A question of desert

I think the following is right:

The contemporary debate seems be tracking more toward offering something like rival accounts of what it takes to be responsible in the desert-entailing sense. There also appears to be a general sentiment that if incompatibilist theories worked otherwise, they would easily secure desert-entailing responsibility, whereas, even if compatibilist theories work, they still bear a special burden of explaining just why satisfying those compatibilist conditions is sufficient for the agent to deserve, say, blame and praise.

At least, the above is my impression. But apart from some comments on the Garden, (and a few remarks in personal correspondence), I'm not sure of any concrete instances which support the observation. That is, I think there is this general presumption that incompatibilist theories have at least this advantage: if they worked they'd secure desert-entailing MR. But this is a general impression I have - not something I could cite examples of.

So I thought I'd solicit The Garden, both to check to see if the above seems like an apt observation, and in the hopes of some pointers to better evidence of the above than my rough impressions.

A Literaure Query

I'm a long-time reader, first-time poster - but I had a literature review question and hoped the Garden could help me out.

It is often assumed (or taken as obvious) that an undermining condition no longer undermines responsibility if the agent is culpable for that condition obtaining in the first place.  So, ignorance may excuse an agent, but *culpable* ignorance does not.  We might call this the "No-Culpability Clause on excuses".

I've seen lots of people assume this clause, but is anyone aware of any place where someone explicitly defends it (or a close relative)?