Garden-type Research and the Public Life

Al Mele has a nice piece on drinking, taking responsibility, and self-deception. It was written in the context of a campaign against drunk driving and is therefore very accessible to non-philosophers. The campaign was launched by Pernod Ricard USA. This fact may strike some as odd, but I think that every decent attempt of philosophers to get involved in the public life is commendable, and I applaud the fact that a first-rate philosopher (and Gardener :)) has taken this step.

I don't mean to imply that philosophers in general or Garden-type philosophers in particular have never been involved in public issues -- off the top of my head, I can remember Joel Feinberg's piece on equal punishment for both failed and successful attempts to commit a crime (which, I'm told, is being discussed by Canadian legislators), Bonnie Steinbock's piece in which she argues that deaths caused by drunk drivers should constitute 2nd degree murder and not merely manslaughter, and a couple of pieces by Gary Watson on responsibility and addiction -- but still, the (more or less direct) involvement of philosophers in public issues is less widespread than what I believe would be desirable. It might be interesting to discuss, then, a set of interrelated questions, which I put forth below. (I'm afraid these questions reveal my ignorance rather than setting up the issues in an interesting way, but at least they might trigger some discussion).

1) What are the implications of philosophy in general, and Garden-type philosophy in particular, for public life? (I know, this is a monstrously broad question, but still... Also, I know there's a post, with a long thread of comments, about whether there are any straight implications of Garden-type philosophy for the public life -- or at any rate, for the notion of legal responsibility, if I remember correctly -- but I can't seem to find it now. Pointers?)

2) Are there any institutions that attempt to bridge the gap between academic philosophy and the public life? 

3) Related to the last point, In what ways could philosophers get more involved in the public life?

4) What Garden-type philosophers are (more or less directly) involved in the public life?

Some caveats: I'm aware that the expression "Garden-type philosophy" is too broad. One may argue that, for instance, research on the Consequence Argument has no practical implications, whereas research on self-deception and control does. Also, the kind and degree of "involvement in the public life" are left unspecified above. I mentioned Steinbock's paper on drunk driving. But that was a paper published (I think) in Philosophy and Public Affairs. Is that to count as an intervention in "the public life," or should this expression refer to something a bit more tangible (e.g., working with legislators)? One last thing: perhaps this post sounds a bit more skeptical than it should be. I have to acknowledge that, among other things, with the increasing acceptance of experimental philosophy -- alongside increasing Garden-related news in the mainstream media -- perhaps the situation is not as bad as I assume. However, I think that the questions above are still worth discussing.

More Reasons to Celebrate: Gardeners Rockin’!

To join in the celebration of the Garden's third anniversary, let me announce two big pub coups by Gardeners:

Neal Tognazzini has a new paper, "The Hybrid Nature of Promissory Obligation", forthcoming in Philosophy and Public Affairs. Congrats to Neal!

John M. Fischer, whose name shines in the firmament of Moral Responsibility (yes, the booze makes my writing corny, but aren't we all still toasting?), and -- again! -- Neal Tognazzini, penned "Exploring Evil and Philosophical Failure: A Critical Notice of Peter van Inwagen’s The Problem of Evil", forthcoming in Faith and Philosophy.

New Garden Feature: Book Reviews

The Garden of Forking Paths hereby launches a new feature: book reviews. Gardeners or guest-reviewers will post on a semi-regular basis (not to be confused with a semi-compatibilist basis!) reviews of books germane to the topics of our blog. We hope the reviews will be a nice springboard for discussion in the comments section of each review post. If you are interested in reviewing a book, and/or you have suggestions regarding recent books that could be of interest, please contact the coordinators. Soon, our very own Chris Franklin will begin with Searle's new volume, Freedom and Neurobiology.

As a warm-up, you can check out Patrick Todd's review at Show Me The Argument.

APA: Cultivating the Garden

Our very Neal Tognazzini has been awarded the Outstanding Graduate Student Paper Prize at the APA for his paper "On Being a Morally Responsible Stage."

Let me shout a juvenile Yay!, and extend my warmest congratulations on behalf of everyone here at the Garden.

Weekend Tidbits

On Resources, we’ve added Olle Blomberg’s bibliography of cognitive science and ethics, which lists some material that is relevant to Garden pursuits (e.g., some papers on responsibility and psychopathy).

Also, you might want to know that Al Mele’s Motivation and Agency (2003) is now available in paperback. You can check it out here. (Thanks Joe Olechnowicz for the pointer).

Harry Potter on Compatibilism and Self-fulfilling Prophecies

You won’t read it in the NYT Review of Books or the Journal of Philosophy, but… Harry Potter is a compatibilist! I don’t think there are any significant spoilers in the passage I’ll quote, but if you are too worried about spoilers and haven’t read the latest Harry Potter book yet, then Do Not

What is the Free Will Problem About? Or The Four Questions

What is the free will problem about? I have found it helpful to think about it as a combination of four very different questions:

1. Is there libertarian free will (LFW)? (Here would go as sub-questions the issue of determinism, the question whether libertarian free will is coherent, and so on.)

2. If LFW does not exist, do we still have moral responsibility and the related things (e.g. desert)? This is, of course, the familiar compatibility question, best asked as the question whether moral responsibility is compatible with the absence of LFW (rather than with determinism).

3. If we do not have moral responsibility (etc.) because of the absence of LFW, or it is at least seriously harmed by the absence of LFW, is this a good thing?

4. What should we do about the conclusions to questions 1-3?

The order seems intuitive, in that pessimism about the first question leads to the second, and so on, while optimism about an earlier question means that we wouldn't be too worried about the question that comes later.

The first two questions are familiar, but I think that we need to think about questions 3 and 4 as well, much more than we commonly do, and in any case be clear which question is being addressed in a given work. Derk Pereboom, for instance (in his Living Without Free Will, CUP 2001) says "no" to the first two questions, but a qualified "yes" to the third, and hence when he comes to the fourth question he is not too worried. In my Free Will and Illusion (OUP, 2000), I say "no" to the first (existence of LFW) question. Then on the second (compatibility) question I give a complex yes-and-no answer, attempting to combine the insights of compatibilism and hard determinism, a position which I call "Fundamental Dualism". Since I think that the absence of LFW and the (partial) harm this does to moral responsibility are negative and highly significant, I answer "no" to the third question as well. Which then leads me to think about question number 4, and my "Illusionism" on free will aims to deal with that question. I would not be able to make sense to myself of much of my disagreement with Pereboom (or, differently, with P.F. Strawson's classic position in "Freedom and Resentment"), if I continued to think only in terms of the first two questions.

Is this helpful? Are these the right questions?

Saul Smilansky

NEH Award to Manuel Vargas

We are very happy to announce that our Manuel Vargas was recently awarded the NEH Chair in the Humanities at the University of San Francisco. It is a one-year award, to pursue the topic of "Evil, Psychopathy, and the Moral Imagination."

Tim O' Connor on Freedom

Our Tim O' Connor will give a talk called "Freedom With a Human Face", at St. Louis University, on Friday, Nov.19, at 3 pm.

Wonder about this and other agency events throughout the country? Check the Agency Calendar! You'll find it on the right-hand sidebar, or here.

New Philosophy Blog

Undetached Rabbit Parts is the cool name that people at Western Michigan University chose for their blog. Check it out!

New Garden Feature: Discussion Boards for Books We Are Reading

On the left column, under the Contributors and Categories lists, you will see Current Garden Reading, a list of books that some of us are reading. Each item has a link to the book (via Amazon.com) and a link to a discussion board where we can post questions and comments concerning that particular book. Check them out!

Feel free, Gardeners, to send the Coordinators a list of books you are (or are planning on) reading. We will update the Current Garden Reading section periodically, picking material from those lists. Comments and suggestions welcome, as usual!

John Fischer on Randolph Clarke’s New Book

Those of you who live in sunny and free will-driven Southern California will have the opportunity to attend John Fischer’s seminar on Randolph Clarke’s new book, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, starting Tuesday, Sept. 28th, from 2 pm to 5 pm, at the UC Riverside Philosophy Department.

Special guests: Harry Frankfurt, Stewart Goetz, and the author of the book himself, among others.

Philosophy of Art Blog

Another topical blog, this time devoted to Philosophy of Art. Contributors include grad students and faculty from Columbia, Temple, Tel Aviv University, Minnesota State University, Auburn University, California State University, and Central Michigan University. Check it out here.

Help us with the Agency Calendar

We would like the Garden to include a calendar of agency-related events throughout the country. We are working on it, but it would be great if you could e-mail us to let us know about upcoming events (i.e. talks, seminars, conferences, etc.). We will post them in the calendar, which hopefully will become a useful resource for those interested in these issues.

Experimental Philosophy Blog

This new blog on "experimental" or empirically informed philosophy focuses on interdisciplinary research in philosophy, legal theory, and psychology. It's run by one of our contributors, Eddy Nahmias, along with Al Mele, Josh Knobe, and Thomas Nadelhoffer. Right now there's a discussion on whether incompatibilism is intuitive, and another, related one, on the role of intuitions in philosophy. Check them out!

New Papers!

Don't forget to check our Papers on Agency Blog, which now has new pieces by John Fischer, Pamela Hieronymi, Neil Levy, Saul Smilansky and Manuel Vargas. (To regularly access the Papers on Agency Blog, go to the the right-hand column, scroll down, and between "Archives" and "Other Homepages" you will find the link Online Papers).

A brief overview: Fischer's papers address recent criticisms to his r.r. view; Hieronymi argues that, although belief is not voluntary, it is subject to two robust forms of agency; she then draws a parallel between intention and belief which yields the following conclusion: in the same sense that you cannot believe at will, you cannot intend at will; Levy's paper discusses new Trolley Problem type examples; Smilanksy examines Fischer's recent approach to the moral luck problem (which allegedly threatens compatibilism). Finally, Vargas's PPQ paper will be helpful to better understand the discussion that Dan Speak has just launched here in the Garden on the need (or not?) to revise our folk concepts regarding moral responsibility.

New Philosophy of Religion Blog

You might find this new blog interesting. I took a quick look and found postings on free will and necessitation, God's foreknowledge and freedom, and even one on the Consequence Argument. The blog is appropriately called Prosblogion.

Blogging norms

Here's another posting in Brian Weatherson's blog on "Blogging Etiquette", which addresses interesting issues on discussing people's ideas in public fora like blogs. It's worth looking into...

Free Humor...

Well, yes, this blog has its bit of humor. I wanted to point that there is a posting in Brian Weatherson's blog that records philosophical break-up lines. I posted the following there, so I guess I can safely reproduce it here:

The Compatibilist I (Frankfurt-type version): Honey, you have to understand this: I freely decided to break up with you, but I couldn’t have done otherwise.

The Compatibilist II (Fischer version): I am moderately receptive but weakly reactive to your love.

And here's John Fischer's contribution, that you can read in the same blog:

The Semicompatibilist: We weren’t completely compatible, and I only sort-of loved you anyway. But don’t worry: nothing we really care about will be lost…

Collective Decision-Making and Its Discontents

Here's an overview and bibliography on the discursive dilemma, prepared by Christian List. The dicursive dilemma, List explains, "concerns the aggregation of several individuals' judgments on multiple propositions into corresponding collective judgments on these propositions", where this aggregation of judgments yields paradoxical results. Aggregation problems of this kind occur in collective decision-making bodies like committees, legislatures, judiciaries and expert panels.