Moral Luck and Desert in the SF Chronicle

In this article in the SF Chronicle, Chris Colin asks whether we deserve our salaries given how much of our lives are a matter of moral luck for us. He even asked John Perry, who apparently said something close to the following: "No, but don't worry about it!"

Enjoy, and happy St. Patrick's Day.

Comments

[Cihan Baran]

Finally, a silver lining from Perry:

"If it makes no sense to deserve anything, there's no reason to feel bad about it!" he said. "You've destroyed the concept of deserving altogether. You might as well say I don't quadzircle this salary. It's meaningless!"

Since when has Perry swung towards the non-realist side of the free will debate? Or does he not agree with the antecedent of the conditional - "if it makes no sense to deserve anything..."

I'll have to ask him now. (It's not my doing unfortunately.)

Speaking of links, online papers blog linked to this interview with Maneul Vargas about philosophy of action, forthcoming in some publication:

http://www.usfca.edu/fac-staff/mrvargas/Papers/5Quest.pdf

[Saul Smilansky]

Here's the way I would call it: yes, on the one hand any desert-based order is morally problematic, because there is a level at which no one is responsible for anything he does, since no one can be ultimately responsible for his motivation set (or motivation to change his motivation set). But on the other hand, there are local compatibilist differences in terms of control (I cannot control my height, but I can decide to grade papers rather than go watch TV). And building a social order - a Community of Responsibility - that takes seriously distinctions in desert based on such differences in compatibilist control (you don't deserve blame for your height, but you might if you don't grade those papers) is a condition for civilized social and personal life. That, in one breath, is my compatibility-dualism, which tries to incorporate the partial but true insights of both compatibilism and hard determinism. Since this mix may well be too unstable and people probably could not handle the dissonance, we need illusion (we also need it for other reasons).

Incidentally, there is a big and fairly neglected related question to the topic of the SF article, as to why we take desert so much less seriously in the distributive/economic sphere than we do in the retributive/punishment sphere. My analysis of that question can be found in a recent Phil Studies paper, here:

http://www.springerlink.com/content/p6p5726076x25r73/?p=e055887f67fa4722ae231cc8847694ca&pi=0

[John A.]

As usual, I am confused. If I do not (morally) deserve my salary because who and what I am is a matter of luck (I am not responsible for the characteristics that define me), what does this do to any right I might think I am entitled too? I thought rights were entitlements and because of that status they are deserved, or at least what the right requires to be fulfilled is deserved. Are rights also a matter of luck? Furthermore, if I do not deserve my salary am I obligated to give it back? It would seem that in common practice we ask people to return that which they did not earn (deserve). I have one additional confusion; if I am not responsible for who and what I am, it is simply a matter of factors outside of my control, then why is this a moral problem? It seems to me that we are simply describing a situation with no more normative worth then describing what a carrot is. At what point does normativity enter into the analysis?

I do not expect anyone to answer these questions, but if you do, is your 'response' your response?

[Joe Campbell]

As far as I know Perry is a compatibilist, not a free will skeptic (aka denier).

I also agree with Saul that even if our lack of free will rules out praise and blame it might not rule out every kind of desert. Maybe salary should be based on performance, whether or not the performance is up to us.

Likely the person who wrote "The Pina Colada Song" made millions but I don't have a problem with that. I'd rather be poor and NOT have written that song.

Think of Donald Trump. He has made billions but he is more blameworthy than praiseworthy, IMO. The desert associated with making money has little to do with praise -- which is not to say that we don't often praise people for making money.

If we don't have free will, then we shouldn't praise people for anything. But that doesn't mean that they haven't worked for, and in that sense deserved, their money.

[John A.]

Joe
You wrote: "If we don't have free will, then we shouldn't praise people for anything."

Why not interpret praise and blame as external (to the one being praised or blamed) practices designed to influence/control behavior? I think that social practices define as acceptable, forms of behavior that fall within a certain operational range. We praise people for performing within that range and blame them if they perform outside the range. The purpose of praising and blaming is to have people operate within that socially acceptable range. I think we can discuss this without referencing the idea that a moral agent could have done otherwise had they chosen to do so or some other interpretation of 'free-will' that implies that somehow the action freely emanates from the agent. We can maintain that they did what they did in causal terms and understand praise and blame as part of the causal factors that result in a person doing what she or he does. Also, I think that praising or blaming one person has intended influences/consequences on how others 'should' perform; a sort of universalizability, if you will.

I think this fits in nicely with your idea that we can say that people deserve their salaries if they work for it. If aperson does what is expected of them in terms of the promises they made she or he deserves what is agreed upon in the agreement. From this perspective we do not need to reference any original starting point prior to the point at which an agreement is reached.

[Gregg Missbach]

What's striking to me is what I see when I read the comments on that article. Most of the "general public" commenting seem unable to grasp the very point of the article. It seems our common notions of free will, desert and blame are very, very deeply ingrained.

[Paul Torek]

John Perry gives the right answer, but I have no idea if it's for the right reason. To wit: desert would be a terrible basis for salaries. As explained by Hayek, and beautifully summarized by Elizabeth Anderson at