Should we Care About The Individuation of Action?

I rarely post anything or even reply to the many interesting posts here at the GFP. So I reckoned it was time for me to post something. But this is not a gratuitous post. I'm wondering what folks think about current attitudes among philosophers of action regarding the value of work on action-individuation. These days folks seem inclined to either ignore the debate over action-individuation altogether (offering blank stares when you raise the topic in a discussion over some topic in action theory) or while they find the topic interesting, they claim that the issue, to quote Ginet, "though sufficiently interesting in its own right, is not one on which much else depends" (On Action, p. 70).

What I am most concerned about is whether anything else in the philosophy of action (including the free will debate) and related areas hangs on the conclusions we reach with respect to the debate over action individuation. I think it might make a difference both for what we count as an action-type as well as for what the proper objects of our reactive attitudes should be when we hold agents responsible for their actions and their outcomes (in fact, it might make a difference for whether or not we count an event as the proper part of actions or as the mere intentional outcome of an action). For example, some folks treat "thought" as an action-type. But as Al Mele and others have noted, it's not obvious that thinking is a type of action. However, if you accept a componential theory of action-individuation, couldn't thinking be an action-type all of the tokens of which are composed of more simple events (including actions and non-actional events)? So if you'd like, perhaps thinking is a "broad" type of action, all of the tokens of which are constituted by tokens of simple action-types. An interesting parallel is "driving". That is a fairly uncontroversial action-type. But when you drive to the store, you perform a fairly complex action that is constituted by a plethora of different events, including non-actional events. Driving like thought, again, assuming a componential theory of action individuation, is an action-type that is broad--i.e., such that all of its tokens are complex actions.

Why does any of the foregoing make a difference? Think about responsibility. You express disapproval of S's thinking about p or S's driving too fast. If we focus on driving, if you accept a fine-grained view, we have to ask when your driving occured among the myriad actions you performed (because there are numerous action-properties exemplified when you are "driving"); and if you accept a coarse-grained view then either your driving is one action that admits of a host of different descriptions or there are various actions you perform, but fewer than on the coarse-grained view because a number of them are really just the same action under different descriptions. Of course, if you accept a componential theory, then we can hold you responsible for performing the intentional action of driving fast, where your driving fast is composed of a bunch of more simple actions. I realize this is all quick. But I think that once we start thinking about it, the conclusions we reach about action-individuation might make more of a difference for some debates than some prominent action theorists have admitted. Does anyone have any thoughts about this? (Again, I'm acknowledging that this was all very quick and very sloppy.)

Comments

[Manuel]

Hey Andrei-

I guess I'm among the unwashed masses who aren't much motivated by the particulars of action individuation. Probably a shortcoming on my part. However, I don't really follow what's at stake for a theory of responsibility, though, in your example. I take it that a point you are making is that depending on one's favorite theory of action individuation there will be more and less for which an agent is responsible. But I wonder if for practical purposes the particular theoretical difference it makes doesn't make much difference. Why would this issue, for example, impact which theory of responsibility I adopt, or what particular practices I take to be justified or engage in, in light of my theory of action individuation and/or theory of responsibility?

[Andrei Buckareff]

Hi Manuel,

These are good questions that I'm afraid I don't have an answer to. That said, my gut intuition is that it probably does not make a difference for what theory of moral responsibility you accept. However, regardless of the theory, if might make a difference for what we can hold agent's responsible, regardless of one's favored theory of moral responsibility. For instance, it seems that on a more fine-grained theory of action individuation there are events that will not count as actions but will constitute the proper parts of actions on a componential theory and may count as actional on a coarse-grained theory. That said, I think it makes a difference for what sorts of behavior we count as actions, which I expect will make some difference for how we theorize about cases of ascribing moral responsibility, even if, in the final analysis it makes no practical difference.

[Andrei Buckareff]

The foregoing was very quick. I should've said "...I don't have a satisfactory answer to." And "it might make a difference...."

I should add that what we say about action individuation might make a difference for whether what we hold persons responsible for in various cases are their actions or the intentional or at least foreseeable outcomes of their actions.

Finally, even if what we say about action individuation makes no difference for what we say about moral responsibility, do folks expect it will make a difference for the conclusions they reach when theorizing about action? As you probably suspect, I think it does. (Again, this is all very quick and sloppy.)

[Kevin Timpe]

Andrei,

I happen to think that questions of action individuation can have an impact on issues of free will/moral responsibility, but perhaps just because I wrote a dissertation along these lines. One fairly straightforward way it came make a difference is in terms of Frankfurt's argument against PAP. I'm thinking here of PvI's arguments in An Essay on Free Will that even if PAP as Frankfurt formulates it is false, there are replacement principles that (a) are true and (b) are incompatible with the truth of causal determinism.

Now, I happen to think that PvI has the wrong view about what individuates events, but I agree with him (and you) that issues of individuation can have some impact on these other issues.

[Heath White]

I think action-individuation is linked to the question of what an action is, though I would think we ought to settle the latter question first, and let that drive action-individuation.

For example, if you define an action as a bodily movement caused in such-and-such a way, then actions have to be coarse-grained, since the 'cause' relation is extensional.

If you define an action as a volition, then presumably volitions are propositional attitudes, to be individuated in a fine-grained way.

[Andrei Buckareff]

Heath,

I'm not sure that the theory of action I am committed to will commit me to a particular view of action individuation. For instance, Goldman is a causal theorist, yet he defends a fine-grained theory. Thalberg defended a componential theory, and he was also some sort of causal theorist. The volitionists who come to mind (viz., Ginet and McCann) both defend versions of the componential view. So I guess (as a defender of the causal theory of action) I want to know why you think that I should be committed to a coarse-grained theory. If the 'cause' relation is extensional I want to know why it is not consistent with some actions being complex actions that are composed of more simple events, some of which are also actions (consider my moving punching someone as an example). So I guess I'm curious about what story you can tell about how accepting a theory of action commits one to a particular theory of action-invidiuation.