John Rawls: Free Will Skeptic?

If we define 'free will skeptic' as someone who does not think we are free in such a way that could justify moral desert then wouldn't this passage from A Theory of Justice place Rawls in the skeptic's camp?

Perhaps some will think that the person with greater natural endowments deserves those assets and the superior character that made their development possible.   Because he is more worthy in this sense, he deserves the greater advantages that he could achieve with them.  This view, however, is surely incorrect.  It seems to be one of the fixed points of our considered judgment that no one deserves his place in the distribution of native endowments, any more than one deserves one's initial starting point in society.  The assertion that a man deserves the superior character that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his abilities is equally problematic, for his character depends in large part upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can claim no credit.  The notion of desert seems not to apply to these cases. 

Add to this passage that the (small) part of our character that doesn't depend on family and social circumstances ALSO depends on things (like heredity) for which we can claim no credit, and you have full blown free will skepticism.   And I think that this is implicit in the passage anyway.   

Does anyone know if Rawls has written about these ideas in the context of the free will/moral responsibility debate? 

Comments

[John Fischer]

Great post, Tammler. As Nozick pointed out, these elements of Rawls do not fit well with Rawls' "Kantian" views about the dignity and inviolability of the individual. Or so it seemed to Nozick, and it does seem that there is a tension here. Does anyone know of any further discussions by Rawls or others of this tension?

[Kip Werking]

Smilansky quotes Rawls in precisely this context at the beginning of one chapter in Free Will and Illusion. This fits within Smilansky's larger scheme of approaching the free will problem with an emphasis upon justice (and ultimate injustice). The first time I read the quote, I thought it was absolutely brilliant to connect free will skepticism with Rawls' political theory.

I am not certain that this passage commits Rawls to fw skepticism, however. The question hinges (as it always does, it seems) upon the validity of TNR, properly articulated. Rawls says that one cannot be responsible for one's natural abilities. This is uncontroversial. A naturally strong person does not deserve to be strong. But one who denies TNR (as Fischer does, and Rawls might, although I have my doubts) might allow that such a person nevertheless deserves praise for lifting heavy weights. From out of the chaos of inequal fortune and irresponsibility, people make their own fortunes and responsibility is born.

[Tamler Sommers]

John,

Where is Nozick's discussion of this tension? Somewhere in Anarchy, State, and Utopia?

Kip,

I think Rawls is implicitly endorsing the principle of TNR, or its converse, since he concludes that no one deserves the fruit of their good character. So I think the passage does committ him to free will skepticism.

[John Fischer]

Yes, it is in Anarachy, State, and Utopia in the material that criticizes Rawls.

[Mark Smeltzer]

"I think Rawls is implicitly endorsing the principle of TNR, or its converse, since he concludes that no one deserves the fruit of their good character."

Or its converse?? Are you implying they are equivalent?

[Tamler Sommers]

No. I don't know why I said "or its converse."

[Mark Smeltzer]

Since many would argue that TNR's converse is compatible with robust responsibility, the phrase "TNR or its converse" should be used with upmost care.

It almost goes without argument that if Rawls accepts the converse of TNR yet denies TNR, he would not be committed to free will skepticism. So, it is unclear to me what you were trying to convey when you used the phrase "or its converse" in that context.

[Tamler Sommers]

Sorry Mark, but it's unclear to me as well what I was trying to convey with that phrase. Probably that last night was $3 pitcher night at the Morris area American Eagle.

Actually, since I tend to associate TNR with blame, my guess is that I used 'converse' to indicate that this was a case of praiseworthiness. And so it would be a good thing to be responsible, not a bad thing. Obviously incorrect and even misleading, as you point out. I promise never again to bandy around the phrase "TNR or its converse" without prior scrutiny.

[Mark Smeltzer]

Assuming the view you hold is correct, there's no need to appologize or make promises that you can't be held accountable to ;)

[Patrick]

Rawls does have a throwaway comment in his essay on Hiroshima and Nagasaki where he basically says that the individual soldiers and citizens subject to propaganda can't be held responsible because they aren't free. They are brainwashed.

But this would seem to be a comment on the pathological case of totalitarian governments. So, I think, implicitly he wants to have free will. I don't know. I am operating from memory here.

[Jeff Moriarty]

I'm kind of late to this exchange, but since it's always interested me, here is a thought.

Those who interpret Rawls as saying that no one deserves anything (because no one is responsible for anything) tend to lean on this passage as evidence. But of course as Tamler noted it isn't conclusive--Rawls leaves room for something besides family and social circumstances to operate. It could be hereditary, or perhaps something more free-will-friendly.

It is also possible to interpret Rawls as saying not that no one deserves anything, but that we cannot tell what people deserve (see e.g. Young 1992). They cite this passage:

"The precept which seems intuitively to come closet to rewarding moral desert is that of distribution according to effrt, or perhaps better, conscientious effort. Once again, however, it seems clear that the effort a person is willing to make is influenced by his natural abilities and skills and the alternatives open to him. The better endowed are more likely, other things equal, to strive conscientiously, and there seems to be no way to discount for their greater good fortune. The idea of rewarding desert is impracticable" (TJ, p. 312).

If Rawls thought no one deserved anything (because no one is responsible for anything), you'd expect him to say, "The idea of rewarding desert is impossible" or some such thing. Instead, he says rewarding desert is impracticable, implying that people are deserving, and perhaps if we could "discount" for their good or bad fortune we could determine what they deserve, but we can't. So desert can't play a role in a practicable theory justice.

Sidgwick gives a similar argument against desert in TMOE, p. 284-285.

[Tamler Sommers]

Thanks Jeff. That's exactly what I was looking for-- references from someone who knows this literature much better than I do. I agree that in the passage you cite, Rawls does seem to view the problem as epistemological rather than metaphysical. On the other hand, it's hard to see what could be more "free will friendly" than endowment, natural abilities, skills, and open alternatives. If these attributes are considered a product of fortune, then what wouldn't be?

Tying this up to Kip's post--if Rawls is skeptical about moral responsibility, then it seems clear that MR skepticism doesn't entail consequentialism. (Because Rawls is certainly not a consequentialist.)

[Tom Clark]

MR skepticism may not directly entail consequentialism, but it certainly helps derail the deontological intuition that goes hand in hand with desert. MR, at least of the robust variety, has it that agents deserve praise or blame because it is *right* to praise or blame them, not because of any consequence that might ensue, and this is the essence of deontology: we have a duty to punish or reward, whatever the outcome. Once the deontological intuition is challenged (by calling RMR into question), then the consequentialist rationale for our practices of assigning credit and blame comes to the fore: to guide behavior. This gets discussed in a piece in which I take Stephen Morse to task for what I think is his insupportable deontological retributivism, especially given that he agrees that a primary function of morality and the law *is* to guide behavior, see http://www.naturalism.org/morse.htm.

Rawls may not have been a consequentialist, but the deontological injunction to treat people as ends in themselves (and thus treat them equally, and therefore fairly) can be straightforwardly reconstrued within a consequentialist framework: the desire to be treated as an end in oneself (what I call in the Morse piece the autonomy right) is a fundamental desideratum which we seek to safeguard via our moral and legal practices.
By spiking any notion that people deserve their advantages and the outcomes that accrue from them, Rawls keeps the focus on the equal status of each person’s desire for self-realization.

[SeanD]

(Knock-Knock)- Is this thing still on?

One might read that passage from TOJ as prefiguring Rawls's comments on moral desert in some of his later work, where it becomes abundantly clear that the difficulty for desert as a fundamental component of justice is, in a sense, a 'practical' problem. See this passage from "The Idea of Public Reason Revisisted":

"But distribution in accordance with moral desert, where this means the moral worth of character, all things considered, and including comprehensive doctrines, is not [a political value]. It is not a feasible political and social aim." (reprinted at 456 in the paperback edition of Political Liberalism)

Wherever Rawls's thought started on the issue of desert and justice, this apeears to be where it ended up- considerations of 'moral desert' are to be left out of politics not because of any facts free will or moral responsbility, but rather because any criterion for moral desert will necessarily draw on a controversial conception of the person. So moral desert is excluded for reasons that might be deemed 'practical' or (very looseley) 'epistemological', though they are clearly still principled in a very deep way- that is, it is not, on Rawls's view, regrettable that criterion for desert cannot be ascertained in an effective way.

So whether Rawls was a free will skeptic or not, it is plausible to suppose that he would invoke the autonomy of political philosophy and deny that at least some aspects of the free will debate could have substantial political consequences. (Does anyone know of a passage where he affirms or denies this point?)

[Tamler Sommers]

That does seem to be more evidence for the view that Rawls views the problem as epistemological. (By the way, I've been asked about this in two private emails--"free will skepticism" is a metaphysical position, it denies desert-entailing responsibility. We've discussed the reasons for using that label for a metaphysical position on this site before so I won't get it into now. But surely this is grounds for concern. What people are saying boils down to: "no, no, Rawls is not a free will SKEPTIC...He thinks the problem is EPISTEMOLOGICAL." Confusing at best.)

Still, I wonder what Rawls would think COULD ground claims about moral desert, given that he rules out native endowments and effort to cultivate abilities. What is it exactly that we are unable to ascertain about a person in order to determine whether they are truly morally responsible for their actions?

Another way to look at the question is this: what criteria does Rawls think an omniscient observer could use in order to accurately judge whether someone deserved punishment or reward for their character or behavior?

[Mark Smeltzer]

Tamler, the answer seems obvious enough from the quote that Sean provided, "moral desert .. means the moral worth of character".

Rawls seems to have roughly the same position that I do: desert is fundamentally *about* a person's moral character. So, the question about the omniscient observer seems easily answered.

[SeanD]

Tamler:

Your question about the omniscient observer can help to bring out nicely how Rawls regards the issue of desert in his later thought. His answer, I think would be this: for the purposes of ordering political affairs, it simply does not matter what such an omniscient observer would see- that perspective is not available in a pluralist society. Because an overlapping consensus cannot be secured over the basic questions about human nature and human character needed to ground a full conception of moral desert, considerations of full moral desert cannot be the basis of legitimate law.

So the problem is, for Rawls, 'epistemological' only in the sense of 'political epistemology', or, to use his phrase, 'public reason'. Principles resting on a particular view of human nature, like principles of desert, cannot be justified within the constraints of public justification. It should be noted, thought, that some desert-like considerations may stil be acceptable- i.e., those drawn from an appropriate political conception of the person. I certainly don't think that Rawls would say that all punishment is unjust, or even that no retributivist justification can be given for punishment. (The kind of appeals to desert that his account would block include more prominently, I think, Lockean justifications of property rights, as often appealed to by libertarians, or feudalistic appeals to natural superiority used to justify inequality.)

I think Mark is right that if there is any genuinely 'philosophical' (i.e., non-political) thesis expressed about desert and moral resposnsibility in the passage quoted, it is that any account of desert must rest on a view of moral responsibility which again draws on a conception of personhood. I'm curious at to whether this claim would be uncontroversial among FW/MR experts.

It's also quite possible that Rawls has a substantive position on the MR/desert issue, one that he would describe as part of his 'comprhensive doctrine.' ToJ would, I suppose, be one place to look for that. In that sense, considerations from his later work may be a bit orthogonal to the question of what he actually thought about the issue qua philosophical problem.

[Edmund Abegg]

First, the epistemological comes into play for Rawls only to justify his contractual approach. We do not know enough that is uncontroversial to simply use the correct comprehensive doctrine. After that, issues of epistemology are not relevant. We seek agreement, not truth.
Second, political liberalism and its embedded public reason may use only the moral values derived from the two principles chosen in the original position and relevant for the person as citizen. There is nothing much to say about deep moral responsibility in this context.
Third, Rawls surely allows for common sense judgments of responsibility and of holding someone responsible as long as these are within institutional contexts justified by political liberalism. But I think these judgments are consequentially motivated within these contexts. Somewhere he says that if an institution sets up a contest with a prize, then the winner deserves the prize. Elsewhere in a note he assures us that surfers who refuse to contribute to society will not be supported (i.e., they are to be held responsible for their contribution). But I do not think that these uses support any deep metaphysical position.

[Edmund Abegg]

First, the epistemological comes into play for Rawls only to justify his contractual approach. We do not know enough that is uncontroversial to simply use the correct comprehensive doctrine. After that, issues of epistemology are not relevant. We seek agreement, not truth.
Second, political liberalism and its embedded public reason may use only the moral values derived from the two principles chosen in the original position. There is nothing much to say about deep moral responsibility in this context.
Third, Rawls surely allows for common sense judgments of responsibility and of holding someone responsible as long as these are within institutional contexts justified by political liberalism. But I think these judgments are consequentially motivated within these contexts. Somewhere he says that if an institution sets up a contest with a prize, then the winner deserves the prize. Elsewhere in a note he assures us that surfers who refuse to contribute to society will not be supported (i.e., they are to be held responsible for their contribution). But I do not think that these uses support any deep metaphysical position.

[Edmund Abegg]

First, the epistemological comes into play for Rawls only to justify his contractual approach. We do not know enough that is uncontroversial to simply use the correct comprehensive doctrine. After that, issues of epistemology are not relevant. We seek agreement, not truth.
Second, political liberalism and its embedded public reason may use only the moral values derived from the two principles chosen in the original position. There is nothing much to say about deep moral responsibility in this context.
Third, Rawls surely allows for common sense judgments of responsibility and of holding someone responsible as long as these are within institutional contexts justified by political liberalism. But I think these judgments are consequentially motivated within these contexts. Somewhere he says that if an institution sets up a contest with a prize, then the winner deserves the prize. Elsewhere in a note he assures us that surfers who refuse to contribute to society will not be supported (i.e., they are to be held responsible for their contribution). But I do not think that these uses support any deep metaphysical position.

[Richard Double]

I don’t presume to say what role the passage cited by Tamler Sommers in which Rawls endorses moral responsibility non-realism [MRNR] plays in Rawls’s broader thinking. Still, irrespective of the views of Rawls experts commenting on this blog that MRNR plays no significant part in Rawls’s ACTUAL argument for justice, it seems clear that MRNR COULD provide a huge dialectical pay-off for Rawls by supporting the difference principle [DP] [A note to you free will mavens-call things by their right names. A non-realist with respect to X holds that X does not exist; a skeptic holds we do not know that X exists. Metaphysics is not epistemology.]

First, as Rawls notes, the nonrealism premise can be used to defend equality-larded principles such as DP against merit-based arguments [e.g., PHD’s deserve greater affluence because of their greater intelligence and perseverance.] A second use of MRNR to support DP is more aggressive. A natural reading of Rawls’s TJ support for [DP] is that rational, self-interested persons operating under a veil of ignorance would opt for principles attractive to risk aversive maximiners. This argument—I don’t surmise whether Rawls intends it to stand alone—strikes me as feeble. There seem to me too many counter-examples in which rational [prudential and altruistic] persons would risk disadvantages even if they thought they were the most disadvantaged: [a] in exchange for the possibility of prospective gains for other segments of society [why must persons under the veil lose the capacity for magnanimity?], [b] for the possibility of future advantages for themselves or their children [why must going under the veil destroy one’s sense of history?], or [c] as a trade-off for some other moral or non-moral goods. I believe that the sheer weight of counter-examples would make a thoughtful person in the position balk at DP. So, arguing for DP simply by using the maximin line looks perilous.

On the other hand, MRNR yields a more provocative argument for DP [and even for a stronger principle than DP]:

1] None of us deserves our degree of natural endowments that cause differences in wealth.
2] Therefore, disadvantaged groups already have been dealt unfair [undeserved] hands by nature.
3] Therefore, society ought to deliberately distribute social goods to help to redress these natural unfairnesses. [Societies should mitigate the unfair plight of the worst off. This conclusion calls for redistribution, whereas DP does not.]
4] If persons cannot accept 3], the least they can do is to endorse DP so that they do not WORSEN the plight of the least advantaged. Otherwise, the impoverished suffer doubly—unfairness from nature and from society.

Though I endorse 1], I reject the argument because it is still vulnerable to my primary objection against DP: some unfair distributions may have large social pay-offs. That is, even granting that no one deserves more of the pie, DP is too rigid to be morally best, all things considered.

Despite this reservation, the non-reality of desert line has a flamboyance the maximin argument lacks. The former, unlike the latter, is a clearly moral argument. So, it is less at risk in the face of conjectures [or research] about what the man-in-the-pub [or sophomore in Philosophy 200] thinks about risk. It frames the question in a compelling manner, namely ‘How wrong it is for our society to heap intentional unfairness onto persons who already suffer from the unfairness of the natural lottery of heredity and environment?’ Such a plea strikes me as more moving than the argument for DP based primarily on risk-aversive egocentrism. Finally, the argument touches both our sympathies for those who suffer [consequentialism] and our indignation at persons being treated unfairly [deontology]. So, MRNR strikes as a valuable premise in behalf of DP, whether Rawls used it or not.