Resurrecting the Paradigm Case Argument

Barry suggests at the end of the "Recent Work" thread that attributions of responsibility seem to be the default (rather than requiring justification). Let me tie this point to the the discussion about paradigm cases in the "Semi-compatibilism" thread. I'm working on a paper to resurrect something like the paradigm case argument (PCA) and I'd love to get feedback (note: I am still reading Flew's argument and trying to understand what the PCA actually is).

Rather than saying our concept of free will is tied to (and learned from) paradigm examples of free and responsible actions, it seems more likely that children attribute responsibility (or at least display proto-reactive attitudes) towards just about anything that does them wrong. Then they learn the concepts of agency, intentional action, and free and responsible action through a process of refinement (or subtraction) by paradigm cases of non-agency, unintentional action, and unfree/non-responsible action. That is, attributions of agency and responsibility are the default and we refine these attributions as we learn more about the contours of agency and the different sorts of mental states (desires, knowledge) that alter the quality of an agent's actions. For the parents out there, I hope this view resonates with you: consider how quick children are to show anger (indignation?) at not getting what they want and how hard we work to explain the cases when this results from unintentional actions, side-effects, or forces beyond our control (not that we don't also point to exemplars of intentional action and responsible agency as well).

I also hope to draw support from Peter Strawson's apt claims about the reactive attitudes being "original, natural, non-rational (not irrational), in no way something we choose or could give up" yet that we can refine our attributions of responsibility in consideration of excusing and exempting conditions, which I am suggesting we learn by paradigm cases. I also think theory of mind literature is relevant here, as it suggests children very early on attribute agency to self-moving objects and then begin to understand other agents as having desires and then beliefs and intentions.

What I need to do now is look back at the paradigm case argument and use theories of meaning and see if they help my cause or not. My hope is that by making the relevant paradigm cases the exemptions from rather than exemplars of free will, I can parry van Inwagen's refutation of the PCA. Furthermore, it seems such an argument could show that eliminativists about free will would have to show that the paradigm cases of unfreedom, such as manipulation by another agent, are no different from some global truth about agents (e.g. determinism or lack of libertarian free will)--and perhaps in a way such that ordinary people would agree that there is no difference. That is, they would have to use something like Pereboom's generalization argument (or Kane's CNC argument). And I've always thought these incompatibilist arguments are not tenable.

Anyway, any thoughts about the prospects for resurrecting the paradigm case argument in this way?

Comments

[tnadelhoffer]

I like the line of reasoning Eddy has put forward. Indeed, I think the same sort of thing can be said about other concepts as well--e.g. intentional action. It seems likely that children don't learn exemplar cases of intentional actions first, but rather unintentional actions. Later on, they come to realize that any actions that are not similar to paradigm cases of unintentional actions are intentional. The only trouble some people will still have with the paradigm case argument is that it seems to be saying that since there are exemplar cases of free will and moral responsibility (i.e. since we use these concepts in particular situations), then we must be free and morally responsible. Perhaps this is the reason why the soft-determinism of A.J. Ayer or Walter Stace (I still find the former's work on free will very valuable) unappealing. For some, being told that "free will" just means acting in the absence of external constraints and/or internal psychological abormalities does not show that we are actually free. For this reason, I think reviving the paradigm case argument would require some work in the philosophy of language--especially the question of meaning. Flew and Stace were both in the grips of the later Wittgenstein's views on meaning as use--a view that has been in disfavor post Kripke/Putnam. In any event, I think Eddy is also correct to suggest that if the paradigm case argument can be recast in the negative--so to speak--then the only viable way of responding will be to use something like Pereboom's generalization strategy.

[Tamler Sommers]

Here's a response from the skeptic's corner, Eddy. Elimitavists can agree with your DESCRIPTIVE story about the how the reactive attitudes and attributions of responsibility develop. We'll agree that it has its origin in childhood development in humans, and perhaps more importantly, that it has strong evolutionary underpinnings. Robert Trivers and Robert Frank both argue persuasively that retributive attitudes like outrage and resentment can be adaptive, even when they go against the short term self-interest of the individual. We see examples of resentment or "moralized aggression" in Chimpanzees, Gorillas, and, according to the great new study, capuchin monkeys. The key point though is that for these attitudes to be perform their function, the object does not REALLY need to be responsible. They only need to be able to detect that you will react in a retributive manner if you try to wrong them in some way.

But there's still the question of whether these attitudes, and the attributions of responsibility that underlie them, "make sense." Human beings as they evolved in the Pleistocene, chimpanzees, capuchins, and small children can feel outrage and indignation without fearing a logical inconsistency in their worldview. But as the capacity for rational reflection emerges, along with the desire to develop a consistent worldview, we may start to wonder whether these "natural" attitudes and emotions fit with our other beliefs about the world. Moreover, we have to be on guard since we know that we are predisposed to experience these attitudes, whether they make sense or not. Entire belief systems (libertarian free will?) may have developed in order to justify certain “irrational” emotions. (This is of course speculative to the highest degree.)

So what you're describing, and what P.F. Strawson so brilliantly brought to the forefront of the debate, seems to me like part of an error theory for (strong) moral responsibility, rather than a way of justifying it. And Strawson's assertion that an attitude like resentment is in no way something we could give up is an empirical one. I suspect he's wrong. If we determine that an attitude like resentment presupposes something we now think is false, I think we could make great strides in doing away with it. Perhaps we can never fully eliminate the visceral feeling of resentment in certain situationsm although this may be a long term goal, or the target of certain meditative practices. But we can be more modest about our aims. We can simply recognize that this at times unavoidable feeling is never justified, and so resolve not to let resentment guide our actions. (Paul Russell has great things to say about this in his essay "Strawson’s Way of Naturalizing Responsibility.")

[Tamler Sommers]

I think I strayed a bit from the topic, so here's one last quick thing to tie it together.

Thomas wrote in his reply to Eddy: "The only trouble some people will still have with the paradigm case argument is that it seems to be saying that since there are exemplar cases of free will and moral responsibility (i.e. since we use these concepts in particular situations), then we must be free and morally responsible."

I think this is a big problem, especially since these concepts are underlied by highly adaptive emotions and attitudes. (More precisly, by emotions and attitudes that likely are adaptations, i.e. that evolved because of their contributions to fitness in ancestral environments.) This should give us even more reason to be suspicious of these concepts, and not assume their reality simply because we commonly employ them.