Agency on the Job Market

Are there are any Gardeners on the job market this year? If so, I'd be interested to hear their thoughts on issues such as the following:

1) What did you put for your AOS?
2) Did you try to market yourself more as an ethicist or as a metaphysician (or something else)? And how well did it work? Did you have to change your approach depending on the particular school?
3) Did you feel like having a specialty in free will/moral responsibility was harmful to your chances in any way? Was it beneficial?
4) Any advice for Gardeners who will be on the job market in the next couple of years?

I know we have talked about some of these issues on here before, but there may be people with fresh perspectives to share. Anyone should feel free to weigh in, though, even if you weren't on the job market this year. I get the feeling that marketing a free will specialty is a somewhat delicate matter, and I wonder how people go about handling it.

(P.S.  I realize the job market is still going strong, so people should feel free to post anonymously if they want.)

Comments

[Anonymous]

I'd be extremely happy to see some suggestions. I put "Action Theory" as an AOS, but of course nobody is looking for that. The problem was where to apply, aside from places listing their AOS as open. Does it make sense to apply for ethics, metaphysics, or phil of mind positions if your expertise in those areas consists, respectively, of moral responsibility (and practical reason), free will, and philosophy of action?

[Andrei Buckareff]

I was on a search committee this year. I was surprised by the number of people working on action, free will, and related topics in moral psychology. I was particularly surprised by the number of people working on topics some folks (unfortunately) treat as dead or uninteresting--e.g., the ontology of action and action individuation. Quite a few applicants put philosophy of action as an AOS, some put philosophy of mind and action. But some didn't put either. Among those whose work focused on free will, I noticed a tendency to put down either metaphysics or ethics as an AOS. Others would put philosophy of action or mind and action along with a closely related area such as metaphysics or ethics. Typically, if people wrote dissertations on topics that straddle the border of action and some other field, they would list both areas (this was what I did back when I was on the market since I wrote my dissertation on doxastic voluntarism--I listed epistemology and philosophy of mind and action).

My suggestion to applicants whose dissertations are on core topics on action/free will is to list action theory (or philosophy of action or mind and action) and the most closely related area--e.g., if you wrote on moral responsibility, put down ethics and philosophy of action. I hope that helps. You can always list metaphysics as an AOC. But I would not recommend just putting down "action theory" as your AOS and nothing else.

[Manuel]

What Andrei said: never just list phil action, and always list phil action + whatever field(s) most closely align with the bent of your work. So, for example, Ethics, Moral Psych, and Phil Action are listed on my CV. I think I may have at one time put 'moral responsibility' somewhere in there, especially when I was first looking for a job, but I think I decided there was no reason to narrow things further because (1) it isn't like someone working on, say, consequentialism works on all areas in ethics and (2) a glance at my dissertation abstract or pubs made it clear what my principal research foci came to.

As for which jobs to apply for— I'd say any that interest you and fall within those areas you broadly list as your AOS. For most folks, there is a clear direction of orientation towards a more familiar field that makes sense for them, and unless there is some special reason to, I wouldn't bother applying for jobs whose AOS is not within the more familiar field your work points towards. Even if you got an interview, it seems extraordinarily unlikely that that department won't be able to find someone who can do a better job than you can at the field they are really interested in hiring in. At least if it is whatever field is closest to your principal interest you stand a fighting chance of convincing them otherwise.

I'd add that I think it is useful collectively (if less so, individually) for us to list Phil Action or Phil Agency as an AOS, in part to get people used to seeing it, thinking of it as an active subfield, and perhaps someday, perceiving a need to hire in it. That's a lot to hope for from how an individual cv is put together, but I think this is one of the small ways in which social change can happen if there are broader patterns of behavior at work.

And, I do think it is worth acknowledging that people working on agency have a rough time of it on the job market if they aren't also clearly working on a topic or in a methodology that fits into more traditional AOSs. Of course, almost everyone has a tough time of it on the market. But it sure seems like people working on agency coming out of excellent programs are less likely to land that plum job the first time out on the market, as compared to their colleagues working more centrally in fields like ethics and metaphysics. (Is this anecdotal— yes. Am I right anyway? Absolutely. And, I'll make you a bet I can convince you over beers at some conference . . .)

It is the "neither fish nor fowl" problem. It does get somewhat offset by the diversity of positions that one might be considered for, and over the long haul I think it tends to work out okay (especially as one picks up teaching competencies in those fields listed in ordinary job descriptions). Still, given the importance of first jobs for one's career prospects, this can be frustrating.

But almost everything worthwhile in philosophy is frustrating at first.

[Chris F.]

Thanks for the questions Neal and for the responses by the others. As someone moving ever slowly and dreadfully towards going on the job market it is great to hear some helpful advice.

Manuel, I had a question about your suggestion for listing Phil Action or Phil Agency under one's AOS in addition to more traditional subjects, e.g. Metaphysics and Ethics. Earlier in the post you wrote: "I think I may have at one time put 'moral responsibility' somewhere in there, especially when I was first looking for a job, but I think I decided there was no reason to narrow things further because (1) it isn't like someone working on, say, consequentialism works on all areas in ethics and (2) a glance at my dissertation abstract or pubs made it clear what my principal research foci came to."

This all seems excatly right to me. But then I would like to hear more as to why one would put Phil action or agnecy as an AOS. Would you also council that others put Consequentialism as an AOS. Or do you think Phil action deserves recognition as it is own AOS whereas consequentialism does not?

Thanks!

[Andrei A. Buckareff]

While the question was for Manuel, I will respond to it. The philosophy of action is a sub-area in the proper sense of the term in philosophy. Consequentialism is an ethical theory. There are various theories of action, free will, moral responsibility, motivation, etc., that all fall under the philosophy of action. The equivalent of putting down consequentialism as an AOS would be my putting down the causal theory of action as an AOS. Of course, it doesn't hurt to list your current research interests under your AOS.

[Manuel]

Andrei's got a nice distinction there, although I suspect I'd be more tempted to interpret that distinction in conventional terms than his remarks might be taken to suggest. But basically, yeah, let's cheer the whole thing (phil action/agency in all of its glory) rather than a particular species or instantiation of the field. This is one of those "rising tide floats all boats" hopes.

[Anonymous]

Thanks for the comments. Very helpful.

If phil. action is a sub-area, what is it a sub-area of? Phil. mind? Metaphysics? Ethics? Moral psychology (itself a sub-area)? Or do you mean sub-area in that it incorporates elements of all these areas, but is not itself a "primary" area like those (i.e., it doesn't have the same clout as a field in its own right).

And what about free will? Would it make any sense to list free will as an AOS, or would you categorize free will as an instantiation of a field? And, if so, what field? E.g., "Phil of Action (esp. Free Will)" or "Metaphysics (esp. Free will)"?

[Andrei Buckareff]

I should have been more careful. I agree with Manuel. It should be treated as a primary area in its own right. Granted, what I work on are issues that are closest to philosophy of mind (intentions, reasons explanations, and mental agency) and epistemology (doxastic agency); but I think it is best to simply treat it as a primary area in the same sense that mind and epistemology are primary areas.

As for free will, I'd say it belongs under the philosophy of action. I do not like to say I work on agency theory or the theory of agency since that has traditionally been associated with agent-causalism. Moreover, I take it that if you are theorizing about agency, you will wind up theorizing about action, and vice versa. Also, I can theorize about agency without ever writing about free agency. So I have found the recent use of 'agency theory' to refer to theorizing about free will a bit confusing. I've published very little on free will, but I like to think that I have published a bit on the topic of human agency.

Topics like free will, intention and intentional action, reasons explanation, mental agency, practical reason, motivation, etc., all strike me as legitimate sub areas of the philosophy of action.

[Eddy Nahmias]

If you work primarily on phil action and/or free will, I think you'll be better off if you can list as an AOS either Metaphysics, Ethics, or Phil Mind (or maybe epistemology?), and you'll probably be better off if you actually have one of those as an AOS! Then you can put phil action or free will within one of those.

I list Phil Mind and Phil Psych and Moral Psychology (esp. free will and moral responsibility).

[Tamler Sommers]

As someone who focuses on the moral responsibility side of things, I feel strange about putting 'philosophy of action.' Philosophy of action makes me think more of people like Bratman, Davidson, and Mele, less of someone like P.F. Strawson. But that could just be me. Does "Philosophy of Action" emphasize certain aspects of the free will/moral responsibility debate more than others? If so, then maybe AOS: "Free Will/Moral Responsibility" along with Ethics or Phil Mind or Metaphysics would be a better choice for Manuel's collective AOS.

[Andrei Buckareff]

For what it is worth, free will/moral responsibility makes me think very little about P.F. Strawson, his significant contributions to the field notwithstanding. I have managed to be the object of the ire of people in the past with respect to these matters. I reckon I'll risk doing so once more.

Can one do effective work on free will/moral responsibility and not be well-acquainted with the sort of work associated with Bratman, Davidson, and Mele (as Tamler put it)? This is an honest question.

I realize work on some problems does not require any familiarity with foundational issues in action theory. But if I'm going to work on free will, I better have some idea of what I'm talking about when I discuss the thing I'm claiming is free--viz., a will or an action, for that matter. (This is why I spend time going over the standard story of action and the nature of deciding whenever I teach free will.) It seems to me that some of these other issues are unavoidable. There is a story of action I assume when theorizing about free agency and moral responsibility, and this does make a difference. If you accept certain theories of intentional action, certain theories of free agency don't look like they're much of an option for you. It is true that if one just works on free will and moral responsibility, one is not doing the theory of action in the narrow, traditional sense of the term. But in a broad sense, one is doing philosophy of action nonetheless (just as one is doing philosophy of mind if working on consciousness and never actually writing about the metaphysics of mind).

I've probably said enough on this matter. But I will briefly note that I have found that there is a growing sentiment similar to what Manuel expressed regarding the need of persons working on these various issues to work towards getting the philosophy of action (construed broadly, mind you) to be recognized as a proper sub area.

[Tamler Sommers]

Andrei,

Just to clarify, I didn't say that one need not be acquainted with the work of Bratman, Davidson, and Mele in order to do good work on moral responsibility. My point was that being a specialist in action theory (and their work on action theory) is different from being a specialist on moral responsibility. We need to have a good understanding of logical argumentation in order to do good work on moral responsibility but that doesn't mean that I should claim an AOS in Logic.

Also, I thought it was clear that 'moral responsibility' calls P.F. Strawson's contribution in that area ("Freedom and Resentment") to mind more than 'action theory' does. I certainly didn't mean to imply that P.F. Strawson's only contribution to philosophy in general--or even his most significant contribution--was his work on moral responsibility.

[Andrei Buckareff]

Tamler,

Your point is well taken. But I think the difference here is over how narrowly or broadly one construes the philosophy of action. Being a specialist about theories of action is certainly different from being a specialist on moral responsibility. But does that mean the person who works on moral responsibility is not working in the philosophy of action, broadly construed? To return to my brief point about the philosophy of mind, it's a bit like someone being a specialist about consciousness and someone specializing in the metaphysics of mind and another specializing in mental content. They all work in the philosophy of mind. I take it things are similar in the philosophy of action. What unifies the various areas is that we are talking about human action and agency. In any case, I'm beating a dead horse. (For what it's worth, I recall something on David Velleman's web page that suggests that he agrees with your point about moral responsibility, but not autonomy/free will. )

Incidentally, I didn't take you to be saying that P.F. Strawson's sole contribution to philosophy was with respect to the debate over moral responsibility. I was half-joking with my remarks. I just think of Harry Frankfurt whenever someone utters 'moral responsibility'. I only think about Strawson if someone mentions reactive attitudes.

In any case, now I will really stop with my replies. I just wanted to clear the air a bit.

[Tamler Sommers]

Andrei,

Looking back, I see I misinterpreted your P.F. Strawson remark, sorry about that. Still, when someone utters 'moral responsibility', you should think of Strawson more often! I'd put his contribution on par with Frankfurt's, especially given the high quality of work from philosophers inspired by Freedom and Resentment. (Wolf's "Importance of Free Will," Watson's "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil," Paul Russell's stuff, Wallace, and much much more.) Does that work fit most comfortably in the "philosophy of action" category? Maybe. But I wish there was another term that captured the difference between those works and the work of, say, Bratman. I wish a lot of things though and as this year's Superbowl demonstrated all too vividly, a lot them don't come true.

[Tamler Sommers]

P.S. Or, as I said in my original post, it would be nice to have term that encompassed both those areas without emphasizing one more than the other.

[Manuel]

I share Tamler's sense that phil action is a term that is most frequently associated with work on foundational issues in action, and that free will/moral responsibility isn't what first comes to mind when people mention phil action. Still, I think these things are importantly related and that it would be nice to have an umbrella term. That's why I sometimes like the 'phil agency' language— it can be taken to suggest something broader than what people associate with phil action, including matters of responsible agency, autonomous agency, and the like.

Of course, Andrei is right that one is going to have a tough time talking about agency without action coming into the picture. And, for anyone who works on the kinds of things that are most commonly associated with phil action, this distinction will likely look like one without a difference. But here, I think it is important to think of the phil agency proposal in terms of a proposal for a serviceable and effective (if not fully accurate) label, and less a matter of sharp conceptual difference.

Or, we could reach way back and resume calling the broader field 'philosophical anthropology.' But that would confuse everyone who isn't at a senior faculty member at a Catholic university and/or working out of a particular phenomenological tradition. But, it might mean we could start confusing phil science search committees, too, which might have its charm.