Feeling Chippy, Part 2

Friday posts are fun! Just make some polemical remarks, then be away from the office for a few days while the comments erupt. (Ideas for this Friday’s polemical post: Why compatibilists are weasels! Why pessimistic incompatibilists have no style! Why libertarians really want their mamas!)Thanks for the many thoughtful comments and reactions, especially to Andrei and Rico for doing the hard work while Dan and I did whatever it was we were doing while you guys posted.

To recap: the issue is the role our desires for libertarian agency ought to play in our development and acceptance of a libertarian theory. (This was raised in the context of the issue of whether or not we should go revisionist about concepts of free will and moral responsibility, on the assumption that libertarianism correctly describes our commonsense concepts of these things, that it is problematic in various ways, and that as a consequence, we should go in for a revision of our concept. We’re also ignoring interesting evidence that commonsense thinking might not be as libertarian as many take it to be- go read the work of the FSU Free Will Liberation Front). Here’s how I take things to stack up: Andrei and I say we want our philosophical theories to be truth-mongering sorts of enterprises, and that as such, we don’t think there is much role for the “I’d be really disappointed if the (I lack libertarian agency/my brother is dead/ Salma isn’t wooing me)” considerations, at least with respect to evaluating a theory or position in the free will debate. There may be prudential reasons for accepting these considerations in various contexts, but in the land of philosophy we should be deaf to such considerations (Andrei, feel free to disown any words I’m putting into your mouth). Dan and Rico are more, shall I say, catholic (Manuel says with a smile) in their conception of what sorts of things should play a role in how we think about a theory or a position in the free will debate. The suggestion seems to be that other considerations might be able to count, depending on how the goal of inquiry is construed.

So tell me more about what you think the goal of inquiry in free will debates is about. In particular, say more about what role the “I want it” considerations ought to play, at least at the first stage of things. If, internal to the free will debates, philosophy should be doing something besides constructing truth-mongering theories, what should it be doing?

Here’s one thing that could happen when we get an answer to this question: folks with my inclinations might say “Well, that’s very interesting Dan & Rico, but that’s not the sort of philosophical project I want to pursue.” I might even think it is a worthwhile project, but just not the project that I want to pursue, or (perhaps) that philosophers, qua philosophers, ought to pursue. And of course, they might think the same thing about my “philosophy as truth-mongering” view. At this point, though, what might have looked like an argument about libertarianism now looks like a difference in philosophical method masquerading as an argument about libertarianism. This would be a very interesting result. Like Richard Double, I am much inclined to think that significant chunks of debates about free will turn on unarticulated but differing conceptions of the philosophical enterprise, and I wonder if that isn’t what is going on here.

But first I want to know more about the conception of philosophical work in this domain that has interests beyond constructing truth-mongering theories.

Comments

[Tamler Sommers]

To continue in the polemical vein, Hume had it right when he wrote:

"There is no method of reasoning more common, and yet none more blameable, than, in philosophical disputes, to endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis, but a pretence of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality. When any opinion leads absurdities, it is certainly false; but it is not certain that an opinion is false because it is of dangerous consequence." (On Liberty and Necessity)

Even the most rigorous, tough-minded philosophers (Hume himself!) have difficulty accepting a view that denies free will and moral responsibility.

But I wonder why libertarians are the only ones who get accused of committing the "I want it so it must be true" fallacy. It seems to me that most compatibilists are just as guilty of this. Their strategies are different, sure, and they do not posit the existence of libertarian agency. But would anyone deny that they are strongly motivated by a desire to save moral responsibility? Look at Susan Wolf's "The Importance of Free Will." Or P.F. Strawson, for that matter.

In my own work, I call arguments of this type “Lady Vanishes" arguments, in honor of the Hitchcock film of that name, and in particular of the two cricket fans that appear in it. Late in the film, one of the cricket fans is informed that a car has been detached from the train they've been traveling on. He responds: “that’s impossible—our luggage was on that car.”

The irony of it all is that nowhere near enough work has been done to try to discover what the implications of denying free will truly are. It may be, as Spinoza, Diderot, Einstein, Darwin, Waller, Skinner, and Pereboom (among others) believe, that we would be better off not attributing strong accountability to ourselves and others. But whatever the answer is to that question, it seems to me that there is no reason to think that the universe tailors itself to our hopes and needs.

Respectfully,

Tamler

[Manuel]

While I think it is right that there is no reason to suppose that the universe tailors itself to our hopes and needs, I'm not sure I understand why we should suppose that this entails that there is NO free will, even if we assume (1) commonsense thinking is committed to libertarianism and (2) libertarianism is implausible. Why not just think free will is different than we tend to suppose?

Historically, conceptual change cases have been varied (e.g., we didn't give up on thinking there was water when we decided it wasn't one of the four basic indivisible substances of the universe). I think some of Hilary's comments in the "The truth about libertarianism" post are relevant here- if we have a set of concepts that does some work for us (e.g., helps us to organize praise, blame, punishment, etc.), and if we can justify continued usage of these concpets on grounds independent of somewhat different grounds than we perhaps ordinarily presume (my view, probably not hers), why shouldn't that be good enough to merit keeping the name? In the case of responsibility, this seems especially compelling- if we have an account that does all the work we expected our commonsense notion of responsibility to do (e.g., tell us when to praise and blame, etc.) it seems excessively demanding to insist that can't be responsibility just because some (as it turns out, largely unnecessary) pre-theoretical commitments didn't survive.

[Rico Vitz]

Let me attempt to clarify my take on 'truth-relevant' and 'value-relevant' considerations as they relate to the free will debate.

One the one hand, we, as philosophers, might (so to speak) throw all of the 'truth-relevant' and 'value-relevant' considerations for a theory on one side of a scale and all the 'truth-relevant' and 'value-relevant' considerations against a theory on the other side of the scale, see which way the scale tips, and elect to adopt or reject the theory based on this weighing. I reject this kind of pragmatic approach to philosophical problems. (I think Manuel and Dan do as well. Correct?)

On the other hand, we might argue that what one takes to be 'truth-relevant' considerations are influenced by their 'value-relevant' considerations. Put in other terms, what a person takes to be 'sufficient evidence' for a theory may depend on the things that s/he values (and the extent to which s/he values them). For instance, the extent to which Dan and Manuel value Dan's hypothetical brother, who is hypothetically MIA, influences what each takes to be 'sufficient evidence' to believe in Dan's hypothetical brother's demise.

Dan's point, as I understand it, is that the value of our folk concepts should lead us to raise the bar with respect to what we take to be 'sufficient evidence' for rejecting them. Now, fellow Garden bloggers ('fellow' used here in a gender-inclusive sense), whether you agree with Dan's conclusion, do you agree with the point regarding the influence on what one values for what one counts as 'sufficient evidence' for a theory?

[Tamler Sommers]

Manuel,

First, I never said that disallowing wishful thinking ENTAILS that there is no such thing as free will. I only echoed that the desirability of free will--if it is desirable--counts as no evidence that it exists.

As for why we should deny free will rather than think it "different than we tend to suppose"--this is purely a terminological question. To me, the capacity to be "strongly accountable" (to use Gary Watson's extremely useful term) or "just-desert responsible" (to use Waller's), is a necessary condition for free will. Denying strong accountability therefore means denying free will. If you want to redefine free will so that it does not involve strong accountability, that's fine. But won't that just confuse matters?

All this leads me to observe that the "free will" debate is really a debate over the existence of strong accountability. Everyone-- incompatibilist and compatibilist, skeptic and libertarian--agrees that we are weakly accountable and reason-responsive, that we can form higher order volitions, that we have hypothetical freedom, take-charge responsibility, etc. The disagreement, where there is one, is over whether we can be deserving of blame or praise for our actions. (And over whether any of the above capacities are sufficient in this regard). The skeptic says no. Most compatibilists and all libertarians say yes. The skeptical view is radical enough, I think, to warrent eliminativism with regard to "free will."

Of course, I could be wrong about this. Does anyone out there think there's a genuine disagreement over anything BESIDES the existence of strong accountability (just-desert moral responsibility)?

[Manuel]

Rico-

I guess I'm being thick-headed here, but I still don't get why I should take the value-considerations of a concept to raise the bar with respect to "sufficient evidence" for rejecting a view, in specifically philosophical context.

I don't find Dan's hypothetical brother to be a usefully analogous case. Suppose, though, that we were collectively constructing a philosophical theory about the status of Dan's brother. I can't see why consideration about his importance should change how we think about the plausibility that he is alive. Value considerations might give Dan reason to hope, and there might be good moral considerations in favor of his being a bad believer in his brothers demise (it reflects well on Dan's commitment to his brother, it might lead him to undertake heroic rescue efforts, etc.). But again, why should any of this be countenanced in the construction of philosophical theory we'd like OTHER people to believe, too?

I don't deny that as a matter of course, value considerations DO affect people's willingness to believe or disbelieve various things. But I take it you guys are making more than a descriptive psychological point, and are instead making a normative point that (at least in some cases) value-considerations ought to play a role. What I want to know is why I should think that, and what the principle is that tells me when I get to let value considerations count in favor or against accepting a standard of "sufficient evidence."

[Michael Cholbi]

I think there's a kind of neglected Kant-ish/Kantian position here too, according to which
(a) we should follow truth-relevant considerations as far as they will take us, but ...
(b) in the case of the debate about free will, those considerations don't take us all the way, to wit, they deductively establish neither the truth nor the falsity of the proposition that human beings have free will, so
(c) we are then free (!) to settle the matter by value-relevant considerations (not just 'I'd sure like to be free dammit!' but also considerations about the objectivity of morality, the intelligibility of responsibility-ascriptions, etc.), which, I suppose Kant and Kantians think, favor affirming that proposition rather than denying it.

I've always thought this an intriguing general line of argument, with (b) being the clear sticking point, since one has to show that standards arguments against free will (van Inwagen, etc.) from lawlike causal explanation fail. Just throwing this out there.

[tnadelhoffer]

In response to Tamler: I have to say that as far as I can tell the notion of "ultimate moral responsibility" (UMR)--the heaven and hell variety discussed by Galen Strawson--is the main bone of contention among the various parties in the free will debate. Some suggesting that we have it, hence we must have libertarian free will; some saying that since we don't have libertarian free will, we don't have UMR; while yet others claiming that we could accomodate UMR even if we don't have libertarian free will. Indeed, if at least some philosophers didn't think that lacking free will posed any problems for the kind of robust notions of retributive desert and justice espoused by the likes of Kant and Hegel, then I see no reason why anyone would be at all that interested in the "free will debate." If it were entirely clear that I would still be FULLY justified in holding someone morally responsible for their actions even if they were wholly unfree, then this would seemingly render unintelligible an argument for libertarian free will such as van Inwagen's whereby because we are morally responsible (just ask anyone!), we must be free. In any event, I should also say that I agree with Tamler that a number of compatibilists are guilty of assuming that since moral responisbility requires that we are free, we must have the sort of free will required. However, I disagree with the suggestion that moral responsibility is a necessary condition of free will--this seems to me to place the cart before the horse.

[Andrei A. Buckareff]

Given that I'm pressed for time at the moment, I'll just go on the record as saying that Manuel got my sentiments correct. And I continue to be a cheerleader in Manuel's corner.

I'll jump into the fray soon. There's just too much good stuff to reply to.

[Hilary Bok]

Michael Cholbi: I don't think that's actually Kant's position. As I understand it, his view is that theoretical reason does not show that we are free, but that practical reason does. Practical reason doesn't mean the sort of 'value-relevant' factors under discussion here; it means rational proofs of claims about what we should do (and other claims that are established either in the course of thinking about what we should do, or that follow from claims about what we should do.)

[Michael Cholbi]

Hilary- Thank you. I was speaking loosely, and I'll bow to your greater expertise on Kant. You're certainly right that what Kant aimed to do was to show that free will was an essential supposition of practical reason. I guess this struck me as akin to a 'value-relevant' consideration in that for Kant (I think), we cannot prove freedom on theoretical or metaphysical grounds, but nor can we disprove it on such grounds. Hence, Kant has recourse to practical reason for his proofs of free will. Do you find this overall approach to free will attractive?

[Rico Vitz]

Thanks for your comments, Manuel (and Andrei). I’m finding the discussion helpful. Let me make two, brief, points.

The first is regarding the fact that ‘value-relevant’ considerations do affect people’s philosophical judgments. This is important since many philosophers seem to act as if they are unaware of this fact.

The second is regarding why philosophers should think that ‘value-relevant’ considerations ought to affect the way in which they evaluate ‘truth-relevant’ considerations. Let’s see; what do you (and Andrei) make of the following principle (or something like it): The care with which we assess the evidence for a philosophical theory and the speed with which we close an enquiry regarding the theory ought to be proportionate to the significance of the theory for common life. So, regarding Dan’s ‘original position’ (not to be confused with some other philosopher’s position by that same name), I take it that he thinks libertarian free will is a position with respect to which philosophers are too quickly closing their enquiry.

Is that right, Dan, are you basically calling Manuel and his ilk a bunch of ‘quitters’? (Incidentally, I’m working awfully hard here to offer a defense of your position — or at least the principle behind the position. Feel free to jump in any time and help a man out.)

[Rico Vitz]

Thinking out loud: Perhaps where we differ, Manuel, is whether there is such a thing as a "specifically philosophical context." I'm working through this as I type, but it seems to me that philosophical enquiry is just part of common life.

[Andrei A. Buckareff]

A lot has been going on since I last commented, but I'd like to offer some further comments on the points made by Rico. Manuel has already made a point I wished to make--viz, that if value considerations influence theory acceptance, that's an interesting psychological observation (but it doesn't seem that one ought to be guided by such considerations in doing philosophy), and, I would add, perhaps one should do so when prudential considerations outweigh theoretical considerations.

This brings me to points made by Rico in his last two comments. He asked what Manuel and I think of the following principle: "The care with which we assess the evidence for a philosophical theory and the speed with which we close an enquiry regarding the theory ought to be proportionate to the significance of the theory for common life." This strikes me as an invitation to remaining entrenched in one's philosophical prejudices because having a settled view is necessary for one to get on with things, if you will (I hope I'm being fair). It's because of questions like this that I made the distinction between one accepting the truth of a proposition or a theory for prudential reasons versus theoretical reasons. One may have to accept that p at t because if one does not do so, one cannot get on with whatever task one is trying to accomplish. This is probably not the most epistemically responsible thing to do, especially if one is not convinced that her evidence supports the truth of p. But prudential, moral, and practical considerations broadly may put pressure on one to accept that p. But if we are engaged in the task of trying to discover what theory is most likely true--i.e., is best supported by the available evidence, then there is no substitute for carefully considering the evidence. Does it matter what the subject of investigation is? I cannot think of any reason why it should. But is there room for a modest epistemic conservatism that allows some privelege for one's current beliefs? I think so. But there must be a continued openness to evaluating evidence for the truth of a theory.

What is the relevance of my comments thus far for Rico's question (and how it relates to his attempt to understand Dan's position)? I cannot see why persons like Manuel and myself are "quitters". We are claiming that revising our concepts seems to be in order because centuries of reflection on the topic of free will has yielded little by way of progress when it comes to defending the standard views. Does this mean that libertarianism is false? That's not obvious to me. Responsible inquiry will leave it an open question--especially if the evidence does not conclusively rule it out as an explanation of the conscious phenomenon of feeling free or the best way to understand the concept of free agency. But it seems that at least some versions of libertarianism (just as some versions of compatibilism) are hopeless. Even defenders of the tradition admit to this--just compare Tim O'Connor's defense of the agency theory to earlier defenses by Campbell, Chisholm, Reid, and Taylor for evidence of this. Being dissatisfied (for theoretical reasons) with defenses of traditional libertarianism (and even some versions of compatibilism) should provide enough of an impetus and justification for "moving on", as it were, and exploring other options and even examining our metaphilosophical assumptions that have guided inquiry and making changes in method if necessary. Proceeding in such a way hardly strikes me as the strategy of a quitter--even if one contends that radical conceptual revision is necessary because of failed attempts at conceptual clarification along more traditional lines.

Finally, is philosophical inquiry a part of everyday life? Well, yes and no. One's answer, I suppose, depends upon what is meant by 'philosophical inquiry'. Michael Stocker has a nice example of the difficulty a philosopher faces reading a poem full of fallacies of reasoning--or just think of how difficult it is to watch many movies full of glaring inconsistencies. We're trained to think a certain way. But it seems there is a difference between what I do in my armchair (or in a labcoat or within close proximity of someone in a labcoat?) and what happens when I notice a fallacy in a poem, sermon, or editorial. For one, my responses in the various circumstances will be different. This does not mean that what I do qua philosopher has no direct implications for what happens in my daily life. It is just that there does seem to be a real difference between what I do in different contexts, and I'm not sure I want to be as liberal in my use of the term 'philosophical inquiry'as Rico suggests.

[Rico Vitz]

Andrei, you suggest that my concerns about the relation of philosophy to ordinary affairs strikes you "as an invitation to remaining entrenched in one's philosophical prejudices because having a settled view is necessary for one to get on with things." I just don't see why that would be the case. My concern is that we recognize that philosophical inquiry is one of many things we do and we need to be responsible, continually, both to seeking the truth and (for lack of a better phrase) to seeking the good. Perhaps we can pursue this more later, but I fear we are straying from the central thread. So, I'll stop for now.

[Josh Bright]

In Rico & Dan's defense (sorry in advance for the long post):

Manuel writes: "I don't deny that as a matter of course, value considerations DO affect people's willingness to believe or disbelieve various things. But I take it you guys are making more than a descriptive psychological point, and are instead making a normative point that (at least in some cases) value-considerations ought to play a role. What I want to know is why I should think that, and what the principle is that tells me when I get to let value considerations count in favor or against accepting a standard of "sufficient evidence."

While I'm not sure that I can come up with a principle for you, it seems to me that a reasonable answer to the first question is that you really don't have any choice in the matter. Paul Helm makes this interesting point in his book Belief Policies, and I'm persuaded by it. When we're considering a theory or, more simply, and individual belief, there is no self-evident standard of sufficient evidence, or justification, other than perhaps certainty. As we all know, our theories unfortunately typically fall far short of that standard.

In the absence of certainty, however, how is it that I determine what the standard of sufficient evidence for a theory is, or when I should stop inquiry? Gilbert Harman addresses the latter issue in an article whose name escapes me at the moment. Practical/pragmatic/value concerns, I think, enter here of necessity. Even if someone attemps to appeal to an evidence-based history of success to support a certain criterion, they are inevitably importing value judgments in their concept of success (ability to get around the world, or achieve certain goals, etc.)

It seems to me that there are two different ways in which value/practical issues can enter our beliefs or philosophical inquiry. The first is when we simply believe something because we want to, if that's possible, or disbelieve because we can't deal with the implications. This is of course problematic. When we allow our wishes to function as evidence, positive support for belief, then I think we've done something very wrong epistemically.

The second, however, is when we allow value/practical considerations to influence the standards for sufficient evidence or justification. As I said, I think this happens all the time, and is no more clearly vicious simply because I'm aware of it. The analogy Rico used is useful here. If we think of beliefs as having to clear a bar in order to be believed justifiedly, then the first type of example corresponds to letting our desires boost a belief up over the bar. This is problematic because belief should be governed by truth, that is, only things which make a belief more probable should move it up over the bar. The second type of case corresponds to our value considerations affecting the height of the bar. Here evidence is still the only thing that can get a belief to clear the bar, so belief is still governed by truth. I'm just arguing that acknowledging belief's truth-governed character doesn't clearly set the bar at a particular place.

Now, I'll hedge a bit. It does seem to me that one can set the bar too low, that one can be too credulous. There is probably a certain range in which we're being epistemically responsible, and outside of which we're not. But this doesn't change the fundamental point, which is that value considerations affect belief and theoretical inquiry in general, and "should" (I guess) do so. So if Dan and Rico, while possessing positive evidence for the truth of a libertarian conception, keep the bar somewhat lower, or keep an inquiry open, based in part on value considerations, then they're doing nothing wrong by the way of their minds. Dan may be doing so in a variety of other ways, ;-) but that's a subject for another post.

Of course, I may have missed the dialectic, if the accusations were coming from Dan to Manuel, then my point might support his "revisionist" project as well. But not his point about value considerations and belief.

[Manuel]

Josh- thanks for the thoughtful post. I hope it doesn't get ignored just because this thread is a few days old now.

I'm still not totally sold on the idea that normative considerations can play an appropriate role in setting the level of the bar (I worry that if they can, we end up with something that is not fundamentally different than the bad way for values to influence beliefs- i.e., by believing something because we want to). I'm also inclined to think that Dan and Rico probably have less positive evidence for the truth of the libertarian conception than they think (though they doubtlessly disagree!)- I'm not even sure what evidence there is for it, apart from our wanting a certain self-conception to be true (bearing in mind that I think introspective arguments are largely crap, to use a technical term). But there is probably room for reasonable disagreement about these points.

But how about this for an end run around the Dan & Rico & Josh view:
(1) let's figure out what those value considerations are that affect where the libertarian wants to set the bar
(2) Once we know what those value considerations are, let's see if a revisionist (or other) theory can make good on those considerations independent of a libertarian picture of agency (I know libertarians will think no, but first tell us what those considerations are so that we can at least see if they can be captured!)
(3) If those value considerations can be adequately captured by a non-libertarian view, then there is little reason to hold on to the libertarianism (provided one also thinks that the metaphysics of agency proposed by the non-libertarian view is more plausible than one's favored libertarian view). On the other hand, if the non-libertarian view can't capture all of those value considerations, then perhaps we can argue about which package of commitments makes more sense given their comparative success at capturing both truth-relevant considerations and the value considerations that affect where we set the evidential bar.

[Josh Bright]

Manuel,

Thanks for your thoughts. I share your worries about value considerations setting the bar. However, because I have found myself so thoroughly convinced by Helm's point (that these things necessarily affect where the bar is set), I suspect that alleviating our fears will involve determining a range like I mentioned in my last post, inside of which someone is acting rationally, though I'm not sure if that's a distinctively epistemic rationality or rather some kind of "all things considered" rationality involved here(there's a dissertation lurking around here somewhere). I also guess I agree that the distinction between where the bar is set and the things that clear it is not a hard and fast one, though again I think this leads to a task of describing the range or influence that is permissible. On a point relating directly to responsibility, I should say that I think that these things have interesting implications for our responsibility for our beliefs. I'm also afraid of a kind of radical relativism about standards here, but I don't think the view necessarily devolves into that.

Regarding evidence, I guess I'll just say what others have said, that it seems to me that the phenomenology provides some evidence here, though I'll happily confess that I need to look into this issue further.

And regarding your project, it certainly sounds interesting and like a worthy endeavor. I do think that your parenthetical comment on the third point is important, because I think that in the case of many libertarians, myself included, the metaphysical disagreements with revisionists and others are often deeper and broader than just issues of agency, or perhaps I should say that the disagreements about agency and responsibility flow out of broader and deeper disagreements. It may be that the libertarians are mistaken about the nature of the disagreements specifically regarding agency & responsibility in particular, and need to be disabused of them. If this is the case, then it sounds like you're just the person to do it. :-)