Free Will and Geography

This is one my philosophically useless posts, so don't bother reading any more of this if you want real philosophy.

What's with the amount of free will work being done in southern parts of the United States? There is a hugely disproportionate number of people working on Free Will who live in either (as far as I can tell) the South or Southern California. Sure, there is a not insignificant concentration of excellent work on free will that happens in the Midwest, so maybe this is the telling exception to my hopelessly broad generalization. But think about Southern California, where I was hanging out last year: The Large Free Will Posse at UC Riverside (Fischer, Watson etc., (where 'etc.' covers faculty there who are interested in free will but maybe don't principally publish on it, as well as any visiting folks working on free will of which there always seem to be some there)), The USC Agency Gurus (Khadri, Gideon), Pamela at UCLA, Dana at UCSD, all of their students, and the host (and I do mean) host of other folks from San Diego up to Santa Barbara who work on these things (shout-out to my man Dan at Azuza P!).

Florida displays a somewhat smaller but nonetheless outstanding embarassment of free will riches- Al Mele and Eddy Nahmias at FSU, David Copp and Marina Oshana at Florida, and good number of others who have pitched tents in the area (Andrew, you are in the South, right?). I'm not even going to try to name names for the rest of the South. The point is, there is a disproportionate number of free will thinking going on in those warmer-climate areas. Places with lousy weather are less potent (at least in numbers) in reflection on free will, though there are some smaller concentrations, e.g., Indiana. Draw what conclusions you will. I like to think that it is because subtler minds generally prefer good weather. :-)

And, of course, apologies to everyone I missed in my catalog of people working in these regions, and apologies to the regions less infected with free will thought. You have some good folks too, of course. You just don't have as many. Too bad for you.

Postscript: another way to carve things up would be by state, as opposed to regional groupings: (1) California (bear in mind that Northern California has Jay Wallace and Michael Bratman, who has written a bit on these things) (2) Florida (3) Indiana (4) Everyone else. (okay, so maybe there is some differentiation to be had in 4, but I'm not going to try and do it). Bear in mind that I'm going by approximate numbers of people who have published on free will in these states, as decided by my guessing. Anyway, I dare someone to start the argument about where the highest quality of work on free will is done. I'll just claim that if someone were to start that argument, California would still win. Go California!

Comments

[Andrei A. Buckareff]

Manuel,

You forgot about Texas. While not as concentrated, there are some prominent figures there. Robert Kane (UT) and Hugh McCann (Texas A&M) come to mind (admittedly, Hugh is less-known for his work on free will and more for his work on core issues on intentional action). Robert Koons (UT) also dabbles in the field, and there's Mark Bernstein nearby(Texas at San Antonio). Jonathan Dancy is now at UT. Of coruse, most of his relevant work has been on practical reason and the theory of action. But work on free will does presuppose a theory of action.

Also, a good way to upset someone from Missouri is to call it a Southern state, but Eleonore Stump and Alicia Finch are both at Missouri. Of course you also forgot to mention John Searle at Cal and George Wilson at Davis (although he's only done stuff on intentional action), Randy Clarke in Georgia, and Susan Wolf at North Carolina, Linda Zagzebski at Oklahoma. If you give Maryland to the south, you also get Hilary Bok and Patricia Greenspan (although I think both Missouri and Maryland may go to the North--it snows in both places).

Now, by way of a challenge to Manuel, if you consider action theory more broadly (to include the free will problem), things may change. IU has Tim O'Connor and Myles Brand, and Notre Dame has Robert Audi, Peter van Inwagen, and Ted Warfield. Sarah Buss is at Iowa. David Velleman is at Michigan (and Stephen Darwall and Peter Railton certainly count for something). Abe Roth is at Illinois at Chicago. In Wisconsin there's Dennis Stampe at Madison, Milwaukee has Luca Ferrero and Ted Hinchman, and David Chan is at Stevens-Point. In New York state we now have Galen Strawson at CUNY, plus there is Bernard Berofsky and Christopher Peacocke at Columbia, Thomas Nagel and Peter Unger at NYU have made important contributions (I believe the latter is working on a book on free will), Carl Ginet is at Cornell, Michael McKenna at Ithaca, and Andre Gallois (Syracuse) and Rich Feldman (Rochester) have both published on free will (Michael Stocker's work would also seem relevant). Don't forget Gilbert Harman, Harry Frankfurt, Philip Pettit, and now Michael Smith at Princeton. Derk Pereboom is in Vermont. Nomy Arpaly and Jaegwon Kim (he's written some important stuff on action) are at Brown. And if you go north to Canada, we get Ish Haji (Calgary) and Paul Russell (UBC). There are more, but I'll stop here.

If you consider action theory more broadly, interests seem more diverse among those of us working north of the sunbelt. But if you just focus on free will, the numbers in the north are no less impressive. What Manuel's correct about is that there is a concentration of work on free will, and action more broadly, in schools in the sunbelt (UCR, FSU, the Bay Area).

I'm sure I've proved very little (except, perhaps, that there are more schools east of the Mississippi, and north of the Mason-Dixon). What I think is obvious, however, is that most of the people who contribute to this weblog are from California and Florida.

[Manuel]

Andrei is absolutely right that there are a bunch of other folks work in the sunbelt that I didn't name, including lots of people in Texas, Georgia, North Carolina, etc. who publish on free will. Thanks to Andrei for mentioning them. And like I said before, I don't mean to suggest that there is terrific work going on in other regions or states ("some of my favorite philosophers work in cold climes . . . ")- it is just a point about numbers. (In retrospect, I should break up the ranking of #4- "everybody else" to something like New York, Texas, then everybody else.)

I think Andrei is also right that if you think about philosophy of action more broadly, the talent seems better distributed. But I was only talking about free will. Of course, uneven distribution of talent isn't a feature of just the free will literature (or phil action more broadly)- think about philosophy of mind, which these days seems heavily concentrated around New Jersey.

[Fritz Warfield]

If the *freedom* / foreknowledge debate is part of this discussion then don't forget the Plantinga and Flint and Freddosso crowd at Notre Dame. Peter and I may well work more on determinism / freedom issues than those guys but anyone who works on freedom issues and ignores the associated phil of religion issues is missing out on lots of first rate work on freedom.

[John Fischer]

Actually, Manuel, it is one of your BEST posts.
I have noted various related weird phenomena. Note that most of us in California, including Bratman, Wallace, Watson, Yaffe, Vivelin, and me (I'm not sure about Nelkin?) are compatibilists. It must be the sunshine. (By the way, Florida has its share of compatibilists or compatibilist wannabes, such as Copp, Mele, and Oshana. Note that, despite its moniker, Florida (recently especially) does not have as much sunshine as Ca.

Now pick a very, very gray state, such as Indiana: this is a hotbed of incompatibilism: Van Inwagen, Warfield, O'Connor, Hasker, et. al. Are there any compatibilists, or even semi-compatibilists, in the entire state? And how about upstate NY, former home of Van Inwagen, and still the home of Ginet? (There are exceptions, such as R. Feldman).

So: let the sunshine in, Fiat Lux, etc!!

[Fritz Warfield]

John,
On one or two occasions we have discovered compatibilists attempting to take up permanent residence here in the great state of Indiana. In a public forum such as this one all I can say is that we, well, eliminated the problem.
Fritz

[Fritz Warfield]

oh and about Florida -- yes you're right that there's a bit of a problem down there (I mean "presence of compatibilists") but my occasional co-author Tom Crisp has been dispatched to Florida State in part to deal with this.

[Manuel]

Given the points that John and Fritz are making, I'm starting to wonder if that isn't the real explanation for my interest in revisionism. The year I spent at Notre Dame may have have given me just enough grey weather that the light of compatibilism is somewhat more obscure to me than many of my sunlit colleagues.

[Eddy Nahmias]

Actually, we're working on converting Tom to the bright side of compatibilism, though all these hurricanes make it harder.

Of course, while incompatibilism may be more pessimistic (grayer) than compatibilism, libertarianism is quite sunny. And most of the Indiana folk believe we have free will. The question then is whether there is any geographic/weather connection among (what I'll continue to call) Skeptics about free will? Galen Strawson and his student Smilansky, plus Honderich (and CD Broad?), are from gray England (but so was Peter Strawson and some old compatibilists like Ayer), Pereboom from the cold NE, etc. (Tamler's at mild Duke but hails from cold Boston.)

Don't forget that some compatibilists like me do worry about the 'flank attacks' from certain scientific theories or reductionistic theories of mind, so I have some gray clouds obstructing the sun.

I do like to see people, even in jest, suggest that the debate may to some degree reduce to fundamentally clashing intuitions, perhaps influenced by one's dispositions or even exposure to the sun (see Wm. James' discussion of optimists and pessimists).

[Tamler Sommers]

Once and for all-- free will skepticism is not a pessimistic position! This is a contemporary prejudice, that's all. Look at Diderot's great free will denier, Jacques(from his novel "Jacques le Fataliste.)'. He's one of the liveliest funniest characters in all of literature. Free will skepticism is a picaresque position maybe, a wanderer's position. But it's not pessimistic.

Here's what Darwin had to say about it:

This view [the denial of free will] should teach one profound humility, one deserves no credit for anything. (yet one takes it for beauty and good temper), nor ought one to blame others. This view will not do harm, because no one can be really fully convinced of its truth, except man who has thought very much, & he will know happiness lays in doing good & being perfect, & therefore will not be tempted, from knowing every thing he does is independent of himself to do harm.

No pessimism there. Here's Einstein:

I do not at all believe in human freedom in the philosophical sense. Everybody acts not only under external compulsion but also in accordance with inner necessity. Schopenhaur’s saying, “A man can do what he wants but not want what he wants,” has been a very real inspiration to me since my youth; it has been a continual consolation in the face of life’s hardships, my own and others’, and an unfailing well-spring of tolerance. This realization mercifully mitigates the easily paralyzing sense of responsibility and prevents us from taking ourselves and other people too seriously; it is conducive to a view of life which, in particular, gives humor its due. (Hat tip--Gary Watson)

No pessimism there either. And Spinoza not only denied free will and moral responsibility but he was said to live that way, showing no resentment over any of the injustices done to him. By all accounts he was one of the happiest and most benevolent philosophers who ever lived.

Being from Boston has made me pessimistic about one thing and one thing only. Baseball.

[Manuel]

Tamler, I take your point. But try reading 'pessimism about X' as 'pessimism about the existence of X', as I suspect that at least some of us who use locutions of the form "pessminism about X" at least sometimes mean something like "doubt about the existence of X" or "rejection of X." And, at least in the parts of the world I run in (though maybe not in others?), these usages of 'pessimistic' aren't terribly unusual. For example, I can be pessimistic about whether my brother is going to have kids (i.e., I doubt he's ever going to have them) without my thinking that his having kids would be a bad, sad, or otherwise unfortunate thing. And, though it strains the language a bit, I can be pessimistic about the existence of unicorns without thinking that the existence of said creatures would be in any way unfortunate. Of course, this use of 'pessimistic' isn't always the most precise, and may lend itself to misinterpretation (which, I'm guessing, would be your reply). However, we needn't assume that usages of 'pessminism about X' build into them the view that the non-existence of X is something bad.

Of course, come people use 'pessimism' in the sense you object to. But at least some of us (or speaking for myself, I) don't use it in these context to mean anything necessarily gloomy- I take it that it is an entirely separate issue whether the absence of free will is a Bad Thing.

[Tamler Sommers]

Manuel,

I'd be glad to look at 'pessimism' that way...if I thought everyone else did. But I don't think that's the case. People who don't believe in God are not called pessimists. People who don't believe in objective morality are not called pessimists. (They are sometimes called 'revisionists' though.) And would anyone really call themselves pessimistic about the existence of unicorns unless they had some reason to want them to exist?

In fact, I can't think of another example in philosophical discourse where 'pessimism' is used to mean 'skepticism' or 'non-belief.' Even your example about your brother suggests that (a) you disapprove of his decision not to have kids or (b) he and his wife are having fertility problems, i.e. they want to have kids but can't. If they just chose not to have kids, and you were OK with that, wouldn't you just say: "I don't think they're going to have kids"?

In other words, you were right about my reply. Pessimism is a loaded word--it implies that one is dissatisfied or worried. Skepticism and denial and doubt do not. The irony is that P.F. Strawson initiated this trend in "Freedom and Resentment" by referring to libertarians as pessimists. The word has since been used to describe all incompatibilists, including free will and RMR (Robust Moral Responsiblity) deniers. But Strawson didn't refer to RMR deniers as pessimists. He referred to them as "genuine moral skeptics," a term that has problems of its own. (One can be a RMR denier and still believe in some kind of objective morality.) In any case, P.F. Strawson was certainly pessimistic, on my reading of the wordm about the prospect of denying RMR, and others have carried on in this tradition--Susan Wolf, Robert Kane, Laura Ekstrom, and even Saul Smilanksy, who is a RMR denier. But I don't find their reasons for pessimism to be compelling. Not at all. As Darwin said about his own theory, "there is grandeur in this view of life." (I wish I could take credit for that analogy, but Galen Strawson suggested it once in an email.)

Maybe it's all just a matter of temperament...

[John Fischer]

Fritz: I completely agree about the richness, and interest, of the freedom issues in philosophy of religion. I do think that much of the debate about "Molinism" and "counterfactuals of freedom," etc., although interesting, is not really about reconciling God's omnisicience with human freedom. It is a view about HOW God can have foreknowledge and thus engage in suitable providential activity; but it is not, in itself, an answer to theological incompatibilism. (Rather, it presupposes an answer, typically Ockhamism--which is problematic, in my view.)

Manuel: yes, my years in Ithaca must account for the "semi" in my compatibilism.

[Manuel]

Tamler,

You are probably right that usages of pessimism imply that there is something of perceived value that is being lost. But, that you think there would be a good or something of value to, for example, someone having children, having free will, or unicorns existing doesn't mean that you can't think, on balance, that someone's having children, lacking free will, etc. is a good thing. So, 'pessmism about X' doesn't imply anything about all-thing-considered judgments. And, I think, most of us agree that if we didn't have free will, moral responsibility, or what have you, we would lose something of at least perceived value (for starters- our self-image!). If so, that's sufficient to underwrite the appropriateness of this usage of 'pessimistic', as it is neutral about (a) whether that thing really is valuable and (b) whether we should want that thing, all things considered.

(Try this out on the case of my brother: I might, on reflection, think that having kids really ain't such a good idea overall, but still think that it has a SOME apparent (or even real) value. And, I might also think that even if having kids is generally a Good Thing, that it would be a Bad Thing for my brother to have kids- hence. Even if I believed all this, it doesn't seem strange for me to say to someone else that "I'm pessimistic about my brother having kids." Of course, some follow-up is to be expected, after a claim like that! But, one perfectly intelligible thing to say afterwards is: "And, I think it is a good thing that he is unlikely to have kids.").

Am I the only person who thinks the 'pessimism' locution is neutral on the "all-in" value of the thing we're being pessimistic about?

And incidentally, I am neutral on whether or not it would be a good thing for my brother to have kids, all things considered. But I am pessimistic about him having kids.

[tnadelhoffer]

I thought the following quotes from Wittgenstein were salient to the discussion about the relationship between one's tempe
"It seems as if, if you are very strongly impressed by the responsibility which a human being had for his actions, you are inclined to say that these actions and choices cannot follow natural laws. Conversely, if you are very strongly inclined to say that they do follow natural laws, then you are inclined to say I can’t be made responsible for my choice. That you are inclined in this way, I should say, is a fact of psychology."
--Wittgenstein, Lectures on Freedom of the Will

[tnadelhoffer]

I thought the following quotes from Wittgenstein were salient to the discussion about the relationship between one's temperament and one's philosophy (along the same line as James)

"It seems as if, if you are very strongly impressed by the responsibility which a human being had for his actions, you are inclined to say that these actions and choices cannot follow natural laws. Conversely, if you are very strongly inclined to say that they do follow natural laws, then you are inclined to say I can’t be made responsible for my choice. That you are inclined in this way, I should say, is a fact of psychology."
--Wittgenstein, Lectures on Freedom of the Will

“It is sometimes said that a man’s philosophy is a matter of temperament, and there is something in this. A preference for certain similes could be called a matter of temperament and it underlies far more disagreements than you might think”
--Wittgenstein, Culture and Value

Interestingly enough, this could itself be an empirical question that one could resolve with personality tests, surveys, etc. But that is another story for another page.

For now, I at least want to say that Manuel's use of "pessimistic" seems strained to me. As far as I can tell, the paradigm cases of pessimisim involve doubts about the occurence of something that you really wish would occur (as Tamler suggested). So, for instance, I could be pessimistic about my chances of winning the lottery tonight (since this is something I would like to happen, even though I doubt that I will), but I can seemingly not be pessimistic about losing the lottery (since I don't want to lose anyway). After all, this would just amount to my being optimistic that I will win. Of course, I suppose it is an open question whether someone can be pessimistic about something they don't care about one way or the other. Perhaps it would be helpful to classify various uses of "doubt" language. In certain circumstances, using "skeptical" seems more appropriate than "pessimistic." By my lights, the question of free will is one of those circumstances. While there are both skeptics and pessimists about free will, some people go beyond mere skepticism (i.e. doubting that we have it) or pessimism (i.e. doubting that we have yet wishing we did). Nietzsche, for instance, wasn't skeptical or pessimistic about free will, he thought it utterly impossible not just doubtful--i.e. he denied it outright. Amor fati. I would place Galen Strawson in this camp--although Pereboom probably belongs in the skeptical camp.

[Fritz Warfield]

John -- yes, some of the Molinism (etc.) discussions are discussions of positive views of providence that *presuppose* some prior solution to the problem of freedom and foreknowledge. Some of these discussions, however, straightforwardly include discussions of that central problem.

As you well know, the classifications are difficult here. In Fredosso's introduction to his Molina volume for example he sharply contrasts ockhamist and molinist solutions to the foreknowledge issue (indeed -- he abandons his former ockhamist position and adopts a molinist position because he thinks that Molinism but not Ockhamism has a chance to solve other relevant problems of providence. Other ways of classifying positions, however, take Molinism to be a type of Ockhamism or simply the exact same position (at least on the foreknowledge problem).

Whatever one thinks about the classification issues, I'm happy (though not surprised) that we agree that those working on free will neglect the philosophy of religion discussion at their peril. On some topics (eg, the discussion of the relation between freedom and various subjunctives) the religion literature is at least 10 years ahead of the determinism/freedom literature. Of course, in some places the determinism literature is ahead of the foreknowledge literature but that's less damaging given that most freedom people are up on the determinism literature but not the foreknowledge literature.

[John Fischer]

Fritz: Thanks. Yes, we are in basic agreement, and it bothers me when some philosophers are so arrogant as to dismiss thousands of years of traditional religious thought. This attitude, found perhaps most conspicuosly recently in Dennett in the name of "naturalism", is really unfortunate.

Briefly: I disagree with Freddoso's view in that introduction because I believe the Basic Argument for Theological Incompatibilism can be reformulated in such a way that Molinism becomes inapplicable and irrelevant. (This point is parallel to the point that the Consequence Argument can be formulated in different ways, but maybe I shouldn't go there...)

Bye from the Sunny (but admittedly SMOGGY) Southland!

[Joe]

John,

I'm not clear on your comments about Molinism. Above you claimed that Molinism "is not really about reconciling God's omnisicience with human freedom" and that "it is not, in itself, an answer to theological incompatibilism." More recently you seem to be suggesting something different, viz., that it is not an adequate solution to the problem.

An example might help to clarify my question. In her Stanford Encyclopedia article “Foreknowledge and Free Will,” Linda Zagzebski lists and then discusses a number of (potential) solutions to the problem. In discussing the Boethian solution, she writes: I have argued (The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, chap. 2) that the timelessness move does not avoid the problem of theological fatalism since an argument structurally parallel to the basic argument can be formulated for timeless knowledge.” This seems similar to your more recent comments on Molinism. But Zagzebski still keeps the Boethian solution on the list of (potential) solutions. Your original comment seemed to suggest something stronger, e.g., that Molinism doesn't even belong on the list.

[John Fischer]

Really I should write something up on this, because in my view there's a good deal of confusion about it. I have talked with Hasker about it, and I think he completely holds the same view as me on this. That is, Molinism is not just an inadequate solution to the foreknowledge problem, it is no solution at all. This is different from the atemporality approach, which clearly is an attempt at a solution.

Typically, Molinists rely explicitly or explicitly on Ockhamism (or at least some other purported solution to the foreknowledge problem). Although I greatly admire Freddoso and his work on these (and other) subjects, I would contend that Molinism only appears to be a solution because he has set up the problem in a certain way. When you lay out the Basic Argument for Theological Incompatibilism in other ways, you can see the Molinism is quite beside the point.

Think of it this way. The Molinists (and Dominicans, for that matter), argue that you can have true counterfactuals of the following sort, and that God could know these in adance of creating a particular possible world as the actual world:

In circumstance C, Mary would do X freely.

Ah, but if doing X freely implies freedom to do otherwise, then the truth of the consequent simply assumes the compatibility of God's foreknowledge and freedom. To say that there can be true "counterfactuals of freedom" is to PRESUPPOSE that God's foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom to do otherwise. It doesn't address the skeptic's worry or provide an answer to it.

Now this isn't to say that it is not important and interesting to think about these issues. I think Molinism is an important model for God's providential powers. But I respectfully submit that some people don't properly keep these matters distinct from what would truly be a "solution" to the free will problem with respect to God's omniscience.

By the way, is Pullman/Moscow sunny or grey?

[John Fischer]

Really I should write something up on this, because in my view there's a good deal of confusion about it. I have talked with Hasker about it, and I think he completely holds the same view as me on this. That is, Molinism is not just an inadequate solution to the foreknowledge problem, it is no solution at all. This is different from the atemporality approach, which clearly is an attempt at a solution.

Typically, Molinists rely explicitly or explicitly on Ockhamism (or at least some other purported solution to the foreknowledge problem). Although I greatly admire Freddoso and his work on these (and other) subjects, I would contend that Molinism only appears to be a solution because he has set up the problem in a certain way. When you lay out the Basic Argument for Theological Incompatibilism in other ways, you can see the Molinism is quite beside the point.

Think of it this way. The Molinists (and Dominicans, for that matter), argue that you can have true counterfactuals of the following sort, and that God could know these in adance of creating a particular possible world as the actual world:

In circumstance C, Mary would do X freely.

Ah, but if doing X freely implies freedom to do otherwise, then the truth of the consequent simply assumes the compatibility of God's foreknowledge and freedom. To say that there can be true "counterfactuals of freedom" is to PRESUPPOSE that God's foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom to do otherwise. It doesn't address the skeptic's worry or provide an answer to it.

Now this isn't to say that it is not important and interesting to think about these issues. I think Molinism is an important model for God's providential powers. But I respectfully submit that some people don't properly keep these matters distinct from what would truly be a "solution" to the free will problem with respect to God's omniscience.

By the way, is Pullman/Moscow sunny or grey?

[Fritz Warfield]

Without getting too far into the merits of this way of classifying things (and without looking back to make sure I'm remembering correctly), I recall that on Fred's division, Ockhamists attempt to solve the problem by arguing that God's beliefs are soft facts. Molinists accept that God's beliefs are hard facts but deny the transfer principle in the argument (the "basic" argument as formulated by Fred in his introduction). unless Fred has set things up poorly in some way (and that's a real possibility given the complexities involved in the issue) the two "moves" are at least in some sense distinct *and* are at least attempts at solutions to the foreknowledge freedom problem. If Fred's set up is problematic in some way it is likely that the problem is that perhaps his "basic" argumeent isn't the best way to formulate the basic argument, or isn't how the argument must be formulated (or something like that).

Well worth writing up if you've got a strong argument for the view that the Molinist "solution" isn't of the right form to count as an attempted solution even. I myself think that it's not clear that the molinist is really distinct from the ockhamist when relevant notions are clarified --- I defend this conditional -- If molinism and ockhamism offer distinct solutions to the foreknowledge freedom issue, the Ockhamist has the better solution. And I have some reasons for thinking that the antecedent of my conditional is false.

[Joe]

Thanks a lot, John, this really helps a lot!

I had thought that Molinism was at least a potential solution to the problem of freedom and foreknowledge since it provides (or attempts to provide) an explanation for how it is that God could know about our free actions. It seemed to me that in explaining how this is possible, one would thereby be showing that it was possible and, thus, be showing that freedom is compatible with divine foreknowledge. But if our freedom is merely presupposed in the story, then an 'explanation' illustrating a 'compatibility' is no proof of the compatibility.

A Molinist might claim that the counterfactuals of freedom have a different form:

In circumstance C, Mary would do X.

But this response just shifts the problem to another location. Ultimately, all you have is a story explaining how it is that God could know that we act 'freely' but we never really get an explanation of why we should believe that the actions are free. This fits nicely with Hasker's criticisms of Molinism in God, Time, and Knowledge, Chapter 2.

Pullman/Moscow is grey today but I'm still a compatibilist! (This is no counterexample since usually there is more sun than there are clouds.)

[Joe]

John and Fritz,

I posted my last response before reading Fritz's nice contribution.

In Hasker's Introduction to God, Time, and Knowledge, he claims that Molina himself adopted the Boethian solution of timelessness (p. 15). So I think that Fritz might be right that Molinists are not (or at least in general not) Ockhamists. Still, I think that John's main point stands: Molinism needs to be supplimented with some other solution to the problem of foreknowledge and freedom. Which is to say that by itself it is no solution.

I'm very interested in the idea of the Molinist denying the transfer principle, especially since it would seem to nullify Haskers crticism (Chap. 2). In short, Hasker notes that the counterfactuals of freedom themselves allow for a bridge from the hardness of the facts about God's foreknowledge to the subsequent hardness of our future actions. But if one denies transfer, than this criticism does not apply. (I'm skipping over some of the subtlties of Hasker's criticism since this fork is only needed if you accept that the counterfactuals of freedom are not up to the individual agents.)

[Fritz Warfield]

One problem with identifying Molinists generally as "those who deny the transfer principle" in foreknowledge/anti-freedom arguments is that really, of course, there is no *the* transfer principle. As Fred sets things up in the Molina volume, his Molinist denies the particular transfer principle he formulates and uses in his "basic" argument. But there are other ways to formulate "the" basic argument -- some of these ways employ transfer principles that are provably valid (at a cost of more controversial premises in the argument). But, with that said, Fred's way of setting up the main argument is one plausible way and, given it, Molinism and Ockhamism are both clearly defined attempts at rejecting the argument and they are distinct -- Molinists reject Fred's Transfer principle and Ockhamists reject the premise that attempts to apply a "p is true so p is a hard fact" principle unrestrictedly (including, eg, to God's beliefs).

[John Fischer]

But. That would only imply that Molinism, as so understood, is a reply to one version of the argument, not to the argument itself or the basic intuitions and principles that drive it.

Suppose there is a set of core beliefs that can be organized into an argument in different ways. Suppose there is one way of doing this which is vulnerable to a certain attack. But suppose further that there are other, equally (and perhaps more) plausible and effective ways of capturing the core of beliefs and organizing it into an argument, which are NOT so vulnerable. Then the attack really is not a deep and powerful attack on the core beliefs and the argument, but, rather, only on one way of seeking to capture and regiment those core ideas. Indeed, this dialectical structure might suggest that that particular way of crystallizing the core ideas is problematic!

[John Fischer]

But. That would only imply that Molinism, as so understood, is a reply to one version of the argument, not to the argument itself or the basic intuitions and principles that drive it.

Suppose there is a set of core beliefs that can be organized into an argument in different ways. Suppose there is one way of doing this which is vulnerable to a certain attack. But suppose further that there are other, equally (and perhaps more) plausible and effective ways of capturing the core of beliefs and organizing it into an argument, which are NOT so vulnerable. Then the attack really is not a deep and powerful attack on the core beliefs and the argument, but, rather, only on one way of seeking to capture and regiment those core ideas. Indeed, this dialectical structure might suggest that that particular way of crystallizing the core ideas is problematic!

[Fritz Warfield]

That's right John -- your remarks gel well with what I was getting at in the first half of my post. Whether the classification that emerges when using Fred's presentation of the main argument is best, ok, or even adequate at all depends on whether his formulation centrally captures the core reasoning and issues underlying the worry. And this is indeed very much an open question.