Final Reconciliation

"It seems to me that nothing approaching the truth has yet been said on this subject." - Thomas Nagel, Freedom and the View from Nowhere

I am quoting Nagel because I think he is wrong. I sympathize with his claim, because like Nagel, I do think that much of the contemporary debate about freedom and responsible is unconstructive. Much of the dialogue seems to be like a computer inefficiently allocating memory--thrashing--and could benefit from shaking off some prejudices. But, unlike Nagel, I think that a tremendous amount of material uncovering the truth on this subject has been written. The truth has just remained beneath the surface of the debate. To bring it to the surface, I want to ask this question: what can hard determinists and hard compatibilists teach each other?

The strategy I am suggesting here might encompass a majority of thinkers on the subject today: hard determinists (and those who deny free will exists) as well as (hard) compatibilists. My thesis is this. The philosophical term of art "freedom of will" does not admit of a sufficiently precise definition for either hard compatibilists or hard determinists to claim victory against the other; on the contrary, within the wide space of potential definitions both sides are attracted to the ones that they prefer for psychological or social reasons. Once attracted to their particular definitions, hard determinists and hard compatibilists--contrary to Nagel--have succeeded in constructing a variety of models describing their idea of free will, as well as arguments defending its existence or nonexistence. Consider Galen Strawson's Basic Argument, Derk Pereboom's Generalization Strategy, or the various models of compatibilism such as those suggested by Fischer and Ravizza, Frankfurt, and so on. Are these arguments not persuasive that, whatever it is Strawson and Pereboom are talking about, we lack it; whereas, whatever it is that Fischer and Frankfurt are talking about, we have it? Both sides have not succeeded in persuading the other, and cannot be expected to do so, because both sides are not talking about the same thing. (Continued below the fold)...

This is not my original view on the subject. But after discussing the subject for several years and listening to the concerns of compatibilists, I came to realize that both sides were talking about two fundamentally different things. I feel that this thesis, which I might call Free Will Dualism, is important if we are to reach any progress on this issue. It suggests that we use a philosopher's greatest weapon: the ability to name. We might, for example, declare that the freedom we have is free will', whereas the freedom we do not have is free will''.

We might not need to invent names ourselves however. I am happy to note that this view is not original to me; David Hume shared it:

"This has been the case in the long disputed question concerning liberty and necessity; and to so remarkable a degree that, if I be not much mistaken, we shall find, that all mankind, both learned and ignorant, have always been of the same opinion with regard to this subject, and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controversy."

We can still find this distinction beneath the surface of many writings on the subject today. Galen Strawson, in his review of Dennett's Freedom Evolves, distinguishes between compatibilist "c-freedom" and another, more demanding kind. I think most hard determinists (or free will deniers) are prepared to acknowledge the existence of something like c-freedom. But we are, in the midst of our denying that free will exists, too slow to admit that c-freedom exists. Similarly, hard compatibilists such as Dennett note that the difference between his position and hard determinists might be extremely slight. Furthermore, hard determinists are by definition prepared to admit that there is something hard about their position. This suggests that there is substantial overlap between the two positions. Things approaching the truth on this subject have been said.

In other words, let's distinguish between these arguments:

A. Free will does or does not exist.
B. My particular model of free will is more appropriate than competing models.
C. Although some compatibilists and hard determinists dispute whether or not free will exists, they both admit that there is a degree of "hardness" to their positions, and this captures an important truth about the subject.

For too long, hard determinists and compatibilists have argued A instead of B. They tacitly assumed that they were talking about the same thing. Perhaps that is because once we begin to explore B, we recognize that the philosophical term of art "free will" is too vague to allow anyone's particular definition to be final. This recognition inclines us towards C.

I believe in progress in philosophy. On this subject, I think philosophers can make progress. I would invite both hard compatibilists and hard determinist to clarify and celebrate their similarities, and only then, to explore and contest their differences. In my estimation, this will be the future--and resolution--of this ancient dispute.

Comments

[Robert Allen]

Excellent post, Kip. It perfectly captures the current dialectic. I would just note that the libertarian Kane argues A and B, believing that his model is the only (naturalistic) one that entails "ultimate responsiblity," which exists due to the performance of undetermined "self-forming actions." Compatiblist models, on his view, capture other senses of free will that are important but fall short of his ideal. Some hard determinists/free will nihilists, such as Strawson and Pereboom, also seem to be arguing A and B: free will entailing self-creation ex nihilo is the only thing deserving of the name and it does not exist.

[Tamler Sommers]

Kip,

I appreciate the spirit of your post, but I have to strongly disagree on one point. You write:

"I think most hard determinists (or free will deniers) are prepared to acknowledge the existence of something like c-freedom. But we are, in the midst of our denying that free will exists, too slow to admit that c-freedom exists."

Free deniers are not slow to admit that c-freedom exists. We'll shout it from the rooftops. In fact, most hard determinist arguments are designed to show that the various kinds of c-freedom are not enough to ground robust moral responsibility, which is what 'free will' is supposed to ground.

In other words, I think more of the "blame" lies on the side of the compatibilists and libertarians, especially those who simply won't take seriously the view that we do not have the kind of free will that would make us (robustly) morally responsible for our behavior. However, since no one is truly deserving of blame for anything, free will deniers accept this bias against their position with cheerful equanimity.

More difficult to accept with cheerful equanimity is Curt Schilling giving up 6 runs in 3 innings, with an injury that might not heal in time for his next start. And yet... Red Sox in 5.

[tnadelhoffer]

Tamler,
I figured all Red Sox fans would have learned to embrace Nietzsche's "amor fati" by now--I know most Braves fans have!
Thomas

[Robert Allen]

Nietzsche was a Yankees fan.

[Tamler Sommers]

Nietzsche has been slandered enough--he's been called an anti-semite, a sypholitic, a forerunner to nazism. But that's crossing the line.

Life is a miserable bleak barren godless void.

[Rob]

"The philosophical term of art 'freedom of will' does not admit of a sufficiently precise definition for either hard compatibilists or hard determinists to claim victory against the other; on the contrary, within the wide space of potential definitions both sides are attracted to the ones that they prefer for psychological or social reasons." (Kip)

As an incompatibilist imperialist, I think this is too comprehensively reductive a diagnosis because it overlooks at least one of the important differences between incompatibilists on the one hand and compatibilists, libertarians, and whatever other names exist for those who do not think the Strawsonian point about ultimacy is integral to the metaphysics of freedom: namely, that such reduction is far more easily and cogently wielded by incompatibilists against their opponents than vice versa. It is typically much easier to identify the "psychological or social reasons" motivating opponents of incompatibilism than vice versa -- and thus easier to reduce their views to a manifestation of contingent cultural, historical, psychological, or other similarly deflationary factors.