Wanted: Philosopher to serve as Expert Witness in Court

Earlier this week, I gave a talk on "responsibility" to the Forensic Psychiatirc Clinic at the San Diego Superior Court to six or so psychiatrists.  Ansar Haroun, who runs the clinic, saw a previous post of mine at the Experimental Blog on causal vs. moral responsibility and thought these issues were interestingly related to some of the issues that his clinic deals with on a regular basis.  It was a fascinating day in so many ways.

During my short talk to the clinic, I mentioned a number of issues that philosophers are working on these days:  the Knobe effect (by the way, I hope that someday I'm cool enough to have my name attached to something in this way!), the effect of affect on people's intutions regarding moral responsibility, skepticism about moral responsibility, etc....

The psychiatrists were very interesting in these issues, particularly as these things could--and probably do--impact the legal system.  Haroun suggested that philosophers (or, at least those who are sympathetic to MR skepticism) could supplement their often meager salaries by serving as paid expert witnesses for defense lawyers:  "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you will hear expert testimony that my client shouldn't be blamed for the crime because none of us should be blamed for anything!"  Maybe I'm the only one missing out on this revenue source--perhaps because I'm not a skeptic or because I don't look 'expert' enough.  Are any of the rest of you raking in the bucks as 'guns for hire'?

Comments

[Joe Campbell]

No. But I do know of some folks who do work in explanation theory who have been asked (and paid) to provide testimony in product liability cases.

[John Fischer]

I did some years ago consult on the phone with a lawyer in the Stockton, Ca. area who was defending an individual in a captial punishment case. The individual had been convicted of the crime, and the trial was in the "punishment phase". The attorney had been a philosophy major at UCLA many years ago, and someone referred him to me. We had a nice discussion, and I got paid as a consultant for two hours. (This is the only time in my career that I have done this.)

[Alan White]

From 1995-2004 I served on the Wisconsin Supreme Court Office of Lawyer Regulation northeastern district committee. It was purely volunteer work, but some of the most interesting and fulfilling service work I've ever done. The committee investigates and reviews accusations against lawyers for unethical/illegal behavior and makes recommendations for punishment in cases of established violations. (The standard of evidence was "clear and convincing"; violations required a majority vote by that standard.) I can assure you that such committees benefit from a philosopher's perspective! And I mention this because I suspect in many of your own states there are such oversight committees, and if Wisconsin's any indication, they are usually in dire need of volunteers.

[Eddy Nahmias]

Generally speaking, what would a Skeptic About Free will And Moral responsibility (SAFAM) say to a jury in, say, a typical murder or rape trial? And what outcome would such testimony be expected to have?

Here's one way (of many ways) I can imagine such testimony going in the future: "This defendant, like almost all violent pedophiles, has the X4 gene [and/or the D62 deficit in the ventromedial frontal cortex]. As such, we can't really blame him for his crime (any more than we can blame someone for getting a brain tumor). Unfortunately, there's also very little we can do to cure him (any more than we can treat the worst brain tumors). Since we can't be sure to change his behavior, all we can do is lock him away in a detention facility where he can do no more harm and where he will be treated with dignity." Given our history of state-run mental facilities, the dignity accorded him will likely be about what Guantanamo detainees will get now that Bush is giving them Geneva protections (i.e., not a whole lot). I suspect most defense lawyers won't be clamoring for this testimony.

[Kip Werking]

I think Eddy raises a very important point (and one that is dear to my heart): the primative state of medical technology prevents us from "curing" wrongdoers. I think it's important to reflect upon how this *impracticality* would affect our reasoning about this issue. The idea would be: if curing X wasn't so impractical, might we be more inclined to regarding X in these medical terms?

Consider, by analogy, aging: many bioethicists (e.g. Leon Kass) argue that it's immoral to cure aging. But is it just a coincidence that both (i) they think it's wrong and (ii) it's also impractical---the upshot being that they don't want to do something they can't do (live forever)? Is that a little convenient?

Similarly, if we could actually cure wrongdoing in the sense Eddy describes, how would this affect our thinking about free will and moral responsibility? I can imagine three possibilities: (i) we regard non-excused wrongdoers as free and morally responsible and therefore refuse to "cure" them and persist in punishing, etc. (ii) we treat or cure wrongdoers while also regarding them as free and morally responsible or (iii) if there is an intolerable inconsistency in ii, we treat or cure wrongdoers and no longer regard them as free and morally responsible.

Eddy's remarks seem limited to the context of "our history of state-run mental facilities" and so I suspect he agrees that adopting (ii) or (iii) need not *necessarily* result in Guantanamo-style treatement. For example, Derk Pereboom has suggested that mere quarantine would suffice. I'm always curious to know what others think about the prospect of such a "medicalized society" (to use Dennett's term).