Apparently, elementary particles satisfy the control condition on moral responsibility

Actually, the result sounds potentially interesting in its own terms, even if the way the claim is framed is a bit odd. More here. 

Comments

[Brian Parks]

I'm not sure if this has been discussed on GFP (probably has, too lazy to look), but nobel physicist Gerard 'T Hooft has a response to Conway and Kochen that does a good job of explaining the determinism v. indeterminism dispute in QM:

http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0701/0701097v1.pdf

(Bear in mind that by 'free will' these authors mean a choice that is not predetermined by physics, as opposed to what a compatibilist might mean by the term).

[Alan]

There once was a cat superposed
by two fates of boxed so enclosed
that a choice of disclosure
collasped quantum closure
that it both lived and died till exposed.

Did physicists just discover symmetrical reflexive logical relations?

[David Hodgson]

I think Conway and Kochen make out a strong case that determinism can be maintained only if there is a thoroughgoing conspiracy of nature that prevents experimenters making those measurements that would contradict well-established results of quantum mechanics (which would in turn undermine the scientific method). 't Hooft's response does not I think answer this.

I have a piece that tries to show this at http://users.tpg.com.au/raeda/website/theorem.htm

I have to update this because Conway and Kochen have now published a stronger version of their theorem at www.ams.org/notices/200902/rtx090200226p.pdf

[Jon Lawhead]

I'm only starting to get some background in the philosophical foundations of quantum mechanics, but from what I can tell (and from conversations I've had with people who understand the math better than I do), there's something funny about this claim. Look at how they put it in the article you've linked to here:

"And we've found that, from moment to moment, nature doesn't know what it's going to do. A particle has a choice."

and again in the more recent publication David linked to:

"To say that A’s choice of x, y, z is free means more precisely that it is not determined by (i.e., is not a function of) what has happened at earlier times (in any inertial frame)."

It seems to me that those two claims are emphatically not identical--that is, indeterminacy by itself is not the same thing as "free will" in the sense that most philosophers mean it. If all that's being claimed here is that some particles' behavior is not fully determined by the past states of affairs in that particle's inertial reference frame, they've proven indeterminacy (which is cool), but is that enough by itself to allow them to make what seems like the somewhat more sensational claim that elementary particles have free will? I'm skeptical.

[Alan]

I'm with Jon on this.

While the authors have done a smashing job of reconciling the logical/mathematical claims of the independence of particle behavior from past states relativistically, it is still telling that their thesis claim in David's updated article is "roughly, that if indeed we humans have free will, then elementary particles already have their own small share of this valuable commodity. More precisely, if the experimenter can freely choose the directions in which to orient his apparatus in a certain measurement, then the particle’s response (to be pedantic—-the universe’s response near the particle) is not determined by the entire previous history of the universe."

The IFs here are glaring (and what I meant in my terse comment above--what is good for the FW goose apparently is likewise for the gander). While they do maintain that this independence of the particle does not reduce to randomness in a formal stochastic way, it still relies on some assumed sense of FW control on the part of experimenters to give them basis for the claim that this is truly FW significant. Then it could be seen as circular even if the physics supports the nondeterministic independence of particles measured.

[Kymberlie R. McGuire]

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[Michael Drake]

So God does play dice with the cosmos -- but the dice have a *choice*.

[Badda Being]

Disanalogies between indeterminacy and free will are no big deal, especially if you view successive concepts of free will as indeterminate in the sense that successive particle states are also indeterminate, which is precisely what we get from deconstructive analyses of meaning. What's happening here is that the authors are simply positing a new concept of free will and tracing it back to previous concepts as if there's a determinate flow from one to the other -- as if they were dealing with the same concept persisting through time -- while you (Jon and Alan) would like to view previous concepts of free will as determinative of your own concepts instead -- as if only philosophers are equipped to speak in fidelity to that lineage.

[Alan]

Badda Being--love your moniker--but I want to whack your comment--

How exactly do your remarks remove the plausibility that C & K have not invoked a circular explanation of FW? I fail to see that.

[Badda Being]

What you quote as the authors' thesis is a mere conditional statement -- no circularity there. Or the circularity is strictly hermeneutic and therefore, again, no big deal.

[Badda Being]

Again, the authors are positing a new concept of free will -- and a rather materialist one, at that -- if only implicitly, and pointing out that the concept is homogeneous between human beings and elementary particles. Now you may object to that concept, preferring instead a more supernatural rendition, the easier to dismiss it as pure metaphysical speculation, but the history of philosophy is non-determinative of either one.

[Badda Being]

Each concept, however, is determinative of how you read the history of philosophy.

[Alan]

Badda--I still ain't getting it. Elementary particles do not self-determine EPR-like spatially separated measurements--people do. The claim of homogeneity breaks down right there in terms of an asymmetrical FW significance that gives experimenters powers that the particles do not seem to possess in themselves. I'm really not trying to be obstinate or dense here--though I concede that being dense is arguably beyond my control.