What is Source Incompatibilism?

Here are some thoughts about so-called 'Source Incompatibilism' occasioned by conversations and papers at the INPC.

It seems to me that often, the term 'source incompatiblism' is used to denote any view that holds the following two claims:

1) The thesis of determinism is incompatible with the thesis that we are sometimes morally responsible for our actions, and

2) The main reason determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible is NOT because determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise.

But I don't think all views that hold those two claims deserve to be called 'Source Incompatibilism'.  For instance, if the above is our definition of 'source incompatibilism', then proponents of the Direct Argument are source incompatibilists.  And Galen Strawson is a source incompatibilist.  But both of those results seem wrong to me.  Proponents of the Direct Argument don't usually talk about sourcehood -- they talk about the Transfer of Non-Responsibility.  And  Strawson doesn't think the reason determinism rules out responsibility is because it rules out sourcehood -- he thinks that responsibility rules out itself, regardless of determinism.  So, I think that Source Incompatibilism should instead be characterized as the conjunction of the following two theses (this is close to how Kevin Timpe characterizes it in his paper, "Source Incompatibilism and its Alternatives"):

1) The thesis of determinism is incompatible with the thesis that we are sometimes morally responsible for our actions, and

2) The reason that determinism is incompatible with responsibility is because determinism is incompatible with our being the source of our actions.

This characterization does not count Strawson or the proponents of the Direct Argument as source incompatibilists, and that seems right to me.  Moreover, anyone who thinks that both determinism and indeterminism are incompatible with responsibility won't count as a source incompatibilist either.  Their reason for the incompatibility isn't anything having to do with sourcehood -- it has to do with the coherence of responsibility itself.  So, for instance, Pereboom counts as a source incompatibilist, but only because he thinks that we could have responsibility if agent-causation existed.

Do people share my intuitions about what source incompatibilism is and who should (or shouldn't) count as a source incompatibilist?  If I'm right, then significantly, objections to the Direct Argument won't count as objections against Source Incompatibilism, as many have taken them to be.

Comments

[Tamler Sommers]

Neal,

As one who has recently been called a "Galen Strawson groupie" (by John Fischer) I feel I can say with some authority that Galen probably would count himself as a source incompatibilist. True, he thinks moral responsibility is incoherent but the incoherence comes from the logical impossibility of being causa sui--a source concept. We cannot originate (i.e. be the source of) our behavior--it's impossible. The fact that Galen disagrees with Derk about the possibility of agent causation doesn't mean that the primary problem with being an agent cause in the necessary way doesn't involve 'source' considerations rather than alternate possibility considerations.

And certainly no source incompatibilist skeptic should have to be committed to the claim that indeterminism would help. To claim that determinism rules out free will does not in any way entail that if indeterminism were true we would have free will. This is true for AP incompatibilist skeptics and source incompatibilist skeptics. In sum, as a GS groupie, I'll embrace the source incompatibilist label with the caveat that determinism isn't the main problem. (But even Derk would agree, I think, that determinism isn't the main problem. Right?)

[Kevin Timpe]

Like Tamler, I think that Strawson and kin should be considered Source Incompatibilists, and for two reasons. One, I think that everyone should be a Source Incompatibilist (because it's true)! But second, and more seriously, I think that Strawson's concern about what is required for moral responsibility is a kind of source worry. So I think we should rewrite Neal's (2) just a bit into something like the following:

(2*) The reason that determinism is incompatible with responsibility is because determinism is incompatible with our being the source of our actions in the kind of way that is required for moral responisiblity.

And I think that the reason that Strawson would agree with (2*) is because he doesn't think the kind of sourcehood required for MR is possible.

Now, perhaps part of Neal's worry is that if we approach Source Incompatibilism in this way (and adding in some of the other stuff from my paper), all of the following seem to be Source Incompatibilists: G. Strawson, Kane, Pereboom, Stump, Clarke, van Inwagen, etc.... So one might think that this is a big group. To which I say, yup. But then there are numerous different and important species in this genus. (Michael and Seth both rightly pushed me on this issue at the APA.) So I think that there is a lot of important and important taxonomical differentiation that needs to be done within this genus. If only there was someone willing to work on this!

[Neal]

I'm still suspicious. While it's true that what motivates Strawson's impossibility claim is a worry about sourcehood in some sense, I still feel like it's cheating to call him a Source Incompatibilist. For Strawson, to say that determinism is incompatible with responsibility is just like saying that determinism is incompatible with the existence of round squares -- right? But the only reason one might be an incompatibilist about determinism and the existence of round squares is that round squares are impossible and so aren't compatible with any other thesis whatever! Similarly with Strawson's view. The only reason I can see why one might be an incompatibilist about determinism and responsibility, given that responsibility is an incoherent concept, is that responsibility is impossible and so incompatible with any other thesis whatever. But that's not to be a source incompatibilist.

Am I just being stubborn here?

[Tamler Sommers]

Neal, here's a quote from "Luck Swallows Everything":

"In order for one to be truly or ultimately responsible for how one is in such a way that one can be truly responsible for what one does, something impossible has to be true: there has to be, and cannot be, a starting point in the series of acts of bringing it about that one has a certain nature; a starting point that constitutes an act of ultimate self-origination."

Doesn't that sound 'source'-ish to you, even though it's an impossibility claim? The logical impossibility of round squares has nothing to do with infinite regress issues...

[Kevin Timpe]

Neal,
You agree that Strawson is an incompatibilist. And you agree that Strawson's incompatibilism is primarily a function of the kind of sourcehood that he thinks is required for moral responsibility (causa sui). Your analogy with round squares is a bad one because round squares don't figure into the requirements for moral responsibility in the way that sourcehood does (as Tamlar points out). What makes moral responsibility impossible on Strawson's view is precisely something about sourcehood (namely, it's impossibility).
That said, I think your remaining hesitancy is to be largely explained along the lines of my posting above, namely that there are numerous distinct and important sub-species of Source Incompatibilism.

[Neal]

Okay, I think you guys convinced me that Strawson is a Source Incompatibilist. I think I had the order of explanation backward. He argues that since determinism and indeterminism are both incompatible with the sort of sourcehood required for responsibility, such sourcehood is impossible. He does NOT argue that such sourcehood is impossible and hence is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism. Good, thanks for helping me clear that up.

New question for Kevin -- why would van Inwagen count as a Source Incompatibilist, on your view? I would think he's about as paradigm as a Leeway Incompatibilist can get. Or does your claim have to do with the fact that you don't think there is such a view as Leeway Incompatibilism?

[Kevin Timpe]

Neal,

I'm glad to have finally persuaded you. And you raise a good question. I agree with you that van Inwagen certainly sounds most naturally like a Leeway Incompatibilist, particularly given the way that he defines free will as two-way ability. But I think that he's a Source Incompatibilist nonetheless, and not because there is no such thing as Leeway Incompatibilism.

If you read van Inwagen's work (as I know you have), you'll see that he often talks of "being able to render a proposition false/true" or "being able to bring it about tha a proposition is false/true" or "being able to make it the case that" (I'm sorry but I'm at home and don't have actual access to his works right now, so I'm going on paraphrases that I hope are adequate enough). And while I don't think he ever uses "source" language, I think that some idea of sourcehood is what is behind these various phrases above. For van Inwagen, it's not enough that something else can happen that resolves the leeway--but the agent in question needs to be able to do something to resolve the leeway (such as the agent making it the case that a certain proposition is true/false). I think that the charitable interpretation is along the lines of sourcehood. But I'll grant you that this is in no way transparent from his work and that I'm engaging in a certain amount of hopefully appropriate interpretation.

[Joe Campbell]

Neal writes: Strawson “argues that since determinism and indeterminism are both incompatible with the sort of sourcehood required for responsibility, such sourcehood is impossible. He does NOT argue that such sourcehood is impossible and hence is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism.”

Strawson has two main arguments for free will denialism, and both commit him to source incompatibilism. First, he gives a version of the ultimacy argument that concludes that if determinism is true, then no one is the source of any action; and indeterminism is of no help. Here he argues first for source incompatibilism and then for free will denialism.

Second, he argues directly for free will denialism by claiming that the type of sorcehood that is necessary for moral responsibility – ultimacy – is incoherent. Here he argues for free will denialism without first arguing for source incompatibilism. But since that free will denialism is true ENTAILS that source incompatibilism is true, he is still committed to source incompatibilism.

Strawson is a source incompatibilist.

[Much of this merely repeats what Kevin and Tamler and others say.]

[Neal]

Joe,

Okay, I now agree that Strawson can be construed as a source incompatibilist.

But it's not true that free will denialism entails source incompatibilism, is it? Can't I be a free will denier for reasons other than source reasons, and thus not be a source incompatibilist? Granted, Strawson's reasons for being a denier also make him a source incompatibilist, but that doesn't make every denier a source incompatibilist.

Part of the problem here, and maybe this is the messy part I don't like, is that source incompatibilism talks about *reasons* why one is an incompatibilist. And talk about reasons why you hold a view tends to get messy.

[Joe Campbell]

I was thinking of Strawson's free will denialism, which claims that sourcehood is incoherent. If sourcehood is incoherent, then it is incompatible with determinism and anything else.

But one might believe that free will denialism is true without thinking that sourcehood is incoherent. Thus, not every denier need be a source incompatibilist.

[James Fletcher Baxter]

At the sub-atomic level of the physical universe quantum
physics indicates a multifarious gap or division in the
causal chain; particles to which position cannot be
assigned at all times, systems that pass from one energy
state to another without manifestation in intermediate
states, entities without mass, fields whose substance is
as insubstantial as "a probability."

Only statistical conglomerates pay tribute to
deterministic forces. Singularities do not and are
therefore random, unpredictable, mutant, and in this
sense, uncaused. The finest contribution inanimate
reality is capable of making toward choice, without its
own selective agencies, is this continuing manifestation
of opportunity as the pre-condition to choice it defers
to the natural action of living forms.

Biological science affirms that each level of life,
single-cell to man himself, possesses attributes of
sensitivity, discrimination, and selectivity, and in
the exclusive and unique nature of each diversified
life form.

The survival and progression of life forms has all too
often been dependent upon the ever-present undeterminative
potential and appearance of one unique individual organism
within the whole spectrum of a given life-form. Only the
uniquely equipped individual organism is, like The Golden
Wedge of Ophir, capable of traversing the causal gap to
survival and progression. Mere reproductive determinacy
would have rendered life forms incapable of such potential.

Only a moving universe of opportunity plus choice enables
the present reality.

Deterministic systems, ideological symbols of abdication
by man from his natural role as earth's Choicemaker,
inevitably degenerate into collectivism; the negation of
singularity, they become a conglomerate plural-based
system of measuring human value. Blunting an awareness
of diversity, blurring alternatives, and limiting the
selective creative process, they are self-relegated to
a passive and circular regression.

Tampering with man's selective nature endangers his
survival for it would render him impotent and obsolete
by denying the tools of diversity, individuality,
perception, criteria, selectivity, and progress.
Coercive attempts produce revulsion, for such acts
are contrary to an indeterminate nature and nature's
indeterminate off-spring, man the Choicemaker.

- from The HUMAN PARADIGM

[Joe Campbell]

James,

Are you an incompatibilist?

[James Fletcher Baxter]

I have yet to encounter a definition I agree with completely. You'll understand why if you reread the piece above. Best regards, jfb