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Jorge Luis Borges

  • "Under the trees of England I meditated on this lost and perhaps mythical labyrinth. I imagined it untouched and perfect on the secret summit of some mountain; I imagined it drowned under rice paddies or beneath the sea; I imagined it infinite, made not only of eight-sided pavilions and of twisting paths but also of rivers, provinces and kingdoms. I thought of a maze of mazes, of a sinuous, ever growing maze which would take in both past and future and would somehow involve the stars."
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July 20, 2006

You, Mele, Doris, Knobe, and Woolfolk

Because YOU demanded, because it cannot be stopped— at most we can only hope to contain it — the GFP is hereby announcing . . .

The Inaugural Session of The Garden of Forking Paths Reading Group!!!!

(imagine majestic music and dancing spotlights)

Here's the scoop:

If you are down (and you know you want to be): You will read Doris, Knobe, and Woolfolk's paper "Variantism about Responsibility." It is available on ye olde Papers Blog here.

You will read this before the week of August 21st.

Sometime during the week of August 21st, resident Super Famous Philosopher Al "Da Shark" Mele will unload some ruminations and deliberations pertaining to the afore-mentioned paper. You will then post responses and thoughts of your own. Electronic conversating will ensue, and the legend of the GFP Reading Group will be born.

You have a month. Be ready or it won't be purty.

July 18, 2006

Summer Reading

I highly recommend the outstanding collection of essays by Andrews Reath, *Agency and Autonomy In Kant's Moral Theory* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2006). I think these essays will be of wide interest to readers of the Garden of Forking Paths, even though the terms "Frankfurt-style Counterexamples," "Source Incompatibilism," "Free Will Skepticism," and so forth do not appear (or at least, I don't think they do).

Congratulations to Andy Reath for a superb volume! One of the things I like about Reath's essays is that they are genuinely engaging with Kant's texts while at the same time achieving a surprising (some might say miraculous) level of clarity. I'm not fully a compatibilist about fidelity to Kant's texts and clarity, but I'm a semicompatibilist, especially in the context of Reath's essays.

July 14, 2006

Wanted: Philosopher to serve as Expert Witness in Court

Earlier this week, I gave a talk on "responsibility" to the Forensic Psychiatirc Clinic at the San Diego Superior Court to six or so psychiatrists.  Ansar Haroun, who runs the clinic, saw a previous post of mine at the Experimental Blog on causal vs. moral responsibility and thought these issues were interestingly related to some of the issues that his clinic deals with on a regular basis.  It was a fascinating day in so many ways.

During my short talk to the clinic, I mentioned a number of issues that philosophers are working on these days:  the Knobe effect (by the way, I hope that someday I'm cool enough to have my name attached to something in this way!), the effect of affect on people's intutions regarding moral responsibility, skepticism about moral responsibility, etc....

The psychiatrists were very interesting in these issues, particularly as these things could--and probably do--impact the legal system.  Haroun suggested that philosophers (or, at least those who are sympathetic to MR skepticism) could supplement their often meager salaries by serving as paid expert witnesses for defense lawyers:  "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you will hear expert testimony that my client shouldn't be blamed for the crime because none of us should be blamed for anything!"  Maybe I'm the only one missing out on this revenue source--perhaps because I'm not a skeptic or because I don't look 'expert' enough.  Are any of the rest of you raking in the bucks as 'guns for hire'?

July 13, 2006

History

Alright, enough meta-blogging. Here's a controversial claim to get the argumentative juices flowing. In a recent Times Literary Supplement (not online, unfortunately), Saul Smilansky reviews Kane's Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. The free will debate, Saul writes, belies the widespread view that philosophy never progresses: in fact with regard to free will recent progress has been so great that it's not worth reading anything on the topic published earlier than 'about 1960' (I quote from memory).

I want Saul to be right. I want a justification for my own practice of rarely going to the library, and almost never reading anything published more than a few years ago. Of course I know that many of the positions defended today have historical precedents, in the work of Hume, Reid, and Kant. But the compatibilism, agent-causation and Kantianism defended by contemporary thinkers is much more careful and plausible than these original views (as I understand them). These greats deserve recognition but do I really need to read them?

Dia-blog-ical Stalemate?

As many have noted, this blog has hit an unprecedented lull recently. Let’s be honest, aside from a bunch of congratulatory notices, conference reports, and a few valiant attempts to get a substantive debate going, nothing much has been going on at the Garden. Below is a list of possible reasons for this state of affairs.  (Note: the list is exhaustive and presented in precise order of likelihood.)

  1. No Robert Allen.  Although the catchphrase ‘bring back Allen!’ did not sweep the nation as I predicted, I think we’re all beginning to recognize the value of Professor Allen's spirited vituperative slightly unhinged assaults on experimental philosophy, free will skepticism, the Red Sox, and Kip Werking.   Since I am familiar with all of his targets and know that they can handle the weight of his over-the-top criticisms with aplomb, I repeat: bring back Allen. 
  2. We’ve said it all.  Or most of it, anyway.  I fervently hope this isn’t the case, but the fact is the blog has been running for over two years and almost all of the important free will/moral responsibility issues have been touched on, and many have been done to death (much like Frankfurt-style examples maybe?  Forget I said that.  That was someone else.  Bad dog, Tess!).  Call to arms: someone say something new and inflammatory!  Or inflammatory at least...
  3. It’s summer, we’re doing something else (lighten up Sommers!) Maybe, but if you look at past summers I bet you don’t find a dry spell like this one.
  4. The Red Sox have made by far the fewest errors in the major leagues.  10 fewer than the next best fielding team.  The Red Sox. The Boston Red Sox. Leading the league in fielding.  This is a significant perhaps apocalyptic event that has ramifications all across the globe—much bigger than some butterfly flapping his wings in Peru.   It would be pure hubris to think that it would have no effect on our humble blog.
  5. You have all been converted to free will skepticism.  And so, you think, what’s the point of blogging, what’s the point of doing anything.  All the paralysis, the diminished ambition, the despair that you have long feared has come to pass.  You feel that you no longer deserve praise for your accomplishments and that strips the value away from your work, interpersonal relationships, everything.  Your only joys consist in watching a bunch of Europeans run around for two hours tripping each other and faking injuries.   (Note: this is not an accurate assessment of the implications of free will skepticism.)  Solution: reconsider your original position and defend it once again.   Free will skeptics need opponents--it’s becoming too crowded in here! 

July 10, 2006

Free Will in the World Cup

Since I am having withdrawl symptoms now that there are no World Cup games to watch, I figured I would write something about it.  In case you missed the final yesterday, Italy beat France in penalty kicks--and if you did miss it, I will try to suppress my reactive attitudes towards you since I realize it is irrational for me to care so much about other people's lack of interest in soccer (sidenote for another post--doesn't it seem like most of our second-order desires are really about other people's first-order desires?). 

Anyway, here are two events from the game that raise some relevant questions (which people may or may not feel like addressing, but this blog has been too quiet all summer!):

1) Compare French star Zidane's made free kick, which hit the crossbar and bounced in a foot over the line with Trezeguet's missed free kick in the shootout, which hit the crossbar and bounced on the line (losing the game for the French).  A micro-difference in initial conditions that had a huge effect on the game and hence (most of) the world.  When people say, as millions surely did in one form or another, "He [Zidane] got lucky--he could have missed that" or "He [Trezeguet] could have (or should have) made that", do many (any) of these people have beliefs about that statement (or event) that commit them to the claim that determinism is false?  If they believe indeterminism is required for these events to have happened otherwise, is it indeterminism in the agent or outside the agent or either, or is it anything like agent-causation?  Do they think that these events are different in some important way from, say, a dog jumping and just missing a frisbee ("She could have caught that") or, say, a lottery turning out a certain way?  If engaged in Socratic dialogue, would they be willing to use "backtracking counterfactuals" on the dog and lottery case in a way that they would not with the human case (e.g., the dog would have caught it only if certain conditions had been different and those conditions would have been different only if...)? 

2) Now compare Zidane's header in overtime that was barely saved by the Italian keeper Buffon with the Zidane's "header" into the chest of Materazzi a few minutes later--the latter has become the story of the game, driving people (like me) to compulsively wonder what could possibly have led Zidane to trash his legacy and perhaps the game (he got thrown out of his last international performance)--what could Materazzi have said to set him off?  When we perform actions we control partially but far from perfectly (and without much conscious consideration) like the header during the course of the game, do people think of those actions in terms of free will and if so, in the same terms as actions people perform that at least seem to allow for some foresight, like his deliberate attack (see the film to see what you think about how much control he had)?  Why do people think (want to think) the header is controlled less than the attack on another person?  While the missed header is at least as important to fans (it would have likely won the game) than the attack, why is he not blamed for the former as much as the latter (I suspect even by people who think he had as much or as little control over both)?  It's amazing how much we want to apply a principle of charity in this case--people want to know what Materazzi said because they can't believe Zidane would do such a foolish thing without sufficient provocation (reports are that perhaps he called him a terrorist, though I suspect it had something to do with his momma).  For that matter, why is it that in the case of other foolish and seemingly irrational acts, like suicide terrorism, people are so much less interested in applying their theory of mind modules to figure out what drives the behavior and so much less to just say it's evil (is there a boundary past which we give up trying to explain or simply cannot explain certain actions)? 

Anyway, my own suspicion for most of these questions is that people don't have any theory or implicit beliefs or intuitions that would commit them to particular views about these philosophical questions, and as such few philosophical theories would conflict with their views (or seem counter-intuitive or revisionary).  But I have mainly been thinking about the questions, not the answers.

Well, thanks for indulging my attempt to transition back from soccer to philosophy.

July 05, 2006

New Perspectives on Free Will and Moral Responsibility

On November 10, 2007 some people you may have heard of will be at USF talking about free will, moral responsibility, and the like.

Speakers will include Joshua Knobe, Eddy Nahmias, Angela Smith, and Dan Speak. Responses will be given by Randy Clarke, John Fischer, Michael McKenna, and Dana Nelkin.

The motivating idea behind this one day conference was to create an opportunity where some up-and-coming-but-not-yet-tenured folks could give invited papers and receive replies by already-well-known-and-tenured stars. This will be something of an experiment, but if it all goes well I hope to repeat the process in subsequent years, thereby providing a semi-regular venue whereby junior folks could receive feedback by established stars and get some additional pre-tenure visibility. I would have loved to double the roster for this round, but given that this is an experiment and given time and space constraints I had to keep it to only four speakers and four respondents. Still, any Gardeners who feel like coming to SF in November to hang out at the conference are more than welcome.

(I've heard rumors that elsewhere there may be a general free will conference coming together for next year, so conference-interested people should keep their antenna up.)

More information and updates on the USF free will/moral responsibility conference, including the TBA schedule, will be posted here.