Surveying Strawson

Dear Gardeners,

Tamler Sommers and I are embarking on a perilous pilot study in experimental philosophy, and we need your help to make it less fruitless than it might otherwise be!  Unlike previous studies on folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility that have focused on scenarios describing determinism, we would like to systematically explore how non-philosophers react to a philosophical argument about FW and MR, how they explain their responses to it, and how they try to resolve and explain any inconsistent responses they offer.  In the pilot study we just hope to learn whether refinements of such studies could lead to valuable information and, if so, how to refine them, and we suspect in any case that we’ll get some interesting responses (as we all have experienced when we do such “studies” the normal way, by listening to our intro students).

 

We want to present our participants with something like Strawson’s Basic argument.  This has turned out to be a painfully difficult task, mainly because the regress idea is hard to get across.  But we seek your feedback about how any of what follows might be improved.  We are fine with people telling us that we are being silly to even go down this path, but since we already know that, it won’t have much effect (though perhaps you will have some reasons why we are being silly that we haven’t thought of already).  Suggestions about best to go down the silly path (which we are determined to go down—no forking here) will be more helpful.

Thanks,

Eddy and Tamler

Directions for taking the online survey, followed by this open-ended question:

1.      When someone says, “She’s morally responsible for doing that” what does that mean?

People understand the idea of moral responsibility in several ways and you likely mentioned one of them just now.  Sometimes people use the idea of moral responsibility to mean something like “moral obligation” (for example, we have a moral responsibility to help our friends).  But for the rest of this survey, we want you to keep in mind this idea of moral responsibility:  When people are morally responsible for doing something bad, they deserve blame (and perhaps punishment) for their action, and when people are morally responsible for doing something good, they deserve praise (and perhaps reward) for their action. 

Another way to describe this sense of moral responsibility is this:  When people are morally responsible for doing something bad, it is fair to blame them, or we should blame (or punish) them even if there would be no future benefit of doing so. 

GARDENERS: ANY

MORE EFFECTIVE WAYS

TO DESCRIBE THE SENSE OF MORAL RESPONSIBILTY AT ISSUE?

[7-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree]

2. Most people are morally responsible for some of their decisions and actions.

3.  I am morally responsible for some of my decisions and actions.

Now consider each of these statements carefully and indicate whether you agree or disagree with them [Responses available are: ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘I don’t know’, and ‘This statement does not make sense to me.’  If participants answers anything other than ‘yes’ we will ask them to explain why they answered that way.]

1.      Your decisions are entirely the result of the situation you are in and the way you are at the time (your character, thoughts, desires, skills, etc.).

2.      The way you are at any time is entirely the result of earlier factors that led you to be that way.

3.      At some point (when you were a young child), all of these factors were entirely beyond your control (you had no control over your genes, your early upbringing, random things that happened to you, etc.).

4.      You cannot be morally responsible for factors that are entirely beyond your control.

5.      Since you were not morally responsible for these factors that made you the way you are, you are not morally responsible for the decisions that result from your being that way.

6.      So, you are not morally responsible for any of the decisions you make.

If they agree with 1-5 but not 6 we ask them to resolve the apparent contradiction…

GARDENERS: ANY

MORE EFFECTIVE WAYS

TO DESCRIBE THE BASIC ARGUMENT SO THAT IT BOTH GETS ACROSS THE PROBLEM AND CAN BE UNDERSTOOD?

This argument is probably not formally valid as written and it may need another premise to get from 6 to 7, but every way we try to make it sharper makes it too technical or unclear.  Needless to say, one of us believes this argument (as presented and in its more precise Strawsonian form) is unsound, while the other believes it is sound.  But we hope to see what people who don’t have deep philosophical commitments or theories think about it, whether they will see any tension between accepting the premises of the argument and rejecting the conclusion, or whether they say anything interesting as they explain themselves.  Thanks for your thoughts!

Comments

[Steven Splinter]

Why not: "For the rest of this survey, you should understand 'moral responsibility' to mean whether one deserves praise (and perhaps reward) or blame (and perhaps punishment) for their actions. Any moral obligation to perform or avoid an action should not be considered."

Also, why not ask if this way of thinking about moral responsibility makes sense to them, at the end of the survey?

[Alan White]

A comment on (statement) 2. It is certainly one of the premises that might most frequently be challenged by most people. I think it might be narrowly intrepreted as meaning that we can, at any time, be *only* a sum of *past* influences, and not at all influenced by *present* influences. Most people are not sensitive to matters of causal influence via the light-cone, and thus might chafe under the force of the word "entirely". If you eliminate that word, you might also eliminate undue dwelling on its force, retain the same meaning of the question, and thus get responses more in keeping with the sense that the past makes us what we are.

[Tamler Sommers]

Alan,

I agree. I've been trying to get Eddy to drop that word for three months!

[Eddy Nahmias]

I'm fine with dropping "entirely" from premise 2. I'm not sure taking it out helps overcome any worries about people thinking the way the are now is also a result of present influences. To correct for that, it seems we'd want to say: "The way you are at any time is [entirely?] the result of earlier factors that led you to be that way and your current situation."

I added "entirely" to try to cut off the thought that the way you are now is partially the result of your creating yourself to be that way now (with some agent causal power or something).

[Paul Torek]

I think the phrase "When people are morally responsible for doing something bad, it is fair to blame them," is sufficient. The remainder of that sentence: "or we should blame (or punish) them even if there would be no future benefit of doing so" doesn't help and probably hurts in my opinion. Steven's suggested language, "deserves praise ... or blame ..." is another good alternative.

Perhaps you should advise your subjects, before they get get to statements 1-6, that they may wish to make tentative notes toward the answers and then feel free to revise them in light of their answers to later items in the series. Or, make this a between-subjects variation, with some subjects getting that advice, and others not.

[Tamler Sommers]

A quick point and a question:

First, my official position is not the basic argument is sound--just that it is intuitively plausible (to me, anyhow).

Second, do we have the regress here? Or do we need something between 5 and 6 to get across the point that you can never hope to become MR for the way you are, because there can never be that first MR decision (which is the only way to acquire moral responsibiltiy for the way you are).
There can never be that first MR decision because the only way to MR for a decision is to be MR for the way you are when you make it. And since you are not MR early in life for either your decisions or the way you are, there is no way to jump-start responsibility.

You see why this is a such a problem--I'm confusing myself just trying to articulate it.

[Justin Coates]

Hi Eddy and Tamler,

Would it possible to test for whether the folk think that the Basic argument is sound across subjects instead of within subjects?

Let me explain in case I'm using the methodological jargon incorrectly: instead of giving one person each of the premises, you'd give six samples of subjects one premise each (with the additional question: do you believe that normal adult humans are sometimes MR for their actions?). Presumably, this would offer you a way of testing to see whether the folk were taken in by this argument (did I just betray my opinion?) in the first place. However, if it turns out that the folk are genuinely disposed to accept each of the premises (and believe that we are usually MR), then you could pursue further studies to see which premise they would give up. But, by testing across subjects, you'd save yourself the trouble if you were to discover that they already rejected the soundness of the argument.

One further benefit to this strategy might be that you could make each premise a bit more precise since the subjects would only have to attend to one difficult idea instead of six.

[Tamler Sommers]

Justin,

That's a really interesting idea, thanks. How would we phrase the regress question now that it was the only one they were going to answer?

[peter]

You could consider using a Latin square design, whereby you'd get some of the benefits of both within and between subjects designs.

The first condition would be the standard sequence of premises, and the first position (across all conditions) would give each premise on its own, between subjects.

[Tom Clark]

Paul (Torek) objects to how Tamler and Eddy (T&E) characterize the sort of moral responsibility respondents should have in mind when answering the questions, namely that "we should blame (or punish) them even if there would be no future benefit of doing so." T&E want to test people’s intuitions about a sense of MR and desert that is explicitly non-consequentialist. Are we MR in this sense, and is it threatened by the Basic Argument? Seems to me this is an interesting sense of MR to test for, since it’s at the core of the philosophical debate. So I vote to keep the phrase in there, and in fact I’d make it even more salient by illustrating what it means to hold someone non-consequentially responsible, e.g., keeping offenders in prison long after they’ve stopped being threat to society.

[Tamler Sommers]

Paul,

Why do you object to that notion of desert (ought to be blamed or punished independent of consequentialist considerations). Do you think that begs the question against classical compatibilism?

[Eddy Nahmias]

Apparently, Tamler and my idea to survey philosophically naive students about their view of a complicated philosophical argument was perceived as so stupid that most of you simply ignored our plea for help. So, obviously, we decided to do it anyway. We'll let you know if anything interesting comes of it. (And we won't let you know if nothing interesting comes of it.)

After this pilot run of the survey, which ended up looking different from what we posted here, we'll refine it a bit and then we'll make it available for you professionals to take as well. I know you can't wait!

[Eddy Nahmias]

I hope my sarcastic tone in the previous post was clear, but if not just put a ;-} after all the snarky sentences...

[Kip Werking]

In all seriousness, I can't wait either.

[Tamler Sommers]

Eddy can put in all the emoticons he wants. The truth is he's really bitter and never wants to speak to any of you again. (Unless the basic argument is definitively vindicated, in which case he forgives all of you because you're aren't responsible for the way you are.)

[Paul Torek]

Now that this subject has revived, I see that I missed some questions asked of me. Oops.

For what it's worth, I don't object to that notion of desert (ought to be blamed or punished independent of consequentialist considerations). I object to the attempt to explain that notion to laypersons in the space of a sentence or two. The overwhelming majority of subjects, I'll bet, will read everything you want and need from the earlier phrasing, "When people are morally responsible for doing something bad, it is fair to blame them."

If one starts talking about cases in which nothing is to be gained from punishing or rewarding, overly astute subjects may quite reasonably infer that you have in mind a scenario where the whole institution of holding people morally responsible has no benefit. Otherwise, holding the culprit responsible would have a benefit - namely, upholding the institution.* (I speak of the actual and near-by possible worlds - where most subjects' thoughts dwell - not the world of the logically possible.)

But in such a scenario, many non-consequentialist subjects might judge that the whole institution of punishment would then be unjustified. And they would then answer survey questions in certain ways, for reasons that had little to do with the intended line of questioning.

*Note that this need not be the, or even a, reason why the particular instance of holding-responsible would be morally right.