>-- The Garden of Forking Paths --<

Hypocrisy

A lot of folks think that if you're a hypocrite, then you lose your moral standing to hold others responsible for their misdeeds (where "holding responsible" involves more than mere evaluative judgments that the agent in question acted badly). 

But what is hypocrisy exactly?  And what is it about hypocrisy that makes it inappropriate for you to hold others responsible when you're a hypocrite (i.e., why does the hypocrite lose her moral standing)?

I have some ideas about how to answer this question, but I'm worried they're idiosyncratic, so I'd like to hear what others thought.

Meme Permutation

OK, so maybe I've been spending too much time on facebook these days and I'm infected by the plethora of top 5 memes there.  But bear with me.*

Suppose someone wanted to know the key** readings/works in the free will literature.  How would you answer?  But wait, there are three further rules:

(i) you cannot name more than 5 works,

(ii) you cannot name a work that has already been named by someone else, and

(iii) you must briefly describe your rational for your choices.

For starters, I would probably go with:

1. van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will
2. Pereboom, Living Without Free Will
3. Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility and Control
4. Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About
5. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will

This set includes what seem to me to be two of the most influential incompatibilist accounts (Kane should also be in here, but rule (i) looms large!), two of the most influential compatibilist accounts, and what I think is an indispensible collection of essays on the subject.

I'm very aware that my sample is skewed in a number of ways.  First, it is exclusively contemporary rather than historical in nature; second, it deals almost exclusively with the compatibility/incompatibility issue.  Feel free to help correct my biases in your additions.

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*If I remember, I'll later share the reason behind this post.

**I mean 'key' along the lines of 'central' or 'influential', rather than 'best'. 

On the Human

This looks like a useful website that readers of this blog may be interested in. There's a 7-minute video on the main page that explains the site's purpose.

The Scorpion and The Frog

I’m surprised that, after studying free will for several years, I’ve never heard philosophers mention the story of The Scorpion and The Frog.

The story is simple.  A scorpion asks a frog to carry him across the river.  The frog is afraid of being stung.  But the scorpion reassures the frog that, if stung, the frog would drown, and therefore so would the scorpion.  The frog agrees.  Halfway through, the scorpion stings the frog.  They will both drown.  The frog asks the scorpion, “why?”  The scorpion says, “I’m a scorpion; it’s my nature.”

The Scorpion and the Frog illustrate a fundamental distinction: between defects in a person’s rationality (r-defects) and defects in a person’s desires and values (v-defects).  The scorpion has a v-defect, but not necessarily an r-defect.  The v-defect is clear: he wants to sting, and stings, innocents.  Is it the scorpion’s fault that he has the character he does?  No.  And then, in accordance with TNR-like principles, isn’t the scorpion excused?

To my eyes, the story of the Scorpion and the Frog exposes a blind spot in compatibilism.  Quite simply: compatibilists seem to never consider v-defects to be excusing conditions.  All of the standard accounts (Fischer’s, Dennett’s, etc.) seem blind to v-defects.  Fischer considers whether a person is reasons-responsive—regardless of what the reasons are.  Frankfurt considers whether a person acts in accordance with his highest desire—regardless of what that desire is.  Well, what if, through no fault of his own, that person’s highest desire is to torture and murder other people?

The scorpion does not necessarily have an r-defect.  Indeed, the scorpion can satisfy the compatibilist conditions of your choice.  He can be reasons-responsive and own his reasons-responsive mechanism.  He might act in accordance with his highest desire—to sting others (even if he drowns).  He might, in other words, be perfectly rational.

For example, the scorpion doesn’t say “well, it’s my character to be friendly and peaceful, but then this random, inexplicable urge to sting you gripped me.”  That r-defect would excuse the scorpion even in the eyes of compatibilists.  But he doesn’t say that.  He says, “I’m a scorpion; it’s my nature.”  Yet he still seems excused.

Instead of just considering defects that could impair a person’s rationality, we should also consider defects in a person’s desires and values.  They can be just as hurtful.  And they should be just as exculpating.