How Universal (and/or objectivist) are Theories of Moral Responsibility Supposed to Be?

Describing their methodology, Fischer and Ravizza write:

..we shall be trying to articulate the inchoate, shared views about moral responsibility in (roughly speaking) a modern, Western democratic society.  We suppose that there is enough agreement on these matters—at some level of reflection—to justify engaging in the attempt to bring out and systematize these shared views….Here we shall be identifying and evaluating “considered judgments” about particular cases – actual and hypothetical – in which an agent’s moral responsibility is at issue.  We shall explore patterns in these judgments  (Responsibility and Control, pp. 10-11.)

(1)  Does this method of seeking reflective equilibrium restrict the application of Fischer and Ravizza’s theory to Western Democratic societies?  Or are the conditions for moral responsibility meant to apply universally, even in societies that may have different intuitions about these particular cases?  The methodology appears to limit the scope of application to cultures, and individuals, who accept their intuitive starting points.  Therefore it’s at least possible (if, say, people in non-democratic non-Western societies have different starting points) that someone might be morally responsible for an act is culture A, while another might not be morally responsible for that very same act, committed in the very same state of mind, under virtually identical circumstances, in culture B.

(2) Assume I’m right that Fischer and Ravizza’s theory can only be applied in cultures that accept their intuitive starting points.  How common is this feature?  Would Kane be comfortable saying that indeterministic self-forming actions are required for moral responsibility in some cultures, but perhaps not in others.  Would Chisholm concede that in certain Mediterranean societies, you may not have to be a prime-mover unmoved in order to be free and morally responsible?  Is beta (or TNR) not valid for Jibaro Indians?   Does anyone—compatibilist, libertarian, skeptic—think that the conditions for moral responsibility in their theory apply universally, whether or not a particular individual or culture accepts their intuitive starting points?  I imagine the answer to this last question would be “yes!  almost everyone believes this!”  Am I right about that?

(3) For the record, here’s my very non-exhaustive list of people with theories that appear to have ‘universalist’ aspirations.   (In other words, the necessary and sufficient conditions of each theory are meant to apply across cultures no matter what.  If a necessary condition is not met, no moral responsibility; if the sufficient conditions are met, the agent is morally responsible):

Universalist: van Inwagen, Galen Strawson, Pereboom, Wolf, Frankfurt, Watson, Kane, Ekstrom, Spinoza, Hurley, Waller, P.F. Strawson (I think). 

Non-Universalist: Fischer and Ravizza, Double, Smilansky (I think), Vargas, Nichols (to come).

Maybe I’m wrong, maybe very few theories are meant to apply universally.  But then isn’t this a pretty bizarre way to look at moral responsibility—as something that is relative across cultures, maybe even within cultures, entirely dependent on the intuitions of the individuals within them?

Comments

[Neil]

Fischer & Ravizza don't seme committed to the view that ssmi-compatibilism is relative to a particular culture. They claim only that they are articulating the view in Western cultures, not that they are articulating a view found only in Western cultures. My guess is that they say what they do because they think that Western cultures have put aside some superstitions which cloud the judgments of (some) non-Western and (some) non-modern cultures. So they start there because so doing is the best way to approach the transcultural and transhistorical truth. They may, in other words, be committed not just to reflective equilibrium, but what is called wide reflective equilibrium, in which views must be in harmony not only with intuitions and our best moral theories, but also our best science. It may be that starting anywhere will get to the same end point, if the method is WRE; this is implausible if the view is RE.

[Tamler Sommers]

Neil, thanks.

"They claim only that they are articulating the view in Western cultures, not that they are articulating a view found only in Western cultures."

I know. My view is that their theory is restricted to cultures (Western or non-Western) that accept their intuitive starting points on certain key questions.

"They may, in other words, be committed not just to reflective equilibrium, but what is called wide reflective equilibrium, in which views must be in harmony not only with intuitions and our best moral theories, but also our best science."

I agree that the best way to look at their method is in terms of WRE--and I didn't make that clear, so thanks.

"It may be that starting anywhere will get to the same end point, if the method is WRE..."

It may be. But it may also be (in fact I think this is a more likely scenario) that if there are core intuitive differences at the beginning about certain questions, even perfect agreement about non-moral and scientific matters won't prevent us from arriving at different end points.

[Manuel Vargas]

Interesting issue. I wonder if outside of most NATO countries, moral responsibility is, among non-philosophers, typically thought of in "universalist" ways. Perhaps internal to NATO countries there is a higher degree of conceptual variation about this, with at least a significant portion of the population still being naive universalists. (Maybe this another reason for the inevitability of revisionism for any philosophically viable positive account of moral responsibility, at least among us Westerners!)

On the philosophical theorizing side of things, whether one is a universalist or not (and indeed, what that comes to) is probably an upshot of one's (explicit or implicit) metaethics. So, for example, if one thought that there were certain structural relations (what a society needs, what makes for a good life in a social context, etc.) that fixed the normative facts, but that the content of those relations varied by time and place, one will likely have to hold a view of responsibility where the norms for praise and blame have a comparable variation.

[Neil]

But Tammler, if you're right that just shows that *all* accounts of MR are relative, not anything special about Fsicher & Ravizza. In other words, it undermines your typology.

NATO countries Manuel? Is that a natural kind? Note Australia is not in NATO.

[Tamler Sommers]

Neil,

No, it would entail that all accounts of MR that appeal to wide reflective equilibrium for justification are relative. As far as I know, none of the 'universalist' theories that I mention explicitly embrace that methodology. Of course, if WRE is the only way to justify a theory of moral responsibility, then you're right--they'd all have to be relative. But even that wouldn't undermine my typology, because I was trying to distinguish between theories that are meant to apply universally and theories have no such aspirations.

More importantly, for once, I can correct the mispelling of my name.

[Manuel Vargas]

What? Oz ain't NATO? What's wrong with this world? I know it isn't in the North Atlantic, but that's just wrong.

[Neil]

I wish Oz was in the north atlantic: I wouldn't face a 24 hour flight on saturday...

[Patricia Greenspan]

Tamler -- Could F&R just mean that the grounds for *believing* in their theory apply only to those who start with the same basic intuitions, i.e. members of western democratic cultures, even though the notion of responsibility that figures in their theory applies to everyone?

But since "belief makes it so" in many cases -- or is needed to make it so -- there's still some room for complications of the sort your post points out.

[Tamler Sommers]

Pat,

Interesting...it seems like under your proposal, you could have two incompatible universalist theories with proponents who are fully justified in embracing their particular theory. For example, theory A might lead to the judgment that a person (in a third culture, say) was morally responsible for an certain act, while theory B might judge that very same person to be exempt from moral responsibility. Yet proponents for theory A are fully justified in their belief, and proponent of theory B, because they have different starting intuitions, are fully justified in theirs.

I suppose it's possible, depending on one's epistemological commitments. But it's a little weird, isn't it? Two fully justified universalist theories yielding contradictory judgments about the same case?

[Mark]

Tamler,

I don't see what's wierd about that. If the two theories contradict, while both are bent on universalism, only one of them can be right. It is like how virtue ethics, deontology, act utilitarianism, and rule utilitarianism can all yield different verdicts about what one ought to do, yet all are aimed at universal moral truth.

[Tamler Sommers]

Mark,

Right, but what if virtue ethicists, deontologists, act-utilitarians, and rule utilitarians were all entirely justified in believing their particular theory (and therefore entirely justified in arriving at their different verdicts). Wouldn't that be weird?

[Joe]

Tamler,

Why think that P.F. Strawson is a universalist?

[Andrew Lee]

(Caveat: I have not read Fischer and Rivizza.)

I'm afraid the scope of the question of the thread title is rather confusing. Is the question, "how universally held (however inarticulately) are these ideas we are discussing", or is the question "how universally are those who hold these ideas (however inarticulately) prepared to apply them when evaluating others", or is the question "how universally applicable are these ideas, once they have been articulated, independently of what anyone else's beliefs about them are"?

[Tamler Sommers]

Joe,

I guess I read P.F. Strawson like this: If someone does something to me that reflects 'ill will' towards me and I resent him for it, then he is blameworthy. This is true no matter what culture I'm in and no matter what he happens to believe about moral responsibility. And if he does the same thing to someone else, and I feel vicarious 'indignation' then he is morally responsible as well. Of course, there are all sorts of complications which I tried to sidestep by putting '(I think)' after Strawson's name.

Andrew,

It's the latter of your two options although I'd phrase it like this: "how universally applicable are these CONDITIONS SUPPOSED TO BE, once they have been articulated, independent of what anyone else's beliefs about them are"?

[Andrew Lee]

I'm assuming you mean, "the last of the three options". So let's take the question, "how universally applicable are these conditions supposed to be, once they have been articulated, independent of what anyone else's beliefs about them are", and ask whether you are asking if F&R specifically are in the business of articulating thick moral concepts such that any rational person of any cultural or emotive disposition who ascribed the descriptive properties of the concept to S, would also be compelled by conceptual necessity to ascribe the evaluative component of the concept to S; or if you are asking if moral responsibility theorists generally could possibly be in that business.

[Mark]

Tamler,

It would be grossly problematic if two conflicting beliefs were both true (e.g. 'X is square' and 'X is circular'), but there's nothing wrong, in principle, with having conflicting, equally justified beliefs.

You're simply getting at the distinction between (mere) justified belief and knowledge. (It is also worth considering whether it is justification that serves the purpose of turning true beliefs into knowledge, but then we'd be discussing epistemology.)

[Joe]

Tamler,

You might be right that Strawson is a universalist but, whatever his view is, it can't be as easy as: "If someone does something to me that reflects 'ill will' towards me and I resent him for it, then he is blameworthy." Strawson has to admit that sometimes we get things wrong and blame people even though they are not blameworthy. At most, our social practice of blaming grounds moral responsibility. It doesn't follow that blameworthiness reduces to blaming, as some suggest.

Naturalism (of the Strawson variety) is not universalist. Hume was (apparently) a universalist but Wittgenstein was clearly not. Since the two of them inspired Strawson’s view, it is at least possible that he wasn't either.

I don't deny that there is a side to Strawson -- what Paul Russell (1992 and 1995) calls his rationalistic strategy -- that sounds universalist. I also admit that, so understood, Strawson's rationalistic strategy is at odds with his naturalistic strategy. But I think that it is possible to give a consistent interpretation of Strawson as a naturalist. On such an interpretation, Strawson's so-called 'rationalistic strategy' against the possibility of free will skepticism is best understood as a set of pragmatic considerations and not as a dogmatic, universalist argument for compatibilism.

[John Fischer]

Andrew Lee: your caveat can be fixed!!!!! It is not too late.

[Paul Torek]

I'm surprised that no one has mentioned the so-called intolerant relativism of Ken Taylor.

It provides one possible way between the horns of the dilemma in Tamler's opening post. Also, I could have sworn that John Fisher expressed approval when someone else cited Taylor's view, many months back.