Mapping the Terrain

Sometimes I have a hard time keeping track of just what the different positions in the free will debate are.  To help clarify a little, I offer the following map of the terrain.  I'm interested to hear whether this seems like an appropriate breakdown.

The basic terminology will be 'compatibilism' and 'incompatibilism', but I think it's important to be clear about what thesis is supposedly compatible or incompatible with what other thesis.  To that end, I think there should be three different compatibility questions -- 1) Is determinism compatible with the ability to do otherwise?, 2) Is determinism compatible with moral responsibility?, and 3) Is indeterminism compatible with moral responsibility?  There's also a fourth question that's not about compatibility, but which seems equally important, namely: 4) Does moral responsibility require the ability to do otherwise?

Call someone who answers (1) with a 'Yes' an APCompatibilist and someone who answers (1) with a 'No' an APIncompatibilist.  Call someone who answers (2) with a 'Yes' a D-MRCompatibilist and someone who answers (2) with a 'No' a D-MRIncompatibilist.  Call someone who answers (3) with a 'Yes' an I-MRCompatibilist and someone who answers (3) with a 'No' an I-MRIncompatibilist.  Finally, call someone who answers (4) with a 'Yes' a PAPist and someone who answers (4) with a 'No' a PAP-denier.  Now, with these positions staked out, we can start to see the different combinations and how they map onto the views people actually hold.

"Official" semi-compatibilism = D-MRCompatibilist + I-MRCompatibilist + PAP-denial

Fischer's version of semi-compatibilism = APIncompatibilist + D-MRCompatibilist + I-MRCompatibilist + PAP-denial

Pereboom's view = APIncompatibilist + D-MRIncompatibilist + I-MRIncompatibilist + PAPist

"Traditional" compatibilism (local-miracle, altered-past, conditional-analysis) = APCompatibilist

Galen Strawson's view = D-MRIncompatibilist + I-MRIncompatibilist (because MR is impossible!)

Kane's and van Inwagen's view = APincompatibilist + D-MRIncompatibilist + I-MRCompatibilist (event-causation) + PAPist.

O'Connor's and Clarke's (former) view = APIncompatibilist + D-MRIncompatibilist + I-MRCompatibilist (agent-causation) + PAPist

Ginet's and Goetz's view = APIncompatibilist + D-MRIncompatibilist + I-MRCompatibilist (no causation) + PAPist

I'm sure I'm missing some view here, so please feel free to chime in.  Now, another interesting question is: What views should we associate with labels like 'Source Incompatibilism' and 'Leeway Incompatibilism' and 'Libertarianism' and 'Hard Determinism'?  Here is what I'm inclined to do:

Source Incompatibilism = (AT LEAST) D-MRIncompatibilist (because of sourcehood concerns)

Leeway Incompatibilism = APIncompatibilist and PAPist, THEREFORE D-MRIncompatibilist.

Libertarianism = (AT LEAST) D-MRIncompatibilist, and I-MRCompatibilist (whether no cause, event-cause, or agent-cause) -- and by the way, we are morally responsible,so determinism is false.

Hard Determinism = D-MRIncompatibilist -- and by the way, determinism is true, so we're not MR.

At least, that's what I'm inclined to say about these views to begin with.  But you'll notice that even this fails to distinguish between, say, hard determinists about the ability to do otherwise and hard determinists about MR, or between libertarians about the ability to do otherwise and libertarians about MR.  Also, this way of mapping things out doesn't really lend itself to seeing the connections between different parts of a view, and that is what sometimes makes a view distinctive.  I tried to capture that by using 'therefore' in Leeway Incompatibilism, but I'm sure there are some other connections this map doesn't pick up on.

I'm not sure what all this shows (except maybe that our terminology is really messy!), but I hope it is a way of gaining a bit of clarity on the situation.  Suggestions and amendments welcome.

Comments

[Kip Werking]

About Pereboom's view:

PAPist. Pereboom spends a lot of effort arguing against the importance of APs. I think, however (please correct me if I am mistaken; Frankfurt examples confuse me), that he only denies the relevance of robust AP. So he would be a PAPist, but only trivially so?

I-MRIncompatibilist. Pereboom also spends a lot of effort arguing for the coherence of agent causal free will. Pereboom distinguishes between this (i) kind of indeterminism and the (ii) simple event indeterminism which follows probabilistic laws. Pereboom is an I-MRIncompatibilist in the sense of (ii): we can't have free will even if the world is indeterministic in that sense. But according to Pereboom, we might have free will if we world was (i) indeterministic (and so, he does not seem to be an I-MRIcompatibilist).

Again, please excuse me if I have misrepresented the subtleties of Pereboom's view. I've misrepresented it before...

Here's another important line to draw: between (iii) those who think it matters whether a conscious agent designs one's life and (iv) those who think this is irrelevant. With respect to moral responsibility Fischer, Pereboom, Frankfurt, Dennett, and Watson all seem to belong to (iv), not to mention Hobbes. Mele seems to be committed to (iii). Fischer seems to belong to (iii) with respect, not to moral responsibility, but "blameworthiness." Similarly, Paul Russell seems to belong to (iii) with respect to moral responsibility between designer and designee: others can hold the designee morally responsible, but not the designer.

Another important line to draw (from amongst the countless we might draw) is between subjectivists and non-subjectivists. In particular, Fischer and Galen Strawson agree about subjectivism. In this respect, Strawson differs from non-subjectivist free will "skeptics" (including myself, perhaps Pereboom, Honderich?).

[Neal]

Thanks, Kip. About PAP -- I made an error in typing. I think it's clear Pereboom is a PAP-denier, not a PAPist. And about whether he is an I-MRIncompatibilist, I think you're right. If agent-causation existed, we could be morally responsible. So in addition to answering the various compatibility questions, we'll need to map the positive theses too -- that is, are we in fact morally responsible? Does determinism in fact obtain? And so on...

[Kip Werking]

About Pereboom and PAP: what of my suggestion that Pereboom is PAPist but not a PRAPist (where PRAPist means one who claims that robust alternative possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility)? In other words, might Pereboom agree that moral responsibility entails alternative possibilities, but only trivially so? Or am I mischaracterizing his view?

[Joe Campbell]

Does anyone know of an argument in favor of I-MR-incompatibilism that is not also a more general argument in support of free will denialism? I can't imagine what such a thing would look like.

There is the Mind argument, but that is really an argument for restrictivism (which is not noted above btw).

There is Strawson's ultimacy argument, which, of course, is an argument for free will denialism. Similarly, van Inwagen's criticisms of indeterminism (his mystery argument, for instance) seem to be extensions of his argument for D-MR-incompatibilism. Both Strawson and van Inwagen seem to argue as follows:

(1) D-MR-incompatibilism is true.
(2) Indeterminism cannot increase the level of freedom or moral responsibility in the world.
(3) Thus, free will denialism is true.

There are also particular criticisms of incompatibilist accounts. But none of these can be generalized to support I-MR-incompatibilism as far as I can see. The reason is that all of these criticisms seem to hinge on a specific place in which an indeterministic event is located. If such an event is located, say, at a time in the remote past or at some remote region of space, it is unclear how it would lead one to draw conclusions about moral responsibility but indeterminism would be true nonetheless.

I'd be very interested to know if I'm wrong about this. In fact, I'm so interested that I will gladly buy anyone a beer if they can show me one persuasive argument for I-MR-incompatibilism that cannot be generalized into a persuasive argument for free will denialism. Any one interested in taking me up on this challenge may collect at this year's INPC or Pacific APA.

Best, Joe

[Neal]

Joe,

I can't imagine winning a beer would be this easy, so I'm probably wrong but -- wouldn't a Hobart-type view be an argument for I-MRIncompatibilism that doesn't generalize into an argument for free will denialism? I take it that Hobart is a (or a Hobartian could be a) D-MRCompatibilist but a I-MRIncompatibilist. The only way we can have the required sort of control over our actions is if determinism is true, otherwise our actions are just random.

I haven't read the Hobart in a while, though. Am I misreading this sort of view?

[Mark Smeltzer]

Neal,

If Joe is asking for people who are both D-MRIncompatibilists and I-MRIncompatibilists, but are not free will deniers, then it is a rather tough challenge indeed; not even Hondrich fits here.

But, if Joe is asking for people who are both D-MRCompatibilists and I-MRIncompatibilists, then it seems any Hard Compatibilist will fit the bill. If this is the case, it seems that he has outsmarted himself this time... and owes you a beer! ;)

[Kevin Timpe]

Kip,

Above you suggest that "Pereboom is PAPist but not a PRAPist (where PRAPist means one who claims that robust alternative possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility)." I think that this is exactly right. Pereboom does seem to think that even in an FSC, agents have some alternative possiblities. On page 37 of Living without Free Will, he writes: “My own view is that moral responsibility requires that the actions’ actual causal history have certain indeterministic features, but that it might well be that alternative possibilities – not necessarily of the robust sort – are entailed by the actual causal history’s having those features. Nevertheless, the aspect of the action that has the important role in explaining why agents would be morally responsible is the nature of the actual causal history, and not the alternative possibilities"--this seems to support your claim here.

[Kip Werking]

Kevin: Thanks! I look forward to meeting you at INPC.

Neal: Hobarg may have claimed that moral responsibility entails determinism (as, I think, Hume claimed), but both are just mistaken. Joe draws attention to the problem. For example, if there is an indeterministic particle in a far away galaxy, then determinism is false, but all of one's behavior is not "random" but orderly.

Mark: Nothing about hard compatibilism (in any of the various senses offered by Kane, Watson, or Tom Clark) seems to imply I-MRIncompatibilism. To my knowledge, hard compatibilism is silent about the compatibility between indeterminism and moral responsibility.

As much as I would love for Joe to buy me a beer, I agree that it is impossible to satisfy his challenge.

[Mark Smeltzer]

Kip,

I used "Hard Compatibilism" in the traditional sense which is taken to mean that responsibility requires determinism to be true.

Furthermore, according to chaos theory your suggestion that "if there is an indeterministic particle in a far away galaxy, then determinism is false, but all of one's behavior is not 'random' but orderly" is not at all as trivial as it seems. To the extent we believe in the tenets of chaos theory, we must believe that even one indeterministically behaving particle would have radical implications on successive iterations of the whole system as those indeterministic effects cascade through the causal chains. In other words, chaos theory predicts that divergences would compound over a continuum of space-time events, which is counterintuitive since we are naturally inclined to believe that it would be diluted instead.

[Kip Werking]

Mark:

I've never heard of that usage. Can you give me an example of where the term is used that way?

About chaos theory. I cited the example about the far away galaxy to disprove the claim that moral responsibility entails determinism. You suggest that chaos theory might complicate the situation. But, in the spirit of my original post, I can just stipulate that, in my example, chaos theory does not hold. So the example would still serve as a counter-example to the claim that moral responsibility entails determinism.

[michael nelson]

Joe,

Suppose one thought that acting freely just was being able to do otherwise and that the local miracle compatibilist was basically right about the ability to do otherwise, in that agents in deterministic universes have the ability to do otherwise because they have the weak ability to break laws of nature. Suppose further that one thought that being morally responsible for what one does requires being the ultimate source of what one does. Then there is room to develop an ultimate source argument that being morally responsible requires indeterminism that would not transfer over to show that acting freely similarly required indeterminism, as acting freely does not require being the ultimate source of what one does but only being able to do other than one does. In short, if one sees the existence of the ability to do otherwise as undemanding and that acting freely is just to have the ability to do other than one in fact does, while thinking that being morally responsible requires more than just the existence of such a weak ability to do otherwise but, say, being the ultimate source of one’s act, then it seems to me that there is room to think that there are arguments in favor of I-MR-incompatibilism that do not generalize to free will denialism. Whether there are any good arguments for such a position is another question, but I take it that that wasn’t your question: It was rather, I take it, is there a stable position that entails free will realism and I-MR-incompatibilism. It seems to me that the answer to this is “yes,” it’s stable and a live option. It is, I guess, the flip side of semi-compatibilism: Acting freely is compatible with determinism but acting with moral responsibility is not. I don't know anyone who holds this position.

Even if you aren’t paying for my beer, I hope you and I will be having one together at INPC.

[Jussi Suikkanen]

I find it hard to believe that your questions 1-4 could do all the work in mapping positions in the *free will* debates. I might be missing something here. The problem is that none of them mentions *free will* at all. All they are asking are the compatibility questions between determinism, moral responsibility, and possibilities to do otherwise. But, with any of these there is no uncontroversial conceptual connection to free will. It seems that the assumption for you is that moral responsibility and free will come as a package, but this might be questioned and it is rejected by many. And, many of the views you classify with the questions address free will directly. I guess I would just like to see free will related questions in questions that classify views about free will. There has to be different answers to the questions of how free will is related to moral responsibility and, thus at least this must be asked.

[Manuel]

I confess to loving taxonomies, and this is a pretty good one. (Nice post, Neal. Lots of interesting comments, too.) Perhaps all-too-predictably, I think there is a more basic distinction that should be added to the mix: a distinction between whether the theory is descriptive or diagnostic on the one hand and whether the theory is prescriptive on the other. The various views Neal suggests could be reproduced on each side of this more basic distinction, but it would better allow room for a range of views that think there is a gap between how we tend to think about free will and how we ought to think about free will.

I am also increasingly inclined to think that any taxonomy of at least descriptive/ diagnostic views needs to allow room for the possibility of mixed views on various compatibility questions. It seems an upshot of the data from the experimental types that appears to support views like Smilansky and Honderich's claims about varied sources of incompatibilist and compatibilist intuitions. In principle, this sort of distinction could be reproduced on the prescriptive side of the taxonomy, as well.

Two other questions one could ask that would map out different configurations of the terrain: whether the account of responsibility (or free will) is cognitivist, etc. and whether responsibility (or free will) is compatible with physicalist reductionism. (Shout out to Eddy on this last one.)

[Eddy Nahmias]

Neal's taxonomy is very helpful (I tried to create a 3D graph of the positions once but it didn't work--there's more than 3 axes!). It is also illustrative of the myopic focus on the question of determinism (and indeterminism) and its relationship to free will, moral responsibility, and the ability to do otherwise. Obviously, there's a lot to be debated about these questions. But while we have these ivory tower discussions, there's a world out there wondering whether we have free will and moral responsibility (or how much we have) given what the sciences are telling us about ourselves. And the scientists seem happy to tell the world the answer (usually they say "no" because they mistakenly think incompatibilism is the only option and that what science is showing is that we are deterministic systems, when in fact compatibilism is at least an option and, regardeless, what the science--i.e., psychology, cog sci, neuroscience--is showing has nothing to do with whether determinism is true but rather whether certain causal explanations of our decision-making and action are true, and *maybe* whether there is some evidence that epiphenomenalism is true or reductive physicalism or the unlikelihood of agent causation, etc.).

Anyway, you've heard this riff before and if you're at my INPC talk, you'll hear it again--supported by the hard evidence of polling the folk ;-}
But regarding the taxonomy above, I'd just add that there is that illusive unnamed position that needs a name: Compatibilists (about determinism and FW, MR, and any AP needed for FW or MR, and about indeterminism and all those as long as the indeterminism isn't rampant) who either (a) believe we don't have FW or MR (perhaps because eliminativism about agency or mental states is true or metaphysical epiphenomenalism is true) or (b) worry that we don't have FW or MR or that we (c) have less FW and MR than we think, because of what the sciences of the mind suggest about human agency. I'm a compatibilist worrier, but I need a better name.

Joe, why couldn't one be a compatibilist about determinism and FW/MR but an incompatibilist about certain types of indeterminism and FW/MR, e.g., indeterminism that arises between an agent's well-reasoned and "identified-with" decision and her action such that there's a good chance she won't do what she decided. Isn't that the "soft determinist" argument?

[Mark Smeltzer]

Kip,

As far as I know, Hume was one of the first published hard compatibilists, but the concept dates back to the ancient greeks. In my schooling we were taught that hard compatibilism refers to the kind of compatibilism that requires determinism, and soft compatibilism refers to the kind of compatibilism that does not require determinism. In my experience, there seems to be a general concensus on the usage of these terms.

Regardless of the terminology at play, any D-MRCompatibilist + I-MRIncompatibilist position would suffice to fulfill Joe's inquiry, which was the point of my post. I'm not interested in debating terminology.

Lastly, regarding your dismissal of chaos theory, I suppose you can try to stipulate it away, but it is certainly dialetically useless. Chaos theory purports to pertain to all dynamical systems, so your stipulation that you can conceive of a world in which it does not pertain is highly questionable.

[Kip Werking]

Mark:

Some points.

1. I agree that, according to your usage, Hume would be a hard compatibilist (he might also be a hard compatibilist according to my usage; he seems to have waffled on this issue). But Joe's challenge stipulated not just that such a position/argument exists, but that it cannot be generalized to free will denialism. For the reasons Joe and I have mentioned, it would seem that views such as Hume's could be so generalized. Hume was an I-MRIncompatibilist because he thought indeterminism would necessarily undermine the connections between agents and their actions. But, as in the far away galaxy example, indeterminism does not necessarily undermine these connections. So I think (although we can never know!) that, if confronted by these arguments, Hume would weaken his claim: only certain kinds of indeterminism are incompatible with moral responsibility.

2. About the semantic point: I don't want to argue about labels too much either (let's bring out the asterisks!), but it is important to be, in some sense, consistent about the way we use terms. The only evidence I've seen that the term "hard compatibilism" has ever referred to the view you describe is your pair of claims about schooling and a "general consensus." In contrast, I know that Kane, Watson, and Clark have used the term "hard compatibilism" to refer to concepts that are quite distinct from yours. It would be surprising if none of them had known of this consensus about your usage, or if, knowing it, they had ignored it. I would be interested to know what any of the other Gardeners take hard compatibilism to mean?

3. About chaos theory (after doing a little research!). It is not at all clear to me that a multi-galaxy system (or the system of your choice) is chaotic, or even dynamic, in the sense you describe. For one, chaotic systems seem to be deterministic by definition (see, for example, the wikipedia article on chaos theory). So the fact that the galaxy I describe is indeterministic would seem to prevent it from being chaotic. Furthermore, although physicists and mathematicians have a number of model chaotic systems (e.g. "double pendulum", "logistic map", "bouncing balls"), I can find no support for the claim that two distant galaxies would form such a system. So it is not clear that such galaxies would be chaotic, in this universe. Finally, even if they are chaotic in this universe, I can *easily* conceive of a far away quantum particle having no effect upon my life. If this wasn't easily conceivable, it wouldn't motivate the concerns that Joe and I, amongst others, express about freedom entailing determinism. Besides, I thought soft libertarians like Kane, and not compatibilists, reached dubious conclusions about how chaos theory and quantum mechanics affect human agency. But aren't you a compatibilist?

[Mark Smeltzer]

Kip,

Disclaimer: You can either take my word for it that your understanding of the implications of chaos theory is flawed or you can insist that you have it right. I am not going to debate you on a subject that you (admittedly) know very little of.

What I will say is that your last point about conceivability prompts me to wonder what you mean by "conceivability". Many, such as Alvin Plantinga, have argued that logical possibility bounds conceivability. If that is true, then conceivability claims containing logically dubious content (e.g. {I can conceive of a world where 1 + 1 = 3} or {I can conceive of a world containing round squares}) cannot suffice for establishing counter-examples to other claims. I, for one, agree with this bounded view of conceivability.

Continuing on, your suggestion was that we were to imagine a world in which determinism would be true, except for a single one misbehaving particle in a far away galaxy. You suggested that this one misbehaving particle would not significantly disrupt things and that world would still behave in ways relevantly similar to our own world. Finally, you concluded that this story serves as a counter-example to the Hard Compatibilist position. Correct?

My point is that in any world where chaos theory is correct, it is logically impossible for micro-level events not to have macro-level effects in later iterations of the system. So, your proposed counter-example obviously begs the question against chaos theory. Since it is presumable that the tenets of chaos theory are features of the causal-mechanics of our world, you have the burden of establishing the dialectical relevance of a world lacking those features.

I do not think there is any "easy" way around it for you. As far as I see it, you have to either:

(1) Defend the thesis that the causal-mechanics of a world lacking the features described by chaos theory is still relevantly similar to our own world;
(2) Defend the thesis that even in light of the causal-mechanics described by chaos theory a distant, indeterministic singularity would not have a relevant impact on the features that are at stake in every conceivable (so-called) Hard Compatibilist account; or
(3) Recant your categorical dismissal of the Hard Compatibilist position as a solution to Joe's prompt.

You are welcome to attempt either (1) or (2) (if you have enough time on your hands and the appropriate mathematical background to engage the source materials — although I doubtful whether sufficiently generic criteria could be established to make [2] approachable), but the course of action I recommend is (3).

[Kip Werking]

Mark,

Considering that you did not mention the label issue in your last post, I'll drop it. This leaves the chaos issue and, related to it, the far away galaxy example.

First of all, I want to note that the claim that you will not argue with me, because I don’t understand everything about chaos theory, seems both unfair and convenient. I may not understand all of chaos theory (and I doubt that you do), but I think I understand enough to justify a rebuttable presumption that your argument does fail, and for reasons I mentioned and which you have not addressed. These reasons were that:

1. Chaotic systems are deterministic and the galaxy in my example is indeterministic, by stipulation.
2. Chaos theory only has implications for chaotic systems, but you have not shown that a far away galaxy, in connection with this galaxy, is such a system.

If you refuse to engage these arguments, then I don’t see how you can expect to convince me or anyone else that you are correct. And please don't think that I am unprepared for the math and physics involved; I have a degree in electrical engineering from the University of Texas and am no stranger to math.

I also listed a third reason: I can conceive of a world such that a far away quantum particle does not exert any significant influence over my life (I agree with you that logical impossibility bounds conceivability). This leads to your claim:

"My point is that in any world where chaos theory is correct, it is logically impossible for micro-level events not to have macro-level effects in later iterations of the system."

There are three points to make about this:

1. Chaos theory is math and, to that extent, is true in every world. So instead of saying that chaos theory is true in a given world, it may be more accurate to say that it applies to certain aspects of a given world. This leads to the second point.
2. Although it is conceivable, I suppose, that the entire universe may or may not be chaotic (I know of no proof that it is and you have not offered one), a quick glance at the wikipedia article shows that chaos theory typically applies to narrower aspects of a given world: plate tectonics, population growth, turbulence in fluid motion, radioengineering, oscillation in radio circuits, etc. (all of these are cited in the wikipedia article).
3. You claim that if chaos theory applied to a given system, then it would be logically impossible for that system not to exhibit chaotic behavior (e.g. sensitivity to initial conditions). This seems true. But from this premise it does not follow that my claim (that I can imagine that a far away quantum particle might not influence my own life) is false. This is so because the world I am imagining need not be the world you describe, where chaos theory applies (the organization of matter would be different; not the math). But, if moral responsibility entails determinism, then this should be impossible in *every* world, not just in the world you describe where chaos theory applies. So I can imagine a counter-example to that entailment, and it is therefore false.

The problem, I think, is that you have confused the claim "chaos theory is mathematically correct and applies in certain domains" with the claim "chaos theory is mathematically correct and the entire universe, as well as any two galaxy system, is a chaotic system." Although the former seems true, I know of no reason, and you have not given me any reason, to think that the latter is.

In summary, let me address the options you give me. I think I have defended both 1 and a weaker 2. I defended 1 by noting that the entailment (mr->determinism), to be true, must work in *all* worlds, and not just "in any world where chaos theory is correct." But mr->determinism will fail for any two galaxy system such that chaos theory does not apply to it, and you have not shown that chaos theory applies to all two galaxy systems. So the entailment remains unsupported. I defended a weaker 2 by noting that "even in light of the causal-mechanics described by chaos theory a distant singularity" need not have a relevant impact on my own life, because you have not shown that the two-galaxy system I describe is chaotic. So even if chaos theory is mathematically correct, it need not apply.

[Mark Smeltzer]

Kip,

To answer the worry you just presented seems simple enough — I did not realize that that was the level of disagreement we were having. What I have said previously in this thread can easily be turned into a modal argument against your conclusion, and would go something like this:

1. World X contains two kinds of causal systems: those that are deterministic and those that are indeterministic.
2. It is true that X as a whole is indeterministic.
3. Because X's deterministic system(s) are chaotic, these systems are adversely affected by the indeterministic system(s).
4. X's deterministic system(s) are contextually significant to the features of Hard Compatibilism.
4. If X's deterministic system(s) are adversely affected by X's indeterministic system(s) and X's deterministic system(s) are contextually significant to the features of Hard Compatibilism, each iteration of X is adversely affected by indeterminism.
5. If each iteration of X is adversely affected by indeterminism, then (in the context of Hard Compatibilism) X is relevantly dissimilar to a completely deterministic world.
6. Therefore, (in the context of Hard Compatibilism) X is relevantly dissimilar to a completely deterministic world.

I believe that leaves you with the three options I mentioned earlier... or you could approach this argument directly and take issue with one or more of its premises.

Joe,

I don't see how this argument could be generalized to support free will denial. Does that mean I win the prize? :)

[Kip Werking]

Mark:

Well I'm glad that this comment will be shorter than my last one! I don't think your counter-argument works, and for a reason I've already mentioned. As I wrote in my last post:

"You claim that if chaos theory applied to a given system, then it would be logically impossible for that system not to exhibit chaotic behavior (e.g. sensitivity to initial conditions). This seems true. But from this premise it does not follow that my claim (that I can imagine that a far away quantum particle might not influence my own life) is false. This is so because the world I am imagining need not be the world you describe, where chaos theory applies (the organization of matter would be different; not the math). But, if moral responsibility entails determinism, then this should be impossible in *every* world, not just in the world you describe where chaos theory applies. So I can imagine a counter-example to that entailment, and it is therefore false."

So, in order to defend mr->determinism, you would need to show that it holds in every world, and not just in any which, according to your stipulation, has the relevant chaotic feature. But, as I also noted before, you have not shown that a two galaxy system must be chaotic in *any* given world, much less that a two galaxy system must be chaotic in *all* worlds. Instead, all your counter-argument does is *stipulate*, without proof, that some world (namely, World X) does. In other words, from the beginning, you have just stipulated that chaos theory applies (or can apply) to the two galaxy system I describe, and I have objected: "you are just stipulating this without proving it." Given that you continue to offer no proof, my objection stands.

[Mark Smeltzer]

Kip,

The modal argument I provided is sufficiently general to address your concerns regarding N-galaxies, N-dimensions, or any other fathomable situation involving some deterministic systems being influenced by some indeterministic elements.

Unless you have it in mind that galaxies have no influence upon one another, but I know of no astrophysistis who would accept that idea. But, even if there is a possible world in which there are two galaxies that have no influence upon each other, we can just restructure the argument from focusing on world-determinism to scope-determinism: Hard Compatibilism would then become the position that responsibility is only possible across scopes where determinism holds. This variant of Hard Compatibilism (which preserves all of the main features of the broader version) is immune to the type of counter-example you've been describing.

[Mark Smeltzer]

Kip,

After thinking about it more, I think it is possible to prove that Hard Compatibilism is compatible with world-indeterminism, but still requires what I called "scope-determinism" in my previous post. And after thinking about *that* for a while, I really think that's what Hard Compatibilists have been saying all along: that the scope of an agent's action(s) must be free of the influence of any indeterministic forces in order for responsibility to issue.

I think this is the kind of position that Joe was inquiring about: one that simply says responsibility is incompatible with indeterminism. I am not defending Hard Compatibilism here -- I am just arguing that it is the kind of view that Joe was looking for.

Anyway, here's the kind of case that can prove that Hard Compatibilism is compatible with world-indeterminism:

In world X at time T0 Joe lives on planet Earth and determinism holds within that scope, and Joe is responsible for his actions. At time T1 a quantum singularity develops in a distant galaxy that emits micro-level indeterministic forces. At time T2 the influences of the indeterminstic forces from the singularity have had measurable effect upon every other particle in the universe (since the rest of the universe behaves deterministically, and thus chaotically).

According to traditional Hard Compatibilism, Joe is definitely is responsible for his actions at T0 and at T1, but he is not responsible for his actions on or after T2. Thus, we can conclude that Hard Compatibilist accounts are really concerned with scope-determinism, and that world-determinism is irrelevant.

That said, the Hard Compatibilist may still have grounds to argue that responsibility is metaphysically incompatible with world-indetermism (since indeterministic forces will always destabalize deterministic systems), even though he conceeds that responsibility is logically compatible with world-determinism.

[Kip Werking]

Mark:

I just finished writing a long answer to your first post! In that post, I continued to argue that my far away galaxy example works.

In your second post, you say that Hard Compatibilism is compatible with “world-indeterminism.” It is not clear, however, what you mean by Hard Compatibilism. Do you mean your original claim that moral responsibility entails determinism (note that determinism implies world-determinism, the “world” modifier seems redundant)? Or do you mean the narrower version mentioned in your last post: moral responsibility implies that the local scope is deterministic? It is also worth noting that, as I’ve mentioned before, you are the only person I know who uses the term “hard compatibilism” in this way; several other philosophers use the term to imply something quite different (Kane and Watson use the term to refer to compatibilist theories that have less stringent historical requirements for moral responsibility; Clark uses it to refer to compatibilist theories that do not soften our reactive attitudes).

It is not clear what you mean by saying that Hard Compatibilism, a philosophical proposition, is compatible with indeterminism, an empirical question. You write:

“According to traditional Hard Compatibilism, Joe is definitely is responsible for his actions at T0 and at T1, but he is not responsible for his actions on or after T2. Thus, we can conclude that Hard Compatibilist accounts are really concerned with scope-determinism, and that world-determinism is irrelevant.”

I agree with you that a compatibilist such as Hume should not find certain kinds of indeterminism threatening (as in the far away galaxy example). Of course, our original dispute involved the claim that moral responsibility entails determinism. Am I to assume that you are dropping your objection, based on chaos theory, to the far away galaxy example?

I also want to address another claim you made (and this may help explain our dispute about chaos theory):

“At time T2 the influences of the indeterminstic forces from the singularity have had measurable effect upon every other particle in the universe (since the rest of the universe behaves deterministically, and thus chaotically).”

Here you claim that:

Determinism->a singularity (a single particle?) will eventually have an effect on every other particle in the universe
Determinism->the universe behaves chaotically

But neither of these conclusions follow. Determinism does imply that any given particle or bit of information will eventually ripple out and affect every other particle or bit. It just implies that any given state of the universe entails a unique future. Imagine, for example, that all particle or bits are grouped into pairs, and each member of a pair only influences the other member. Then there could be determinism but no rippling. Similarly, determinism does not imply that the universe behaves chaotically. That chaotic systems are deterministic is, if anything, a necessary but not sufficient condition of being chaotic. For example, consider the two dimensional cellular automata which follows the rule: shaded cell->shaded cell; non-shared cell->shaded cell. This system will be deterministic but not chaotic (unlike other two dimension cellular automata, which are both deterministic and chaotic, such as Wolfram’s Rule 30; see http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Rule30.html).

In summary, you seem to have abandoned your objection, based on chaos theory, to my far away particle example. To the extent that I was only defending that example, there is no need to continue arguing. Since then, you’ve made further, and distinct, claims (such as your claim that “hard compatibilism… requires… scope-determinism”) but it is not clear to me what you mean by them or how they are relevant.

[Mark Smeltzer]

Kip,

I conceeded the point about the logical compatability of Hard Compatiblism (the thesis that responsibility entails determinism — it shouldn't matter if I'm the only one in the world using it this way since I have defined it and am using it consistently in this thread) and world-indeterminism because I introduced a case that actually demonstrates the point clearly. Given that concession, has Hard Compatibilism been thwarted? No. Simply interpret "responsibility entails determinism" as either a logical thesis referring to scope-determinism or as a metaphysical thesis referring to either world- or scope-determinism.

Regarding your point about possible worlds which are deterministic, but not chaotic: if the world contains a number of chaotic systems that do not effect one another and none of these systems could conceivably contain an agent, it is hard to see how such a world is relevantly similar to the kind of world that a Hard Compatibilist has in mind — since Hard Compatibilist accounts require worlds which are conducive to the transmition of information throughout causal systems and are suitable environments for agent(s) to exhibit responsibility-relevant features.

[Kip Werking]

Mark:

I'm glad we agree that moral responsibility (at least by typical compatibilist standards) does not imply determinism. That was all I wanted to defend.

About chaos theory. You write:

"[I]f the world contains a number of chaotic systems that do not effect one another and none of these systems could conceivably contain an agent, it is hard to see how such a world is relevantly similar to the kind of world that a Hard Compatibilist has in mind — since Hard Compatibilist accounts require worlds which are conducive to the transmition of information throughout causal systems and are suitable environments for agent(s) to exhibit responsibility-relevant features."

I haven't said anything about such worlds, which contains a number of isolated chaotic systems, and none of which can "conceivably contain an agent." So that point seems irrelevant. Instead, I was just challenging the claim, that determinism implies that the universe is a chaotic system. We seem to agree about this, and so there is no need to further argue.

[Mark Smeltzer]

Kip,

I think there is a way to dismiss your case without getting into describing the dynamics of complex deterministic systems (viz., chaos theory).

All of the kinds of cases you offered as counter-examples to Hard Compatibilism involve the stipulation of worlds containing one or more indeterministic systems that are causally isolated from its one or more deterministic systems. Because of this stipulation, we can "subtract" the indeterministic systems from these worlds without any measurable effect on the deterministic systems. Consequently, your counter-examples fail to address the core issues relevant to Hard Compatibilism since it is only concerned with the dynamics of deterministic systems.

Hard Compatibilism, as I am using it, is the thesis that responsibility entails determinism. That scope of that entailment, by its very nature, is limited to the causal-context of cases of responsibility. Therefore, the entailment reads as "responsibility in causal-context X entails that determinism holds in the scope of X".

I only brought up chaos theory as a means of combating cases (which you were not advancing) that involve indeterministic systems exhibit causal influence upon chaotic systems. This line of argument is more contentious since it is not clear at this point whether Hard Compatibilism requires chaotic systems in addition to deterministic systems. Part of me thinks there perhaps chaos is important to Hard Compatibilism since chaotic systems by their very nature are systems that emphasize even the minutest piece of information (there is zero information loss in truly chaotic systems), but that is a question for another thread.

[Kip Werking]

Mark:

Let's be clear with our terms. Let's call the thesis "moral responsibility -> determinism" "HT" for Hume's thesis. Let's call the thesis "moral responsibility->the local scope is deterministc" "MT" for Mark's thesis. You called both HT and MT by the label "Hard Compatibilism" in this thread.

You say that "[a]ll of the kinds of cases you offered" were offered as counter-examples to Hard Compatibilism. It is true that I offered them as counter-examples to HT. We both agree that HT is false.

But I have never offered them as counter-examples to MT. On first blush, however, I suspect that MT will be vulnerable to "far away galaxy" style examples. Here is what I originally wrote in response to your first post (above):

"You say that [MT] "preserves all of the main features of HT" but this is not obvious. MT does not preserve the HT's claim that moral responsibility entails that the entire universe is deterministic, and this, if anything, seems to be a main feature of the theory (what constitutes a main feature?).

More importantly, it is not clear that [MT] would be immune to a two galaxy style argument. In particular, if you claim that moral responsibility entails that its local scope is deterministic, one needs to specify where moral responsibility is located. What region bounds a given amount of moral responsibility? The brain? The human being? A point in space? Anything larger than a point in space would be vulnerable, I think, to two galaxy style arguments. For example, consider the case where a quantum particle in one's brain is indeterministic but exerts no influence on any of the other particles in the brain (instead of being an unmoved mover it is a moved non-mover). By at least typical compatibilist standards, that brain might be morally responsible and yet the scope, if large enough to contain the brain, would not be deterministic."

One potential answer is to say that moral responsibility exists in the set "brain minus the moved non-mover." So whereever one encounters indeterministic bits of the universe, moral responsibility disappears. But this seems strange, to say the least. So, although I remain undecided about MT (and I'm glad we agree about HT), it is not clear that MT is immune to counter-example in the way you suggest.

[Mark Smeltzer]

Kip,

Using your HT and MT terms, I argued in my last couple posts that HT must be equivalent to MT and, consequently, that your counter-examples miss the point of HT. In other words, I don't think Hume was ever concerned with the possibility of a distant, indeterministic galaxy that bears no causal influence on our own causal-context.

What matters as far as the HT thesis is concerned is whether all of the causal-forces involved or connected with an agent and its actions are deterministic in nature. Your examples involves indeterminism that does not, in any way, affect the agent or its situation. So, that kind of indeterminism cannot be relevant to the HT thesis.

Your case of an indeterministic, quantum particle located within an agent's brain can be dimissed for the same reason: since the quantum particle bears no causal implications (by stipulation) on the agent or its situation, the particle can be subtracted from the world — its existence is irrelevant to the question at hand.

Have you got any other types of cases against HT in mind? I do not think this set is worth pursuing...

[Kip Werking]

Mark:

Although I stipulated that HT meant “moral responsibility -> determinism” you are using the term to imply your own revised “hard compatibilism.” Looking back at Hume’s Treatise, I think you are right that Hume was a hard compatibilist in that sense (and would not say that moral responsibility entails that the whole universe is deterministic). The relevant passage is:

“Nay I shall go farther, and assert, that this kind of necessity is so essential to religion and morality, that without it there must ensue an absolute subversion of both, and that every other supposition is entirely destructive to all laws both divine and human. `Tis indeed certain, that as all human laws are founded on rewards and punishments, `tis suppos'd as a fundamental principle, that these motives have an influence on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions. We may give to this influence what name we please; but as `tis usually conjoin'd with the action, common sense requires it shou'd be esteem'd a cause, and be book'd upon as an instance of that necessity, which I wou'd establish.”

The key phrase here is “kind of necessity” (as opposed to necessity in general). Perhaps I misinterpreted this passage because I knew that Hume also believed, not just that human nature follows laws, but that the whole universe does. It would be nice to ask Paul Russell about this issue. In the meanwhile, instead of HT, let’s call the view “moral responsibility -> determinism” KT (for Kip’s thesis), instead of HT.

Moving on, let’s distinguish between:

1. moral responsibility -> the local scope is deterministic
2. moral responsibility -> no indeterministic events influence the agent

My brain counter-example was directed at 1. You ask if I have any counter-examples against 2. I strongly suspect that 2 is vulnerable to counter-examples. Obviously, agents can satisfy typical compatibilist criteria for moral responsibility if indeterministic events affect their situation (and, indirectly, the agents themselves). For example, if the agents use geiger counters which detect indeterministic radiation, these geiger counters can influence the agents’ situation. So it is false that “all of the causal-forces involved or connected with an agent and its actions are deterministic in nature.” And yet the agents might intuitively satisfy typical compatibilist requirements for moral responsibility. Kane discusses similar examples involving a sharp-shooter and radioactive materials.

I suspect one can even go further. Returning to the brain example, suppose that instead of being a moved un-mover, the indeterministic particle does exert an influence on the brain. Although too much of this influence can undermine compatibilist-type responsibility, it seems that such responsibility can survive even a significant amount of this quantum noise. In other words, it doesn’t matter whether the randomness is in a geiger counter, or in the agent’s brain. Although I disagree with Kane’s claim that his view provides anything more valuable than compatibilist freedom, his view does begin to show how compatibilist-type responsibility can survive such quantum noise.

So, no, I don’t think the view you describe (as defined by 2 above) is immune to counter-example.

[Mark Smeltzer]

Kip,

Ah, at last, we are approaching consensus. Thanks for providing that Hume quote.

I think you are right that the next step would be to attempt to construct cases to discredit specific MT accounts, where an MT account is any account of responsibility that accepts the thesis that {moral responsibility entails that no indeterministic forces influence the agent or its situation}.

These cases would have to engage the specific method that each MT account uses to motivate the MT thesis. However, I think that project, while interesting and worthy of further study, is not relevant to Joe’s original question, which is what prompted this discussion.

My first contention is (merely) that if there is an account of responsibility that is an answer to Joe’s question, it has to be an account that accepts the MT thesis. I also contend that there could be ways of arguing for MT that do generalize to support free will denial.

Since I have not provided a positive argument for MT, you have the option of being able to agree with the first contention, and remain skeptical about the second.

I do not intend to argue for MT, but since there are others that have held MT positions, such as Hume and Leibniz, there are accounts (and arguments) out there to consider. Presumably, there are others as well.

One could even construe Locke as an MT-like compatibilist given his position on ideal agency, but it would have to be in a qualified sense such as, “ideal agency entails that no indeterministic forces influence the agent or its situation”, which would give rise to the idea that indeterminism (proportionally) mitigates the agent’s freedom/responsibility. That qualified thesis is still in line with the spirit of MT, so we could say that Locke advocated a kind of Soft MT. However, I do not think a Soft MT account represents an answer to Joe’s specific question.

(Endnote 1: when I spoke of “scope-determinism” in previous threads, I was intending that phrase to denote the idea that “no indeterministic events influence the agent or its situation”. In other words, I did not intend “scope” to denote any specific portions of space-time. Rather, “scope” merely refers to whatever concerns are relevant to the question at hand, which indicates that the scope may vary from one MT account to another.)

(Endnote 2: after reviewing some of the books on my shelf, I think the definitions of Hard and Soft Compatibilism I was using earlier were vestigial taxonomical terms from a class I took in college. In the context of that class, we identified a taxonomy of the various kinds of views of freedom and responsibility that was very useful for the purposes of the class, but nonetheless outside the bounds of convention. In fact, I find no consistent conventions in the literature for applying terms like “hard” and “soft” to the various positions. At best, in the literature “hard” seems to connote an uncompromising position and “soft” seems to connote a position that makes some concessions, and so these qualifiers are of little use in the end since their use is relative to the authors’ view of what constitutes concession in the context of particular debates.)

[Mark Smeltzer]

I left out a crucial "not" in my second contention... It should have read as, "I also contend that there could be ways of arguing for MT that do not generalize to support free will denial."

I have started checking all my posts in Word before I post them, but even that is not enough to overcome my inability to avoid typos! I am helpless to do otherwise, yet apparently still responsible ;)

[Joe Campbell]

Sorry for the delayed response but I left for a spring vacation shortly after posting my challenge!

Michael,

I should have been more careful. By ‘free will’ I just mean ‘the kind of freedom or control that is necessary for moral responsibility.’ (I continue to use the term in this way below.) Thus, if one is a free will denier, one is a moral responsibility denier. But my fault for not being clearer; you get a beer! The view you sketch is very interesting, as well, and worth a beer anyway! (Not that I believe it, of course.)

Neal,

Hobart will not work for the reason Kip notes: “if there is an indeterministic particle in a far away galaxy, then determinism is false, but all of one’s behavior is not ‘random’ but orderly.” (I might have to buy Kip a beer for agreeing with me!) But an even stronger point can be made.

D-MR-incompatibilists think that the very same action cannot be causally determined and free (in the moral-responsibility-denying sense). If determinism is true, then every human action is causally determined. Thus, given determinism D-MR-incompatibilism is true.

There is no comparable I-MR-incompatibilism argument. First, it is false that if indeterminism is true, then every human action is undetermined. This is the point that Kip notes. Second, the first premise of the comparable I-MR-incompatibilism argument -- the very same action cannot be undetermined and free -- is impossible to establish without arguing for some more general claim first.

Folks who think that determinism compromises free will think that determinism in general, however it is manifested, compromises free will. But folks who think that indeterminism compromises free will think that it does so because (as Hobart claimed) it makes human actions random. But not all manifestations of undetermined events within a causal chain leading up to an action can be shown to make the action random in a moral-responsibility-denying sense.

Imagine an ambidextrous killer who is just as good at shooting people with his left hand as he is at shooting them with his right hand. Suppose that he decides to kill someone and that whether he uses his left or right hand is causally undetermined. He happens to use his right hand. The killing is causally undetermined but he is, it seems, still responsible.

The best that one can do when making a general claim about indeterminism is this: “indeterministic occurrences cannot possibly contribute to moral responsibility” (G. Strawson, “Free Will,” section 5). The only way to turn this claim into an argument for I-MR-incompatibilism is to use it as Strawson does, e.g., as a premise toward a more general argument for free will (in the moral-responsibility-denying sense) denialism.

Eddy,

You ask: “why couldn’t one be a compatibilist about determinism and FW/MR but an incompatibilist about certain types of indeterminism and FW/MR, e.g., indeterminism that arises between an agent’s well-reasoned and ‘identified-with’ decision and her action such that there’s a good chance she won’t do what she decided. Isn’t that the ‘soft determinist’ argument?”

Right. But this view is not properly called ‘I-MR-incompatibilism.’ Certainly compatibilists can believe that some manifestations of determinism are threatening to FW/MR. What makes them compatibilists is that they don’t think that all manifestations of determinism are threatening to FW/MR.

My main point is that the term ‘I-MR-incompatibilism’ needs to be abandoned. Two theses are incompatible if it is not possible for them both to be true. What one means when one applies the ‘I-MR-incompatibilism’ is something other than what the term actually means, something closer to what you (Eddy) describe. But what is incompatible with FW/MR, on this view, is something more than mere indeterminism.

Sorry if I missed anyone! I’ll look closer at the other responses later this week.