Repentance and the Will

The notion of repentance is a key notion in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic ethics, and in other views that have been inspired by these traditions. The central idea is that someone who has done wrong should go through a progression of stages -- the second stage should result from the first, the third from the second, and the fourth from the third. The first stage is the recognition of one’s wrongdoing – it is to understand that one has done wrong, what is wrong about it, and how it harms others and oneself. It includes accepting that one was the agent of wrongdoing, by contrast, for example, with believing that the act was merely a reflexive response to what someone else did. The second stage - remorse, regret, or guilt -- is a kind of emotional response that should result from recognition of one’s wrongdoing. It involves at least pain or sadness that one has done wrong. The third stage, by contrast with the first two, is forward-looking, and it involves an effort of the will. It is, at root, a commitment to refrain from the sort of wrongdoing in question, for the reason that one wants instead to do what is right. The fourth stage is restoration -- motivated by this commitment to change, one aims to restore what one has damaged. For example, to restore damaged relationships, one might be moved to confession, and sometimes also to restitution.

My question is about the third stage, which involves the will. A problem here is that often morally deficient personality characteristics (such as those we associate with Eddy’s title) seem to be resistant to the effort of will, as does the expression of these personality characteristics in action. In fact, it seems that often, given these personality characteristics, no effort of will can significantly alter these characteristics, nor can it  prevent, at some time or other, their expression in action. According to Stoic ethics, every rational, mature, non-intoxicated human being can always, by effort of will, prevent such personality characteristics from being expressed in action. Whether this is so is clearly an empirical issue, but from my observations, I would say that most such human beings are on occasion unable to do so. 

At the same time, it seems to me that our practice of reprimand (by, for example, the use of the term in Eddy’s title), presupposes that effort of will can have the effects at issue. But our evidence for the truth of this presupposition is slim -- and this is independent of the sorts of considerations that support hard determinism or hard incompatibilism. One might reply that even if it is false, we might justify expressing this presupposition in our practice because there is always a significant epistemic possibility that an effort of the will on the part of the agent could alter the personality characteristics, or could prevent the bad behavior. Still, it seems that the possibility of alteration or prevention of this sort is often not a good bet (especially after character is well-formed). So should our practice of reprimand be altered to reflect the dubiousness of the presupposition?

Comments

[Heath White]

A relevant point: it is a pretty typical bit of Christian theology that one cannot change one's nature by oneself, but only with divine help. Hence Christian repentance involves a surrender to the divine will, not merely a resolve to do better.

[Chris Franklin]

Derk,

Your post is a focused concern about the third stage of repentance of the will. You maintain that the Stoic claim about the alterability of personal characteristics by an act of will is, at least upon occasion, false. This point, coupled with the claim that our "normal" practices of reprimanding presuppose the Stoic claim, lead to your question about whether one ought to revise our reprimanding practices. Have I understood you correctly?

I think the Stoic claim can be construed in a plausible if not intuitive manner. In this way we need not consider revising our reprimanding practices. Surely one who is a referent of the title of Eddie's book cannot upon occasion refrain from expressing this trait. Even when he has decided to revise this trait there will be times where he simply cannot refrain from expressing this characteristic.

This does not however need to contradict the Stoic's claim, if we understand it as follows:

(SC) every rational, mature, non-intoxicated
human being can always, by *direct or indirect
effort* of will, prevent such personality
characteristics from being expressed in action.

The important point is the notion of indirect control over one's will. An alcoholic may not, as you claim, be able to prevent himself from expressing this trait in getting drunk. He can however, attend AA through an indirect effort of the will. By attending AA he can develop a new set of habits and through these begin to transform his character. Certainly there will be times when he slips up, but there will be an evident overall change of characteristics. This process may take a few years, but he will get to the point where he can, simply by direct effort of will, avoid alcohol. This is a rough characterization, but I think it still serves my purpose here.

I think the notion of indirect control over our personal characteristics allows one to make sense the phenomena you refer to and to maintain the Stoic's claim.

[Eddy Nahmias]

I like that this discussion seems to require some serious empirical investigation *not* into whether, say, causal determinism (or agent causation--if that's empirically "investigatable") is true, but rather into issues regarding character traits and their malleability, limitations on "will power," cognitive capacities to recognize, for instance, indirect ways of avoiding future actions that would be regretted, etc. Evidence that we did not have the requisite "abilities of the will" to the extent that we think we do (or think we need to hold people responsible) would constitute a form of "flank attack" (as I used the term in a long-ago post): a threat to both compatibilist and libertarian conditions on free will posed not by determinism but by some empirical facts about human beings and their cognitive capacities.

I'm looking for a label for the important unlabeled position of the philosopher (like me) who believes the issue of global determinism is irrelevant to the issue of free will (and hence is a compatibilist) but believes we may not have free will (or certainly do not have it to the extent we think we do). I don't like "worried compatibilist" or "troubled compatibilist", much less anything like "no-free-will compatibilist" (since I don't want to commit to the "no" part). I'd rather not use "compatibilist" in that it pays homage to the traditional incompatibilist/compatibilist debate, and the idea is to put that debate to the side. Any ideas for names? (Hopefully I'll be able to post a paper before too long on the threats to free will from social psychology, which offers one demonstration of this view).

Finally, I should clarify that I want to have a book titled "On Assholes" not because it will be about that subject (i.e. those people), but because it seems to be a good way to get on John Stewart (and probably sell a lot of copies). Would a tome on free will with that title be false advertising?

[Neil]

One thing we need to know is what a personality consists of. We don't have assholes in this country (that's a difference of idiolect, rather than of moral goodness) but if understand the word properly, their reprehensible characteristics are at least as much evaluative as volitional. Rather than not being able to refrain from acting like an asshole, they act in the way they think they (all things considered) should. In any case, we need to address the volitional and the evaluative questions separately. I agree with Chris that we also need to deal with indirect control (though the evidence from social psychology seems to suggest that indirect control is a lot more difficult than philosophers think: for addicts, for instance, there are high costs and great difficulties in structuring your environment so that you will act in the future as you now think you ought).

And I also agree, as that last comment suggests, that this issue is ripe for empirical invesitigation. There is, in fact, a mountain of empirical literature out there, which philosophers need to mine. A problem with the literature is that it is often descriptive of behavior, which leaves mechanisms frustratingly out of reach. Suppose we find (as we do) that normal agents invariably give in to temptations if they are continuous for an extended period of time. We don't know what has happened: should we assimilate the case to duress (the pain of holding out), to compulsion (the desire became stronger than it is reasoable to bear) or to some kind of distinctive volitional incapacity. Tim Bayne and I have published several papers on this empirical material, with more on the way.

Finally, getting back to Derk's question. We punish and blame for lots of reasons. Some are concerned with agent blamed, but some are concerned with other agents. Moral education and formation is an important function of blaming: we teach children our norms and how to apply them through examples, good and bad. We may even be reinforcing the norms for ourselves when we blame.

[Tom Clark]

Eddy,

You think certain sorts of fairly sophisticated capacities for self-control are necessary for ascriptions of free will and thus moral responsibility, but you’re worried we might not actually have these to the extent necessary to *really* have free will. So I’d call you an agnostic empiricist: you’re waiting for evidence to decide the issue.

My question, though, is what motivates your selection of these capacities as criteria for ascriptions of free will in advance of knowing whether we ordinarily possess them? Why not go the other way, and empirically investigate what capacities inhere in agents that we ordinarily hold responsible, and then say that these folks have free will?

[Brendan]

Eddy,

How about: On Assholes: A Defense of Free Will
or On Assholes: An essay on Free Will

I think the title works, if you add a subtitle.

Also, empirical ambivalist, or ambivalent empiricist has a nice ring to it. I think Tom is right in his analysis of your position, but I think the term 'agnostic' is boring...