I'm puzzled by a claim in Robert Kane's new book, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. In chapter 11, where Kane is talking about the importance of ultimate responsibility (UR) for free will, he attempts to show the connection between UR and the alternative possibilities condition for free will (AP). Here is the passage I have in mind:
"To understand the connection between AP and UR (alternative possibilities and ultiamte responsibility) we have to return to a claim made earlier in this chapter--that having alternative possibilities is not sufficient for free will, even if the alternative possibilities are undetermined. Some incompatibilists have thought that all one needs for free will is alternative possibilities plus indeterminism: in other words, it is sufficient for free will that we be able to do otherwise in a way that is not determined by our past" (124).
Now, I'll agree that often the almost exclusive focus on AP over UR may have given the impression that AP was more important than UR. And surely Kane (and others) are to be thanked for showing that something along the lines of UR needs our attention. But I'm puzzled that anyone would claim that satisfying AP is sufficient for free will. Does anyone know who Kane might be talking about here?