The Consequence Argument

Why do some philosophers take the Consequence Argument (CA) seriously, whereas others do not?  This does not correlate (perfectly) with whether a philosopher is a compatibilist (either a traditional compatibilist or a semicompatibilist), incompatibilist, or skeptic.  Also, it does not seem to me that it is a matter of whether a philosopher is primarily interested in "metaphysics" or "ethics".  After all, all of us writing about moral responsibility are concerned with the appropriate conditions for praise, blame, reactive attitudes, punishment, and so forth. 

Some philosophers simply ignore the CA or shunt it quickly to the side, whereas others take it as something that must be dealt with, one way or another.  Why the difference?  Also, is it ok simply to ignore or dismiss the CA?

Comments

[John Fischer]

Saul,

Thanks for your (as always) thoughtful post. I do think that there might be a tendency among some proponents of the CA to be "techy" or to think that we can make huge progress "just by doing logic". But one can abuse perfectly good arguments, and that would be an abuse of an important and intuitive argument. In The Metaphysics of Free Will (1994), I tried to lay out a "Basic Version" of the CA, following Carl Ginet (On Action). One can formulate the intuitive points very simply and naturally. Of course, others will seek to make everything more rigorous (see, for example, Sobel, Puzzles for the Will), but one need not have a "more rigorous than thou" attitude to appreciate the basic intuitive force of the CA.

And yes, things are complex, nuanced, and "messy" in this area of philosophy (as, presumably, in most interesting areas of philosophy). But in my view that involves various different perspective, or parts of the puzzle; I wouldn't, however, be enthusiastic about abdicating our basic commitment to clarity and rigor in light of the complexity of the issues (and, presumably, I take it you would agree).

[Justin Capes]

Tom,

Some observations to add to what Mark said. Not all Christian theists who are libertarians are substance dualists. Van Inwagen, Timothy O'Connor and Trenton Merricks, to take just three examples, all have theistic (and I think, Christian) commitments, all three are libertarians but they all reject substance dualism.

Notice, moreover, that in the case of O'Connor and Merricks, both seem to think that the truth of determinism would preclude free will at least in part because it would preclude our being the first cause of our actions (though Merricks is less clear about this). But this isn't because the self is some non-physical, supernatural substance the causal efficacy of which would be subverted in a physically deterministic universe.

So we have even more reason to doubt that any explicit or implicit commitment to dualism is playing a fundamental role.

[Kip]

I think Saul may be reinforcing what I suggested earlier: that those less enamored with the CA regard it with suspicion, as a form overly technical argument, or an argument that relies too much on the particular way it is worded. (I wrote that: "They might feel that it involves a kind of word trickery.")

Here are some more comments on that idea, with the caveat that philosophers of language and meta-philosophers know much more about this already.

Of course, I agree with John that clarity and rigor are ideals worth pursuing. However, I think we also have be cognizant of the following danger: believing that our words are clearer than they really are.

It seems to me that, in philosophy, we often:

1. regard words as having clear, precise definitions that we can make decisive judgments about;
2. rely on these precise definitions in supporting the philosophical work we want to do.

But I think this is often a mistake.

Here's an analogy: suppose you are trying to build LEGOS with boxing gloves on. The boxing gloves make it difficult to do much, or any, precise work. Now suppose someone comes along and says "clarity and rigor are ideals to pursue in building LEGOS." You might think "that's great, we should be as clear and rigorous as we can, but these boxing gloves are limiting my abilities."

Words are often like those boxing gloves. And, what's worse, we often don't seem to realize it. Something about words gives them an illusion of precision.

Take "moral responsibility." What is it? I don't really know, not with any precision. But there are entire books written about it. Of course, we are going to keep arguing, and have difficulty reaching agreement, if we're arguing about things that are poorly defined and can't be physically inspected.

[Mark Smeltzer]

Kip,

I seem to have understood precisely what your point was... is that problematic for your view?

[Sofia Jeppsson]

Kip, I agree too. :-D Had to put in a smiley, cause I can't remember when that last happened.

Here's a serious question for you though, Kip. You wrote in an earlier thread that you think there's no significant difference between living in the matrix and living in the real world, if your experiences are exactly the same. Couldn't the same thing being said for living in a deterministic world vs living in a world where people have libertarian free will? If people have the same experiences, why does the difference matter?

Tom, you wrote: "Point taken - Christians like the rest of us come in all philosophical shapes and sizes. It's weird though that some believe you deserve to burn in hell forever even though you were fully determined to sin!"

That's pretty much what saint Augustine claimed, and I think Calvin too. It might seem terribly counter-intuitive to embrace that kind of heaven-and-hell-compatibilism. But it's not difficult to understand how they ended up there. Just put lots of stress on God's allmightiness! Point out, as at least Augustine did (I read most of his work ages ago, but haven't read Calvin), that if God really created everything that must include TIME. So when he created, he created all of space-time. If you take this view on God, you don't need the past and the laws of nature to get to the familiar free will problems....

Justin, you wrote: "Some observations to add to what Mark said. Not all Christian theists who are libertarians are substance dualists. Van Inwagen, Timothy O'Connor and Trenton Merricks, to take just three examples, all have theistic (and I think, Christian) commitments, all three are libertarians but they all reject substance dualism."
Of course one can be an incompatibilist, and a christian incompatibilist to that, without embracing substance dualism. But I don't think that was Tom's point really... At least that wasn't my point earlier.
My point is this: If one thinks determinism (or, for that matter, an indeterminism that merely is determinism plus a small amount of randomness) is problematic because it robs us of something we thought we had, but which isn't compatible with determinism (or indeterminism) - what IS this thing that we THOUGHT we had but can't have?
Perhaps this can't be explained, perhaps one must have a brute intuition as to what the thing is, or otherwise there's nothing to say on the matter. But when people do try and hint on an explanation by using phrases like "my actions wouldn't be up to me, they would be determined by the past and the laws of nature INSTEAD", it at least SEEMS to me as if they're implicitly relying on some idea of the self being something BESIDE "the past and the laws of nature" rather than being part of them. So you obviously don't have to be an explicit substance-dualist or anything of the kind to embrace incompatibilism, but perhaps incompatibilists often have some vague dualism coming in the back-door and prodding their intuitions in the incompatibilist direction? (Lego with boxing gloves! Lego with boxing gloves!)

[Paul Torek]

Justin,

Let me explain more what I meant by chiming in with Philoponus's 1st paragraph. It isn't about whether we would change our belief in FW & MR - it's about the intuition that quantum physics is the wrong place to look. It's the wrong place to look for a defense of FW & MR even if quantum theory is the best place to look for resisting determinism.

You're right, of course, about the controversy on transfer principles' implications in indeterministic cases. But, the overall argument can be recast as a dilemma. Either the transfer principles do lead, as Eddy claims, to the metaphysical impossibility of free will. Or they don't, in which case it seems that we are back to regarding QM as relevant.

[Franz JANSEN]

Sofia,
You asked an explanation for “an intuition about what "can" (or "choice", or "control", or "up to me" etc) means”

As I see it, “can” or “choice” of free will is dependent on two basic conditions:
A) free choice and
B) personal motivations.

If both conditions are simultaneously fulfilled, there is compatibility of free will with the consequence argument (CA).

A) A completely free choice alone does not satisfy the conception of free will, fore instance when considering the choice of a lottery number or of a candidate for an election in a list of completely unknown persons. If there is not the slightest motivation for one or the other alternative, free will remains completely unsatisfactory.

B) Personal motivations allow free will to find the necessary indication for the best alternative, but depend on motivations coming from the biological and mental environment. Hunger, thirst and sexual desires belong to the biological environment and suddenly emerge in consciousness. Although they arise from unconscious biological roots, they can be considered as determinist, since following biological laws in the unconsciousness. The choice of a book in a bookstore belongs to mental desires and can be influenced by quite different causes, such as religion, education, information media, friends, social pressure, bestsellers, personal activities in sports and art or many others. Therefore the mental choice is also determined by motivations, which are based on already existing information.

The whole information horizon of a person is dependent on multiple determinist causes, which also limit the number of possible alternatives for her free will choice. Alternatives are not indefinite and depend on the biological and mental environment of a person. But within these limits her will is free and has the ability to decide only for the best alternative within her motivational base.

A free will choice guided by personal motivations could be considered as indirect determinism, which follows a loop through the motivational base before decision. But it remains compatible with the CA, since it does not need to break deterministic laws of nature. Its essential aim is the introduction of personal preferences in human actions.

Do we really expect free will to be more than the ability to do what we would like best to do within the range of our actual information horizon? John Fischer expressed it as “I would want to do it my way” (concluding sentence in Metaphysics of Free Will, 1995).

[Franz JANSEN]

Sofia,
You asked an explanation for “an intuition about what "can" (or "choice", or "control", or "up to me" etc) means”

As I see it, “can” or “choice” of free will is dependent on two basic conditions:
A) free choice and
B) personal motivations.

If both conditions are simultaneously fulfilled, there is compatibility of free will with the consequence argument (CA).

A) A completely free choice alone does not satisfy the conception of free will, fore instance when considering the choice of a lottery number or of a candidate for an election in a list of completely unknown persons. If there is not the slightest motivation for one or the other alternative, free will remains completely unsatisfactory.

B) Personal motivations allow free will to find the necessary indication for the best alternative, but depend on motivations coming from the biological and mental environment. Hunger, thirst and sexual desires belong to the biological environment and suddenly emerge in consciousness. Although they arise from unconscious biological roots, they can be considered as determinist, since following biological laws in the unconsciousness. The choice of a book in a bookstore belongs to mental desires and can be influenced by quite different causes, such as religion, education, information media, friends, social pressure, bestsellers, personal activities in sports and art or many others. Therefore the mental choice is also determined by motivations, which are based on already existing information.

The whole information horizon of a person is dependent on multiple determinist causes, which also limit the number of possible alternatives for her free will choice. Alternatives are not indefinite and depend on the biological and mental environment of a person. But within these limits her will is free and has the ability to decide only for the best alternative within her motivational base.

A free will choice guided by personal motivations could be considered as indirect determinism, which follows a loop through the motivational base before decision. But it remains compatible with the CA, since it does not need to break deterministic laws of nature. Its essential aim is the introduction of personal preferences in human actions.

Do we really expect free will to be more than the ability to do what we would like best to do within the range of our actual information horizon? John Fischer expressed it as “I would want to do it my way” (concluding sentence in Metaphysics of Free Will, 1995).

[Sofia Jeppsson]

Franz... I just don't understand how your post is meant to clarify anything for me?

You just explain that if I make an informed and voluntary choice in a determinist universe, my wants and the information I have will have been caused by prior events. Sure. But how does that adress what I have written in my previous posts?

[Tom Clark]

Sofia: "My point is this: If one thinks determinism (or, for that matter, an indeterminism that merely is determinism plus a small amount of randomness) is problematic because it robs us of something we thought we had, but which isn't compatible with determinism (or indeterminism) - what IS this thing that we THOUGHT we had but can't have?"

One thing that changes is that the me isn't a first cause any longer, so what we can't have, but thought we had, is ultimate (libertarian) origination and responsibility.

"But when people do try and hint on an explanation by using phrases like "my actions wouldn't be up to me, they would be determined by the past and the laws of nature INSTEAD", it at least SEEMS to me as if they're implicitly relying on some idea of the self being something BESIDE "the past and the laws of nature" rather than being part of them. So you obviously don't have to be an explicit substance-dualist or anything of the kind to embrace incompatibilism."

But if the self is not part of what nature contains (past and laws), then it seems to me one is driven to supernaturalism about the self, a kind of dualism. As has been pointed out, dualism isn't necessary for conceiving of oneself as a libertarian first cause. But it sure makes it intuitively easier, at least for non-philosophers (who Eddy was referring to when I made the point about dualism).

[Kip]

Mark,

The above doesn't conflict with my view, because it's a part of my view!

But I think I know what you mean. I often write, especially here at the Garden, as if I am an uncompromising anti-realist about free will. And I certainly have that inclination.

But, as dissatisfying as it may be, I have to acknowledge Richard Double's point that, at the end of the day, free will is not very well defined. Double (in his book) says that he reaches this conclusion reluctantly, and believes that it doesn't apply to most philosophical terms/ideas. But I actually believe that it probably plagues most philosophical debates. I think philosophy thrives on semantic ambiguity.

I have certain arguments for why the anti-realist/impossibilist/libertarian conception of free will is the right one. But these arguments are not nearly as strong as I would like. They are arguments like:

1. The "insights" of compatibilism are obvious and boring. The insights of anti-realism are surprising and interesting.
2. The insights of anti-realism are more important for our ethical development than the insights of compatibilism.

I use an analogy with the the Monty Hall problem. The original Monty Hall problem was ambiguously worded. According to some popular interpretations, you reached the intuitive answer. But, according to von Savant's interpretation, you reached a counter-intuitive answer.

Von Savant's interpretation relied on at least one unstated premise. That premise was obvious to her, but less obvious to others. Why? Because it made the problem interesting.

That's how I see the free will problem. The anti-realist interpretations are the interesting ones. They show us how cognitive biases and moral illusions lead us to believe people are more free and responsible than they are. In contrast, all of the compatibilist's points about the freedom and responsibility we have, are not interesting to me.

But the above is a weak, cosmetic kind of argument. What I would want is hard data, survey data showing that people use the anti-realist conception and not the compatibilist conception.

Unfortunately, all of the preliminary work shows that no single conception has a strong grip on the definition of "free will." So the problem is probably ambiguous from the start.

[Saul Smilansky]

John - I agree. I am also sure that some useful philosophical results emerged from all the work on the CA; which is only natural when so many smart people work for so long on something. But my claim was that (a) the CA just explains the old, familiar, free will problem in a sharp way, but does not really add much. It's still very elegant, though. Compare the CA to the rejection of PAP, for instance: for 2000 years everyone was talking about PAP, and suddenly the very need for it is put in doubt. There is nothing like that with the CA. And (b) the idea that any of the sides on the compatibility question is making a LOGICAL mistake seems to me to be so implausible, that it's just the wrong approach to take. Of course we should be as clear as we can, but the compatibility question is a question of interpretation, i.e. what does it mean for, say, control, or moral responsibility, or self-respect, or remorse, or punishment, to live with determinism. And the way to understand why a hard determinist or a compatibilist interpretation is good would be through telling complex stories that would be found more or less convincing. Which you have been doing in a very creative way yourself, so I doubt if there is a real methodological disagreement between us. I just wish more people told stories (as clearly as possible) rather than thought that some logical point (or indeed linguistic point) could settle things.

Kip - I have been too much in agreement with you of late, so here goes... I think that if I didn't believe in some form of moral realism I wouldn't bother to work on the free will problem. It of course also depends on what sort of meta-ethical skepticism one holds. But IF I thought that morality is just nonsense, then the part of morality that is worried about how we ought to treat people in response to the levels of control expressed by their actions, would not hold a special fascination for me. In other words, I would think that one's meta-ethical view needs to be fairly robust if one is to have philosophical basis for the sort of indignation at retributive punishment that you express.

[Franz JANSEN]

Sophia,
(II) Your main worries seemed to be:

Determinism “cannot mean that my "self" …. lacks the power to influence my actions, since they are INSTEAD determined by the past and the laws of nature” suggesting that the “self” is outside determinism.

There is indeed a temptation to exclude an “active self” from determinism, if the general conception of determinism is oversimplified, fore instance in the sense of a chain reaction or a clock mechanism in which the “self” would only be one of the interacting wheels, which has necessarily to follow the previous wheels (the past and laws of nature).

But determinism may be seen in a very different way. It should better be considered as a “complex network of deterministic interactions”, such as a boat in rough sea deterministically shaken by multiple waves in all directions, but guided by a pilot (self) trying not to capsize by cutting dangerous waves under the appropriate angle. The boat movements appear to be indeterminist although resulting from multiple deterministic interactions with multiple waves in an unpredictable way. The indeterminist appearance should not hide the underlying complete determinist environment. Nevertheless, the pilot (self) can deterministically guide the boat, according to his experience acquired in the past, by cutting dangerous waves.

A similar “complex network of determinist interactions” could be seen when the motivational base containing multiple individual motivations in concurrence with each other and acquired in the past, guides free will decisions. Choosing a book in a bookstore is dependent on the former mentioned great variety of motivations, out of which each represents a different personal value. The dominant personal value is not always evident at the first glance. In the case of the conception of a new house the personal evaluation of all motivations can take a long time. A person has to make a certain effort to evaluate and to rank her personally preferred motivations for the best choice.

Therefore determinism may well include an “active self” or an ultimate source, which has to make this kind of clarification to find out the dominant personal motivations, before a decision can be taken.

[Sofia Jeppsson]

Franz, I still don't understand what you're trying to tell me. Are you trying to tell me that my decisions matter, even if the world is deterministic? But I know that already. I'm a compatibilist. I'm not worried that determinism will take away my free will.

What I've been claiming in this thread, is that I have a hard time grasping exactly what the incompatibilists, i e the opposite camp, think we lack if determinism is true.

[Franz JANSEN]

Sofia,
(III) may be I have a suggestion of “what the incompatibilists… think we lack if determinism is true”.

Compatibilists and incompatibilists favour different aspects of the free will phenomenon. In the CA compatibilists preferentially consider the past (a person “could not have done otherwise considering the past and the laws of nature”), whereas incompatibilist prefer the future of free will (“Garden of Forking Paths”). But each conception of doing and willing alone is insufficient for the explanation of free will.

One essential aspect of free will is willing, which is better defended by incompatibilists. It means taking in the present a decision for the initiation of doing in the future. Willing represents the preparation of future doing, but when doing is already initiated in the present, willing is no longer required, clearly showing their mutual exclusion. (Nevertheless, there is the exception that willing accompanies doing, but only to continue the same doing in the immediate future.) Willing always needs the prospective context of the future, whereas doing represents accomplishment in the present.

Besides random decisions a motivational base should guide free will decisions in general. Although future actions and the future context are motivations which can guide a decision, the future context can have a certain or an uncertain aspect. The day and night rhythm, the moon movements as well as ocean tides represent a context of certainty, since they can be predicted with precision, whereas the weather still remains uncertain for prediction.

A free will decision facing the future has to take into account certainty or uncertainty of the context. In a context of certainty a free will decision can be totally determined by the motivation of the future action, for instance I decide to go to the office tomorrow morning at 9 am. This is a situation, which compatibilists could accept.

In a context of uncertainty, because of the instability of the weather, I cannot simply decide to follow my motivation to go swimming at the beach tomorrow afternoon. The motivation of the future action alone is insufficient for a decision and needs complementary motivations coming from the person. For instance, there is a constant period of sunshine and to my opinion there will be good weather tomorrow. An uncertain future requires additionally the input of personal motivations thereby justifying the “ultimate source argument” of incompatibilists.

Incompatibilists may think that compatibilists lack the consideration of a context of uncertainty during a free will decision, which would suggest indeterminism. The retrospective view of the CA concerning “doing“ excludes uncertainty completely, although it is present in many personal free will experiences.