As I noted a few weeks back, there was a recent article in The New York Times by Jeffrey Rosen concerning the growing new field of neuro-law. The central issue in Rosen's piece is the role that cognitive neuroscience (CNS) can (and should) play with respect to the criminal law (and its underlying notion of criminal culpability). In the article, Rosen mentions an interesting paper by O. Carter Snead entitled “Neuroimaging and the ‘Complexity’ of Capital Punishment.” And while Snead mostly limits his attention to the role that CNS could play with respect to capital sentencing (and punishment) rather than punishment more generally, for present purposes I want to use his argument as a way of jump starting a discussion concerning the general relationship between CNS and criminal law.
For starters, I want to first provide a brief overview of what I am going to call the Cognitive Neurolaw Agenda (CNLA)—an agenda that Snead associates with the following two-fold goal: (a) the short term goal of CNLA: get CNS findings into the courtroom as mitigating evidence, (b) the long term goal of CNLA: use findings from CNS both to debunk retributivism at the institutional level and to develop a forward looking two-pronged preventative and rehabilitative regime.
According to Snead, the proponents of CNLA envision the long term goal as a focused attempt to adopt a more humane and compassionate response to the crime problem than the present retributivist regime. Snead criticizes CNLA on two fronts. On the one hand, he tries to show that the short term goal and long term goal of CNLA are inconsistent. By his lights, the present goal of using data from CNS to mitigate or exculpate blame would be undermined by the long-term goal of purging the criminal law of retributivist principles. On the other hand, Snead claims that if the long-term goal of CNLA were to come to fruition, it would make the system of criminal law more rather than less brutalizing and inhumane.
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