Cross-Cultural Intuitions about Free Will

Hi everyone,

Check out this post over at The Splintered Mind by fellow Duke grad Hagop Sarkissian. Hagop, Josh Knobe, and Shaun Nichols ran a cross-cultural X-Phi study and found that incompatibilist indeterminist intuitions were universally shared to a surprising degree.

Hopefully, you'll be able to identify some problems with the experiment since the results are disasterous for my book project!

Comments

[Justin Coates]

It appears that Hagop, Knobe, and Nichols (HKN) mean for Universe A to be deterministic and Universe B to be indeterministic, and when they ask

In Universe A is it possible for a person to be fully morally responsible for their actions?

I suspect that they take themselves to be getting at whether or not the folk are compatibilists.

But look at how HKN describe Universe A: it is a world in which every event is completely caused by some antecedent event. Now, I used to think that you had to define determinism in this (or some similar) way so to make it accessible to the folk. But I no longer think that because what HKN describe isn't determinism (and it just doesn't follow that the folk are incompatibilists because they think that moral responsibility is incompatible with something kinda like but not exactly determinism). Of course, that doesn't mean that HKN haven't discovered something interesting. As far as I can tell, Universe A looks a lot like a universe in which all causal relata are antecedent events. And Universe B looks a lot like a universe in which other sorts of things can stand in causal relations (agents perhaps?).

So instead of showing that the folk are indeterminists and incompatibilists, it seems like HKN can only claim to have shown that the folk think that more than just events stand in causal relations, and perhaps that the folk think agent causes are required for moral responsibility. If the folk think agent causation is required for responsibility, I think this would be a fascinating result. But that wouldn't show that the folk are incompatibilists or even determinists because agent causation is compatible with determinism (as far as I can tell).

So how could this help you, Tamler (assuming that my analysis is in some way preferable to the one HKN offer)? Well, you might have to concede that people share a theory of action across cultures, but it doesn't follow from sharing a theory of action that they share theories of moral responsibility.

[Terry Tomkow]

I agree with Justin. Indeed I think it worse that he suggests.

If any student were asked to define 'determinism' and responded with Knobe and Nichols answer they would be lucky to get a passing grade.

The instructor would point out that "complete cause" is Bad English. After all, what is the difference between an event's having incomplete cause and being uncaused? If there is a difference it needs explanation and if there is no difference then "completely caused" is pleonastic: it just means "caused". But there can be indeterministic causes. The student would be told to go away to look up a proper definition of determinism and do some reading about causation.

And what is the instructor to make of "So, if everything in this universe was exactly the same up until John made his decision, then it had to happen that John would decide to have French Fries."

Like so many questions in the experimental literature this is semi-literate. "Exactly the same as" what? the instructor impatiently scribbles in the margin.

In any case even if the universe is deterministic it does not follow that it "had to happen that John would decide to have french fries". Determinism is compatible with contingency. What is being described is a Fatalist universe. The student would be sent away to learn the difference between Fatalism and Determinism.

The upshot of is that these studies cannot tell us anything about people's views about Free Will and Determinism as because neither scenario describes a Deterministic universe properly so called.

I continue to be astonished by how bad expermental philosophy is qua philosophy.

[Justin Coates]

As I said in my previous comment, I think that HKN's data does reveal something interesting, just not necessarily anything about free will, moral responsibility, or determinism per se.

That said, I definitely appreciate the difficulty in crafting scenarios that are (1) accessible to the folk and (2) capture the philosophical theses in question. Moreover, there are additional methodological constraints on researchers imposed by the IRB; one such constraint is that all questions must be on a rather low reading level (I can't remember what grade level specifically, but it's quite low). In recognizing that these scenarios must be written on low level, I think we can move past some concerns that they are ungrammatical or wouldn't pass muster in a college classroom (of course, they seem a great deal more sophisticated than many of the papers I've graded). Experimental philosophers must give scenarios that are standards appropriate, even though we might ideally give people questions that look something like this:

In Universe A the distant past and laws of nature are sufficient to ensure one unique future state of affairs.

(1) Do people in Universe A have free will?

(2) Are people in Universe A morally responsible for their actions?

Of course, most folks couldn't make heads or tails of this scenario, so we couldn't make too much of their answers (NOT because the folk are stupid, but rather, because understanding determinism and its implications takes a great deal of technical acumen and sophistication and even reasonable philosophers disagree about some of these issues).

Experimental philosophy finds itself in the middle of this tension. And this is what can sometimes lead to unwarranted claims. But it is not, I think, because the experimental philosophers are bad qua philosophers. I know quite a few of them to be quite adept at good old fashioned conceptual analysis (as well as being excellent scientific researchers). Of course, Terry only said that the philosophy was bad qua philosophy (not the philosophers themselves), but even this, I worry, is premature. It's only been in the last four or five years that these sorts of studies concerning folk theories of responsibility have been run, and with any psychological research project, there will be a period of development when methodologies are constructed, tested, and (ideally) perfected. This process will often involve some dead-ends. And from personal experience I can attest to the fact that sometimes it is easier to see problems with these scenarios after the fact. So I meant for my first comment to be constructive criticism, and hopefully that was evident from the tone.

This is a bit far afield of Tamler's original post, but I wanted to clarify my earlier objection by putting it in the context of what I take to be some general difficulties (that can be overcome) with any experimental research program.

[Terry Tomkow]

... or it could be that the enterprise of Experimental Philosophy is ill conceived from the start.

Jonathan Ichikawa's paper Who needs Intuitions?" is well worth reading in this connection.

[Tamler Sommers]

Terry,

Regarding your last comment, are you saying that, say, Frankfurt's (1969) critique of incompatibilism doesn't appeal to intuitions? Or Susan Wolf's critique of the deep self view? How do those arguments work then? How are we supposed to evaluate them?

[Tamler Sommers]

Justin,

If, as you suggest, HKN shows that people across cultures think that agent causes are required for moral responsibility, that would be a pretty huge result, no? Arguably, that would be even more interesting than standard incompatibilists which would still allow for them to subscribe to Kane-like event-causal views...

[Justin Coates]

Tamler,

I was too quick in my comment probably. I suspect that what it shows is that the folk do not believe event causation, as it is described in HKN's scenarios, is sufficient for moral responsibility. In those scenarios, it's not explicitly stated that at least some of the antecedent causes for the actions of agents in Universe A are psychological states within those agents. If the event causation were described in this way, I suspect the folk wouldn't be threatened by it (this is consonant with the results of the study I ran with Nahmias and Kvaran). So it's too quick to jump from the fact the folk think event causation as presented in HKN is insufficient to the claim that the folk think agent causation is required. They might be (although I have no idea) completely satisfied with an event causal account that just involves the agent in the right way (e.g. Frankfurt, Watson, Bratman, Velleman, etc.).

[Terry Tomkow]

Tamler Somers asks:

.." are you saying that, say, Frankfurt's (1969) critique of incompatibilism doesn't appeal to intuitions? Or Susan Wolf's critique of the deep self view? How do those arguments work then? How are we supposed to evaluate them? "

I don't know Wolf's stuff but I am very familiar with Frankfurt's. You might say I've lived with it for years.

No, Frankfurt doesn't "appeal to intuitions" in the sense you mean.

Frankfurt sets up a thought experiment which is supposed to show us someone who is responsible but cannot do otherwise. Lots of people thought it did show that. You might say they found it "intuitively correct" or that they "agreed with Frankfurt's intuitions". Which is to say that they didn't think that any more argument was needed.

But people started to be skeptical about the Frankfurt story. You can say they had different "intutitions" but that is just a (pop) psychological guess about their motives. The critics did not appeal to their intuitions, they argued that Frankfurt the story was incoherent: how could the Frankfurt intervener know what the agent would do? How could he intervene in time? Wouldn't there always be a "flicker of freedom" etc. etc. In turn, those who "shared Frankfurt's intuitions" did not think it sufficient to shrug and say "I have different intuitions". They recognized their responsibility to answer these arguments with counter-arguments-- typically involving ever more careful and complicated thought experiments.

Again, if you want to say all these people were motivated by their intuitions, ok. But so what? Their intuitions are not their arguments.

Now some people didn't want to get caught up with that argument. They thought it more interesting to think about the upshots for the way we think about responsibility if Frankfurt was right about alternative possibilities. You might say these people operated on their "intuitions", but again that is just story about their motives. When a good philosopher says "My intuition is p so I'm going to assume p ...." what he is saying is that he doesn't want to argue about (= do philosophy about ) p right now but would rather assume p, agruendo, and talk about is consequences. He does not mean, "my intuition proves p".

To take an example close to hand: who was more influenced by Frankfurt's story than the patron of this blog, John Fischer? Clearly Fischer thinks there is something right about Frankfurt's claim. You may say that this is Fischer's "intuition". But Fischer never offers the fact that John Fischer has the intuition that p is evidence that p. To suggest that Fischer's only grounds for his view are "intutions" would be insulting and demonstrably false.

Kadri Vihvelin argues that when you look closely at the arguments for Frankfurt's thesis you can see that they involve modal and counterfactual fallacies. I guess you could say that she is explaining away the intuitive plausibility of Frankfurt stories by showing that they rest on the more basic "intuitive appeal" of certain patterns of fallacious argument. But, in the end, Vihvelin is not interested in psycho-analysis; she want's to show that Frankfurt's arguments are formally invalid and his conclusion false.

And when Vihvelin challenges Fischer on this point Fischer does not reply by saying "well I have contrary intuitions". He mounts an extended and (dauntingly) technical argument about counterfactuals, and hypothetical syllogisms etc. etc. . You can look at their debate on-line and nowhere in all that will you find either of them appealing to their intuitions as proving anything.

If you want to know "how should we evaluate" claims like Frankfurt's, I invite you to look at that debate. Never mind who wins: it is a good example about how serious philosophers do business: they trade arguments not intuitions.

Albert Einstein said "God does not play dice with the Universe" as a way of expressing his intuition that there was something wrong with Quantum Mechanics. That intuition guided much of his research. But Einstein never thought his intuitions were arguments and no one supposes that Physics "rests on intuitions" in any interesting sense.

I see no reason to think that Philosophy is different from Physics in this respect.

---------
PS. Alas I find that most of the OPC links to the Fischer and Vihvelin papers are broken. As I understand it the CJP will soon devote a whole issue to their debate.

[Jona]

Hi. I´d like to question the statiscal validity of the experiment. According to Sarkissian et al., 82 % of US Americans voted indeterministic, 62 % of the students from Hong Kong did so. Sarkissian et al. show that this is not statistically significant. Considering that these data points tend towards expectations if one was to assume that an "asian" or at least a non - european mentality might rather show deterministic assumptions, one wonders why they didn´t simply increase the sampling size. I´d wager that the tendencies would remain, but become significant. You cannot, after all, meaningfully discuss nonsignificance; maybe your sample is just too small. If an experiment doesn´t find a statistically valid difference between A and B, it is not shown that A = B; only that the current experiment can´t find a difference.
So, more people please, Sarkissian et al.! And maybe people that weren´t in the possibly globalised households that offered them the possibility to become students (the samples were taken at mostly english - speaking universities). Students might generally tend towards indeterminism, moreso as they live in close contact with western thoughts.

[Tamler Sommers]

Terry,

I'm not saying that the Frankfurt debate doesn't feature arguments. I'm saying that in every argument that I'm aware of, there's a bottom line appeal to intuition in order to justify one or more of the premises. There needs to be truth-makers for premises in an argument, right? Explain to me how we can evaluate the truth of every premise in a Frankfurt-style argument without appealing to intuitions about whether an agent in a particular case is morally responsible. It's not an a priori truth that Jones is morally responsible for the assasination if there's no intervention. And as far as I can see, there's no scientific test that can establish that Jones is morally responsible. In the end, (yes, after plenty of argument) it has to boil down to intuitions about whether it's fair or appropriate to blame the agent. If you disagree, present a credible argument that doesn't make such an appeal.

Jona,

Good point, I suspect you're right.

[Joe Campbell]

Here is an interesting quote at the end of section IV of Fischer's "Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Frankfurt: A Reply to Vihvelin."

"Additionally, I am not at all convinced that one needs to regiment the analysis as suggested by Vihvelin. Here are the facts in a Frankfurt case. There is a triggering event that occurs to indicate that the agent is about to refrain. The 'counterfactual intervener' watches for that even and has the power and intention to intervene upon noticing the triggering event. Further, the counterfactual intervener is a completely reliable triggering-event detector, and is completely reliable in carrying out his intentions. Given these facts, it just seems intuitively obvious that if the relevant individual (Jones) were about to refrain, he would be rendered unable to refrain. And thus it seems intuitively obvious that Jones is unable to do otherwise, given the facts of the case; no argument employing hypothetical syllogism or transitivity appears to be required."

Vihvelin gives an argument in reply and, of course, Fischer is not claiming that an argument for his position can't be given, just that it need not be given. Also, in her reply (which I think is coming out in the CFP volume noted by Terry Tomkow), Vihvelin suggests that Fischer is appealing to an argument in the above passage, one that she criticizes!

I guess I would say that appeals to intuitions are made by proponents of Frankfurt examples but that it need not stop there.

[Tamler Sommers]

I wish I could look up these references... I'm traveling and currently locked out of any library system. But I still don't get how anyone can make an argument about moral responsibility without an appeal to intuition at some point. True claims, if they exist, about whether an agent is moral responsible aren't conceptual or a priori. They don't seem to be something that can be discovered using the scientific method. I assume that no one is claiming that we can recollect the Form of moral responsibility from more perfect previous existences. So how are these arguments supposed to work? What am I missing?

[Cihan Baran]

Tamler,

If that's the case, then how is one intuition better than another one? Does being shared by the majority of people make an intuition better than competing intuitions?

If the free will debate or arguments about moral responsibility depend on intuitions and there is no way to rank these intuitions, then, I feel bad about saying this, is there a point in discussing?

Also couldn't intuitions be mistaken? I think somebody asked you about this in CRAP in San Francisco, i.e. suppose everyone had the intuition that killing children is morally permissible. What would follow from that?

[Tomkow]

Tamler says:

Explain to me how we can evaluate the truth of every premise in a Frankfurt-style argument without appealing to intuitions about whether an agent in a particular case is morally responsible.... In the end, (yes, after plenty of argument) it has to boil down to intuitions about whether it's fair or appropriate to blame the agent. If you disagree, present a credible argument that doesn't make such an appeal. .

I'm sorry, but you don't seem to understand what these Frankfurt arguments are about. Vihvelin and Fisher agree that the agents in Frankfurt stories are "responsible" and "to blame" for what they do. The issue is whether
or not those agents are able to do otherwise than the things they are responsible for doing.

Do you think questions about what people are able to do rest on intuitions? (So when the DMV says I'm able to drive a car, are they just playing a hunch?) What doesn't rest on intuitions then?

Tamler says:

"I'm saying that in every argument that I'm aware of, there's a bottom line appeal to intuition in order to justify one or more of the premises. There needs to be truth-makers for premises in an argument, right?"

Are you say that all arguments for everything must be premised on intuitions? Physics too? Or just philosophical arguments? And if you think philosophical arguments are special, why?

Joe usefully gives us examples of the role "appeals to intuition" really play in philosophy. Note that, in the quotes Fischer, is not claiming to know any facts on the basis of intuition, he is saying that certain inferences seem to him not to require justification: "Given these facts, it just seems intuitively obvious..." and "thus it seems intuitively obvious...". What Fischer means here (go ahead ask him) is that he can't imagine how any reasonable person could accept the premises and deny the conclusion. Which, of course, is fair enough. But he is not “appealing to his intuitions” as proving anything. And I can guarantee you that when someone (e.g. Vihvelin) gives him an argument that the inference is invalid, Fisher will not cite his "intuitions" as proof that she is wrong, he will meet her argument on its own terms.

In philosophy, when all you can do is “appeal to intuitions” you have lost the argument.

[Tamler Sommers]

Terry,

No need to be sorry. I understand the dialectic. I think if you look at my comments, you'll see that they're obviously referring to arguments and premises about moral responsibility. And I'm still waiting for your concrete not referenced without a link example of an argument (about moral responsibility, I guess I need to stress) that doesn't ultimately appeal to intuition. You know how arguments work, right? Premises leading to a conclusion. About moral responsibility. No appeal to intuition. Please enlighten me about how that'll work. Otherwise I'll have to be sorry too.