I rarely post anything or even reply to the many interesting posts here at the GFP. So I reckoned it was time for me to post something. But this is not a gratuitous post. I'm wondering what folks think about current attitudes among philosophers of action regarding the value of work on action-individuation. These days folks seem inclined to either ignore the debate over action-individuation altogether (offering blank stares when you raise the topic in a discussion over some topic in action theory) or while they find the topic interesting, they claim that the issue, to quote Ginet, "though sufficiently interesting in its own right, is not one on which much else depends" (On Action, p. 70).
What I am most concerned about is whether anything else in the philosophy of action (including the free will debate) and related areas hangs on the conclusions we reach with respect to the debate over action individuation. I think it might make a difference both for what we count as an action-type as well as for what the proper objects of our reactive attitudes should be when we hold agents responsible for their actions and their outcomes (in fact, it might make a difference for whether or not we count an event as the proper part of actions or as the mere intentional outcome of an action). For example, some folks treat "thought" as an action-type. But as Al Mele and others have noted, it's not obvious that thinking is a type of action. However, if you accept a componential theory of action-individuation, couldn't thinking be an action-type all of the tokens of which are composed of more simple events (including actions and non-actional events)? So if you'd like, perhaps thinking is a "broad" type of action, all of the tokens of which are constituted by tokens of simple action-types. An interesting parallel is "driving". That is a fairly uncontroversial action-type. But when you drive to the store, you perform a fairly complex action that is constituted by a plethora of different events, including non-actional events. Driving like thought, again, assuming a componential theory of action individuation, is an action-type that is broad--i.e., such that all of its tokens are complex actions.
Why does any of the foregoing make a difference? Think about responsibility. You express disapproval of S's thinking about p or S's driving too fast. If we focus on driving, if you accept a fine-grained view, we have to ask when your driving occured among the myriad actions you performed (because there are numerous action-properties exemplified when you are "driving"); and if you accept a coarse-grained view then either your driving is one action that admits of a host of different descriptions or there are various actions you perform, but fewer than on the coarse-grained view because a number of them are really just the same action under different descriptions. Of course, if you accept a componential theory, then we can hold you responsible for performing the intentional action of driving fast, where your driving fast is composed of a bunch of more simple actions. I realize this is all quick. But I think that once we start thinking about it, the conclusions we reach about action-individuation might make more of a difference for some debates than some prominent action theorists have admitted. Does anyone have any thoughts about this? (Again, I'm acknowledging that this was all very quick and very sloppy.)
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