Although I don't share Robert Kane's metaphysical libertarianism, I do tend to be politically libertarian. So I subscribe to David Friedman's weblog. I only mention this because Friedman has written three posts so far on the subject of moral luck (one, two and three). He has not cited any of the relevant literature, however (in particular, he has not cited Nagel's work; see the SEP article on moral luck). Friedman distinguishes between two senses of moral responsibility, which remind me of Watson's distinction between self-disclosing and accounting moral responsibility (Watson, Gary, 1996, "Two Faces of Responsibility." Philosophical Topics 24: 227-248). Smilanksy's The Ethical Advantages of Hard Determinism makes a similar distinction between the "substantive" and "accountancy" parts of morality. Like Smilansky, Friedman is concerned about egalitarianism (as discussed, for example, in Smilansky's On Free Will and Ultimate Injustice). On his weblog, Friedman writes:
"The conclusion is radically egalitarian–more radically than most egalitarians would like, since it applies not only to the difference between rich people and poor people but to the difference between good people and bad people as well. Strip off everything external, everything a person is not himself responsible for--genes, wealth, upbringing, nature and nurture both--and it is hard to see what is left on which differences in desert could be based."
Gardeners, I would ask you the same question that Friedman asks: "...I think it is more interesting to try to deal with the egalitarian conclusion of the argument from moral desert on its own terms. What, if anything, is wrong with it?"