent A has no choice about whether p.”

Also, when I said "There is no (p) to which the argument cannot be effectively applied" I obviously mean provided that D++ holds with respect to all X's, which, as a reminder, is just a label for things that a critic of the argument would identify as "choices."

[Paul Torek]

I like Brian's reformulation of the Consequence Argument. It seems truer to the spirit of

Rule B(eta), and it has the advantage of using a weaker formulation of "determinism". Brian

just needs to rework D++ to get back the reference to a person, so that we aren't talking

about all events in the universe. (In a computer-geeky spirit, I suggest that the successor

of D++ be called D#.) In other words: what Alan said.

It would be interesting to consider whether other incompatibilist arguments might require

stronger, or different, formulations of determinism.

Like Eddy, I like moving the crux of the debate to the "first free choice", because (I

agree) it diminishes the appeal of rule B(eta). But I think Eddy makes a technical/tactical

mistake by doubting that there's a first free choice. Rather, we should allow that there

are many candidates for "first free choice" - as many as there are precisifications.

Probably an infinity of them. The trick is that for any given particular precisification,

the occurrence of the first free choice is no big deal - much as your son or daughter does

not suddenly gain tremendous maturity on turning 18. Even if we throw a big celebration of

that milestone, we recognize that the underlying reality is a continuum of development.

Thus instead of saying or implying, "First free choice? No such thing," we should say,

"First free choice? Take your pick!" Same spirit, better dialectics.

[Paul Torek]

Better dialectics, but worse formatting. Sorry about that.