Libertarianism and Laws

I've been surprised to find several writers say that Libertarianism is committed to the view that undetermined free actions are not covered by laws of nature. In some cases, the writer is a Libertarian; in others, the writer thinks that this view is, unfortunately for Libertarians, something to which they are committed. I haven't found much of an argument for thinking that Libertarianism entails any such commitment.

All of the writers I have in mind take Libertarianism to be at least metaphysically possible. Thus, they think there is some possible solution to the problem of luck. Perhaps the idea is that a solution to that problem requires that undetermined free actions be lawless. But why think that?

Any ideas? Also, has anyone else seen much discussion of this question?

FSU Workshop on Moral Responsibility

The Philosophy Department at Florida State University will host a one-day conference on moral responsibility on Saturday, January 24, 2009. The speakers will be Dana Nelkin, George Sher, David Shoemaker, and Michael Zimmerman. More information is available via the following link:

http://www.fsu.edu/~philo/new%20site/sub_category/moralrespwkshop.html

You may also contact the organizers, Randolph Clarke (rkclarke-at-fsu.edu) and Michael Mckenna (mmckenna-at-fsu.edu).

Kudos to Haji and Nahmias

Congratulations to Ish Haji (Calgary), winner of an SSHRC Grant for "The Relevance of Free Will to the Intrinsic Value of Lives and Worlds," and to Eddy Nahmias (Georgia State), winner of a grant from U. Chicago's Defining Wisdom Initiative for "Free Will and Wisdom in the Age of the Mind Sciences." Way to go!

Infinitely Harry

I’m grading papers, and wanting distraction, I thought of this puzzle:

Jones voted for Bush. Black was ready to intervene and ensure, had the ensurance been necessary, that Jones so vote, but it wasn’t necessary. It may seem that Jones could not have refrained from voting for Bush.

But, in fact, White was ready to intervene and ensure, had the ensurance been necessary, that Black not intervene with Jones, but it wasn’t necessary. Now it may seem that Jones could have refrained from voting for Bush.

But, in fact, Gray was ready to intervene and ensure, had the ensurance been necessary, that White not intervene with Black, but it wasn’t necessary. Now it may seem that Jones could not have refrained from voting for Bush.

But, in fact, the sequence of would-be interveners is infinite. Could Jones have refrained from voting for Bush?

Deny or Deflate?

A friend of mine has long thought that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism. He recently became convinced that indeterminism is no more hospitable. Now he's not sure what to think.

Not surprisingly, my friend is loath to accept that he was wrong all along about responsibility and determinism. But he says he finds it hard to believe that no one's responsible for anything. At least, he says, he can't give up responding to people as though they're responsible--sometimes getting mad at someone, sometimes becoming indignant, sometimes thinking that someone's punishment is deserved.

My friend has heard of a philosophical approach according to which, to determine what, say, responsibility is, we collect the truisms about responsibility and then find the item in the world that best fits them (provided, of course, that something fits well enough). In this way, he's been told, we sometimes learn that things aren't what, in our armchair theorizing, we thought they were. My friend wonders whether, taking this approach, he ought to say that we are, after all, responsible, though perhaps responsibility isn't quite (maybe not even close to) what we thought it was. And he wonders whether, if this is what he should say, he should then say he's now a compatibilist, or instead say that his incompatibilism was, in a way, correct after all, or perhaps say neither of these things.

He's asked me for advise, but, frankly, I don't know what to tell him.