Book on the Future

I'm at home and don't feel like going to my office, so I'm calling on the collective wisdom of the rest of you.  There is an example that gets used in the free will literature about a person who pulls a book off a shelf in a library and begins to read, only to find that the book describes everything that he does--including entering the library, pulling the book off the shelf, reading the book, etc....  For some reason, I think the guy's name in the story was Hobart.  Rather than sorting through the 193,000 hits returned by Google, could any of you point me to the (preferably original) reference for the story? 

Comments

[John Fischer]

I'm traveling and away from my books.
I think the guy in the story is named "Osmo". I know that Alvin Goldman discussed this sort of "story of one's life" example in his book, "A Theory of Human Action". Also, Richard Taylor discusses this example in his "Metaphysics". I'm not sure what the original source of the exmaple is.

[Ben Bayer]

Probably this isn't the original source, but there's a story like the one you describe in *Philosophy: An Introduction Through Original Fiction*, by Thomas Davis:

http://www.amazon.com/dp/0072831766

It's the first story, "Please Don't Tell Me How the Story Ends." You can read a bunch of it online through the Amazon "Look Inside" feature, since it's the first one.

[jim]

That story appears in Goldman's "Actions, Predictions, and Books of Life", which he said was his first publication. I think it's in Amer Phil Q, in the early 70s.

[Paul]

Linda Zagzebski wrote a "Story of the World" example in her The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, but I'm not sure that's the one you have in mind. (It's very brief and doesn't mention any names.) Maybe it'll help though.

This is almost surely not what you had in mind, but it's worth noting that Will Ferrell's character in Stranger than Fiction was named Harold (which is somewhat close to Hobart).

[Bill Egginton]

Julio Cortazar's "A Continuity of Parks" explores exactly this problem.

[Bill Egginton]

Julio Cortazar's "A Continuity of Parks" explores exactly this problem.

[Alan]

Not to add anything new but to affirm the references to Goldman above--I'm almost sure that is the piece requested. I haven't taught it in years, but maybe I should again--students were positively maddened by it.

[Joe Campbell]

The first I heard of it was Goldman's paper. It was printed in early editions of Feinberg's "Reason and Responsibility."

Also, isn't Taylor's story of Oslo in the later editions of "Metaphysics" similar?

[KT]

You Gardeners are the best--thank you so much.

[John Fischer]

Kevin: You are reading this blog, you are reading this blog, you are reading this blog, you are reading this blog...

[KT]

And then on the next page, it described me replying to John Fischer and eating a cookie. Not wanting to prove the book wrong and make the universe implode, I replied to John, telling him how funny he was--just as the book had described... Mmmm, oreos.

[Andrei Buckareff]

John is correct, it is in Goldman's action theory book (a classic that deserves more attention). But Velleman also discusses it in his paper on epistemic freedom that was published in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly and reprinted in *The Possibility of Practical Reason*. The same stuff is discussed in a chapter in Velleman's *Practical Reflection*.

[Joe Campbell]

Likely you've tracked down the references but just in case you didn't, here is the reference for the Goldman article: "Actions, Predictions, and Books of Life." American Philosophical Quarterly vol. 5, no. 3: 135-151 (July 1968). A slightly different version appears as Chapter Six of his A Theory of Human Action (Prentice-Hall, 1970). The article is reprinted in Feinberg's Reason and Responsibility, 6th Edition, which is where I got the reference information.

Note that the Story of Osmo doesn't appear until the second edition of his Metaphysics (Prentice-Hall, 1974). It is in subsequent editions (1983, 1992), as well. In the first edition (1963), the chapter entitled "Fate" offers a different, more interesting argument for fatalism IMO.

I felt bad that my first post was a repeat of John's -- which I failed to notice at first! And I happened to be visiting my office today, so I thought that I'd add a bit more!

[KT]

Thanks again all. Let me ask another--and hopefully more substantial--question. I'm going to go with the Osmo version for now, just because I like the name.

Suppose that Osmo finds the book of his life. Suppose he reads enough to believe that everything the book describes about his life (including the future times of his life) is true. And just for fun, let's say that he knows it is true.

One might be inclined to think that if Osmo reads in the book about a future decision that he will make (say, his decision about what to make for dinner that night), then on the basis of his knowledge derived from the book, he would have no need to deliberate about that decision. "The book says I'll grill fish. The book is right about such things. So no need to deliberate about this. I wonder what wine it says I'll serve...."

A slightly stronger conclusion is that it would not be possible for him to deliberate about the future action. After all, one might think, he knows what he'll do, and one can't deliberate about what one knows one will do. "I can't deliberate about what to make for dinner. I should read what it says about the wine so I can't deliberate about that either..."

But suppose that the book also (truly) claims that he will make another decision in the future, such as what to have for breakfast tomorrow, about which he is unaware--say he hasn't read that far yet (he's still reading about tonight's wine). Issues of logical fatalism aside, is there any reason to think that he couldn't deliberate about what to have for breakfast tomorrow given that (a) the book contains the truth about the matter, (b) Osmo could become aware of that truth quite easily (e.g., turn to the next page and read), but (c) Osmo isn't presently aware of that truth?

[Paul Torek]

If Osmo grills fish on the basis of having read in the book that he will grill fish, then he opens himself up to self-fulfilling predictions by the author. And once he takes that approach, he no longer has any reason to suppose that the author takes Osmo's reasons for action into consideration. Fish would be a disaster, displeasing several dinner guests, and Osmo would realize this if he put two seconds' thought into it? No problem - predict it anyway, and he'll do it. So, once having done the hard work of figuring out what Osmo will do up to the point where he realizes that the book is accurate, the author can rest easy, and write anything plausible whatsoever for the rest of the story.

Luckily, Osmo is smarter than that. Forseeing all this, he realizes that he must (that's a normative "must") continue deliberating on his actions. It's the only way to keep the author honest.

[Tamler Sommers]

Kevin,

"Is there any reason to think that he couldn't deliberate about what to have for breakfast tomorrow given that (a) the book contains the truth about the matter, (b) Osmo could become aware of that truth quite easily (e.g., turn to the next page and read), but (c) Osmo isn't presently aware of that truth?"

In my view, none whatsoever. Which is why I don't feel the force of those 'deliberation is incompatible with determinism' arguments at all. Honestly, I don't fully understand them. This example illustrates my confusion perfectly. Does anyone think that Osmo couldn't deliberate about his breakfast decision even though he believes, he knows, that the decision is already determined? If he can't, why not? He's aware that his deliberations will play a role in the outcome. If he thinks 'I love buttermilk pancakes, I haven't had them in a while, I have the ingredients, so that's what I'll have" and also believes (correctly) that these thoughts will play a role in determining the decision, where's the problem? What obstacle does the knowledge that the truth is already determined place in his way? I really don't get it. (P.S. And the truth of determinism does not, of course, entail (b))

[Eddy Nahmias]

Assume the book is always right about what Osmo will do and it says, "Tonight (7:13:42 until 7:14:59) Osmo deliberates about whether to grill fish, order pizza, or cook pasta. At 7:15:00 Osmo decides to grill fish and begins preparations..." (Assume also that the book has defined deliberation at some point as Osmo's considering his reasons for various courses of action, each of which is possible *if* he decides to pursue it.)

Well, if the book says that, then the book must be right, so Osmo does deliberate and make a decision. Is the book re-defining deliberation and decisions in some wretched compatibilist way? (If so, wouldn't the book know it and say that Osmo deliberates* and decides*?) Of course, the book will also be right about when Osmo will read about (and hence know about) what he will deliberate about and what he will decide. So the quotation above will perhaps be followed by: "Osmo will read the previous sentence at 6:12 and hence know what he will be deliberating and deciding about at 7:15..."

Where's the problem?

[Neil]

Tammler,

Surely there is a difference between finding reasons for an action and deliberating about whether to perform an action. Suppose I know that you will protest about my spelling of your name. I might sit down and think 'what reasons might Tammler have for protesting about my spelling of his name'' I might do that now, before you have engaged in that action. And I might be able to come up with the reasons. Now, the fact that if you read my post before you starting protesting wouldn't prevent you doing the same thing, right? So there is a difference, even from the first-person point of view, between looking for the reasons that would make an action the best one to perform, and deliberating about which action we should perform. So why should I regard your case as a case of the second, and not the first?

(BTW, it doesn't follow that determinism is incompatible with deliberation, as I've argued elsewhere).

[Tamler Sommers]

Neil,

I love the metablog nature of the example, but I can't say I understand your point. Who's deliberating or coming up with reasons about protesting? You or me? Or both? How does this address my confusion (rather than adding to it)?

Is it that in knowing about your post, I might still think that there are overriding reasons for protesting, but then deliberate and decide not to protest? (And so deliberation and coming up with best reasons are not the same thing.) If that's the case, then no--I deny the premise. I wouldn't (and don't) find overriding reasons for protesting. True, I might see that there are some small reasons to protest but in this case, because I know you're trying to make a point and I tend to like meta-things in general, I would realize that reasons to protest are easily trumped by reasons not to protest. That's what deliberation is all about, right? Weighing reasons, seeing which of them win out. I certainly wasn't claiming that Osmo had no reason not to have pancakes for breakfast. He might think buttermilk is fattening, but find that reason to be easily outweighed by his desire to eat pancakes and read the Globe sports section.

[Joe Campbell]

Are books of life, like the one that Osmo has, possible? I doubt it. Or, to be more careful, I doubt that such a book could (a) contain all and only truths and (b) accessible to Osmo.

It is strange enough when you consider things like your fish example. There the problem is relatively minimal, though. If Osmo knows he'll grill fish, why would he deliberate? If he genuinely deliberates, how does that not defeat his prior knowledge? I've said before that this is enough for me to think that deliberation and prior knowledge (knowing what you will do while you are deliberating about it) are incompatible but I recognize that intelligent folks might disagree.

But presumably Osmo is like the rest of us and sometimes bad things happen to him. Osmo reads in the book: "Osmo drives his 1965 Mustang to work and gets into a car crash." Osmo knows that he can just as easily take the bus. What does he do? Suppose he decides to drive to work anyway and, indeed, gets into a car crash. How many times does this sort of thing have to happen before Osmo attempts to thwart the predictions of the book? And if the bad things keep happening, even though he tries to prevent them, then I think that Osmo has good reason to think that he is a puppet and never really deliberated about anything.

Note that determinism need not entail the existence of a book of life, so I don't think that you can draw any conclusions about determinism and deliberation from this.

There is an interesting paper by Karl Popper -- "Indeterminism and Quantum Mechanics" or something like that -- which discusses similar issues but I don't have the full reference. I'll post it to later in the week.

[Joe Campbell]

Are books of life, like the one that Osmo has, possible? I doubt it. Or, to be more careful, I doubt that such a book could (a) contain all and only truths and (b) accessible to Osmo.

It is strange enough when you consider things like your fish example. There the problem is relatively minimal, though. If Osmo knows he'll grill fish, why would he deliberate? If he genuinely deliberates, how does that not defeat his prior knowledge? I've said before that this is enough for me to think that deliberation and prior knowledge (knowing what you will do while you are deliberating about it) are incompatible but I recognize that intelligent folks might disagree.

But presumably Osmo is like the rest of us and sometimes bad things happen to him. Osmo reads in the book: "Osmo drives his 1965 Mustang to work and gets into a car crash." Osmo knows that he can just as easily take the bus. What does he do? Suppose he decides to drive to work anyway and, indeed, gets into a car crash. How many times does this sort of thing have to happen before Osmo attempts to thwart the predictions of the book? And if the bad things keep happening, even though he tries to prevent them, then I think that Osmo has good reason to think that he is a puppet and never really deliberated about anything.

Note that determinism need not entail the existence of a book of life, so I don't think that you can draw any conclusions about determinism and deliberation from this.

There is an interesting paper by Karl Popper -- "Indeterminism and Quantum Mechanics" or something like that -- which discusses similar issues but I don't have the full reference. I'll post it to later in the week.

[ADAM]

AHOY,
There is a similar begining to the one you mention in Italo Calvino's _If On A Winter's Night A Traveller..._, which begins with you opening up the new book by Italo Calvino and reading...
Yours, ADAM

[Neil]

Ttamler,

My only point was that there is a difference between deliberating and finding reasons in support of a course of action; showing that there are cases in which someone knows what they will do but still looks for reasons for that action therefore doesn't establish that one can deliberate about actions one knows one will perform.

[Paul Torek]

Joe, your objection is easily overcome by the combination of (A) an intelligent author and (B) an intelligent Osmo (as I explained above) who keeps the author honest. Such a combination could work out very well for Osmo, since the author will need to write "Osmo would ordinarily drive to work today in his usual semiconscious state, but he will be highly alert at the intersection with Telegraph Road in order to avoid the threat of an accident, which he reads about in the Book of Life." No more accidents for Osmo once the Book falls into his hands - except for very minor ones, since presumably the author draws the line at some level of significance, lest the Book be infinitely long.

Of course, none of these benefits are available to Osmo if his personality is highly defiant. In that case such a Book either cannot exist or cannot fall into his hands.

[Mark Smeltzer]

Sorry to jump in late...

We can distinguish three different versions of the "book of life":

V1) It is written such that the author never writes about the agent's future in a way that specifies a holistic account of future events in the agent's life that is accessible by the agent prior to those future events, and the agent reads the book.

V2) It is written such that the author writes about the agent's entire life in a linear fashion, and the agent reads the book.

V3) It is written such that the author writes about the agent's entire life in a linear fashion, and the agent never reads the book.

Regarding V1

Assuming knowledge of the sort required to produce the book is possible, the author is simply a kind of biogropher who can see the effects of the writing on the agent's life. If the author is writing the book in the past and the author maintains the ability to see the book's future effects, the author would be able to record events those into the narrative.

Assuming the author has the capacity to hit the "undo button", the author would be able to design the agent's future to fit the narrative: if the author "sees" the agent running out and doing something in response to something the book said, the author could record those events in the book and see if they line up with the author's goal. Think prophecies: the author writes prophetically, "You will be late for work tomorrow as a result of reading this". Now the author can "peek ahead" and see if the suggestion has the desired effect. If it doesn't, the author just deletes the line and tries something else. In this way, the author could speak very prophetically about the agent's future and see have those events come about.

Moreover, if the author sees the agent skip around in the book (viz., the agent's trying to jump ahead), the author would be able to jump ahead as well to the appropriate page and continue writing there — to the agent's obvious (and recorded) frustration. Thus, even if the book accounts for the agent's actions and thoughts about the agent's experience of reading the book, the mechanism at work is just a matter of the author writing down what the author "sees" the agent doing.

Given all this, V1 is just a run-of-the-mill time paradox. It doesn't have any special bearing on freedom over and beyond the standard worries about the possibility of foreknowledge. The agent's ability to deliberate seems perfectly compatible with the information contained in V1 because the agent never has enough information to see how the future events are going to come about.

Keep in mind: depending how diligent the author is, V1 could end up containing a complete and exhaustive account of the agent's life, past and future. In this way, V1 could approach the breadth of information contained in V2 and V3.

Regarding V2

V2 is logically impossible due to an obviously vicious infinite regress so I don't see the point in discussing it much...

Regarding V3

Even if the agent knows about the book's existence, the agent never reads it. So V3 couldnt possibly affect the agent's ability to deliberate.

Conclusions

The story about Osmo stipulates that Osmo reads the book, so it isn't a case of V3. That leaves V1 and V2. If the Osmo story is about a V1 book, then it doesn't affect his ability to deliberate. If the story is about a V2 book, then it is a logically impossible scenario and doesn't tell us anything useful...

[Joe Campbell]

Thanks, Paul! I think your right that the judgment that a book of life is impossible might be hasty. After my post, I was struck by the similarity between the book of life case and the grandfather paradox about time travel. I don't think that the grandfather paradox provides a good reason to think that time travel is impossible since it tends to focus on just a few ways in which time travel might play out. It is hard to jump from this to the conclusion that time travel is impossible and the same might be said about the book of life.

In the film Twelve Monkeys, for instance, you have a plausible story of time travel with no apparent contradictions. What makes it work, in part, is that the Bruce Willis character never puts two and two together. He has memories which he misidentifies as dreams. He also believes that time travel affects his cognitive abilities, so when he starts to put things together he has doubts that he's getting it right. Cetainly if time travel always caused memory loss, for instance, it would be hard to see why it was problematic. You might leave the present with the goal of killing Grandfather but forget about that goal once you arrive in the past. I suppose that a similarly plausible account of a book of life might be given, too.

Nonetheless, my (perhaps irrational) gut tells me that time travel is possible but books of life are not. Note that adding memory loss to the book of life story seems to be cheating.

I wonder what others think about the comparison between the two problems.

[Tamler Sommers]

Paul, you might even get the book to end with his death, depending on how it works. If the book ends: "Osmo is is killed October 13, 2009 in a train accident on a trip to trace his family tree in the Northern Romania" and Osmo reads that, then it's going to be a huge stretch to get him on a flight to Bucharest in October. But if it ends: "Osmo is killed in nuclear war that wipes out the planet on October 12, 2008 moments after making (sweet) love to Scarlett Johannson as Isaac Hayes plays in the background." then Osmo may plausibly agree to go along with the prophesies.

The whole problem, as you say, seems to depend on the personality of the character and also the events of the book.

[Tamler Sommers]

Ooops, there was a typo in my previous post. I meant "making (sweet) love to his beautiful wife of eight years..."

[hilzoy]

Well, in ch. 2 of freedom and Responsibility I had an argument to the effect that it was impossible for anyone to tell us any prediction of our future actions that had the force of science behind it (as opposed to predictions like knowing you, you'll be late again), except when our deliberation was irrelevant, or the prediction would not affect our deliberation, or we were making a specific mistake about what such a prediction would imply. I think it also works for books of life, and if sound would imply that books of life that are read by the person whose life they describe are impossible.

[hilzoy]

Sorry -- this is Hilary Bok.

[Paul Torek]

Hilary, what do you mean by "the force of science?" Are you familiar with David Velleman's writings on epistemic freedom?

The agent generally has epistemic freedom to disbelieve the predictions. But that doesn't mean that the author's predictions can't be scientifically warranted, in something comparable to the way an engineer's predictions of the carrying capacity of a bridge are warranted. The predictions simply need to be favorable from the agent's point of view, and the author needs to pick an agent who is not overly defiant. (And to have more information at his disposal than may be computable using all the matter in the universe, but hey, we're supposed to ignore minor technical difficulties, right?)

[Clark Goble]

Probably not the story you were looking for but back in I think the 20's or 30's H. P. Lovecraft wrote a story about this. Only the guy dreams writing the book and then (if I remember correctly - it's been a few years) makes an archaeology discovery with a hallway like in the dreams and he finds the book where he was writing of everything he was doing. Of course Lovecraft constantly put quasi-Platonic themes in his story to illicit a kind of developing horror. Here it was the horror of not really being free.

[Martin]

I can imagine myself finding a book that happens to describe exactly my all my past, no problem, too late for me to prove it false. But I don't see how can it possibly tell me my future and turn out to be fatalistically true. Again, it's ok if I don't read it. But if I read it then it's easy for me to prove it false, at least as for what I'm going to have for dinner tonight. So, in my opinion, it might be possible to correctly predict someone's future but only as long as he doesn't know it.